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Management Summary 
 
The European airline industry is experiencing a trend towards consolidation, and many 
carriers are contesting in a highly competitive environment. From 2011 – 2015, the 
number of scheduled airlines operating within Europe declined by over 70, and the 
growing influence of large players such as the Lufthansa Group or the IAG Holding 
challenges small airlines in their economic viability. Consequently, small firms must find 
new strategic solutions to secure their continuing existence. 
 
The aim of this study was to clarify the chances of survival for small airlines, and if selling 
the company proactively through an M&A auction could be a beneficial solution to the 
consolidation trend. Therein, the focus lies in maximizing the transaction price and 
ensuring the continuity of the brand. Additionally, the study intended to identify key 
criteria and stumbling blocks for small airlines considering to follow such a strategy. 
 
To facilitate the understanding of airline consolidation, this study introduced the 
differences between the US and the European markets. Literature review and expert 
interviews were used to conduct a trend and market analysis. To reveal key strengths, the 
collected data also served in the evaluation of other strategic tools such as the SWOT and 
value chain analysis. 
 
The trend analysis concluded that consolidation will pick up speed and scope, yet in 
contrast to the US, European airline groups follow multi-branding strategies due to 
market fragmentation. The pursuit of higher cost-efficiency may lead to future mega-
mergers in Europe. Hence, the chances of survival for small airlines were rated as low. 
The market analysis outlined that the power of buyers as well as the industry rivalry 
inhibit a small airline’s capacity to compete on price. Furthermore, their key value chain 
factors to safe costs were identified in Human Resources, Logistics, and Marketing and 
Sales. This was congruent with the findings in the SWOT, which discovered the lower 
salaries and the operational flexibility to be the main strength of small airlines. The thesis 
showed that takeover pressures are inevitable, but proactivity can positively impact on 
the transaction price, since there is no immediate need to sell. Merger success factors 
were found in the Strategic Niche, the Organizational fit such as the availability of planes, 
and the alignment of the airline Staff to maintain the aforementioned cost advantage.  
 III 
 
Concluding, the study suggested that key criteria for the auction to yield a positive 
outcome are proactivity, prudent market foresight, the leverage of success factors, and a 
clean operational history. Conversely, the misalignment of staff, the inability to make 
concessions, the lack of a raison d’être, and the perceived desperation by the buyer could 
be major stumbling blocks. By extension, this means the key criteria and their impact 
should be carefully studied within the organization, and resources should be assigned as 
to their efficient management. Last, wider research into the development of a framework 
for such airline auctions is recommended in order to guide executives in building a 
business case. 
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V. Glossary 
 
 
Aircraft, Crew, 
Maintenance, Insurance 
(ACMI) 
A wet-lease option in which the operator sells the 
tickets and brands the flight, but hires the rest from a 
second operator. This operator provides everything 
else to fly the route, including the aircraft and crew. 
(Swoboda, 2016) 
 
Airport Slot Gives an airline the right to operate from and to an 
airport at a given time; usually used if the number of 
takeoffs and landings at an airport are restricted due to 
certain constraints, such as the number of parking 
spaces or limited opening hours. Airport slots can be 
acquired or traded and can be extremely valuable 
(Eurocontrol, 2016). 
 
Available Seat Kilometers 
(ASK) 
Method to measure flight passenger capacity; the 
number of available seats on scheduled flights 
multiplied by the number of kilometers they are flown 
(AirlineGeeks.com, 2015) 
 
Buy-on-Board A service concept in which the passenger can 
purchase additional services on board such as food 
and drinks 
 
Charter A type of non-scheduled air service (Eurocontrol, 
2005, p. 39) 
 
Commercial Air Flight An air transport flight performed for the transport of 
passengers and/or freight and mail, for remuneration 
or for hire (Eurocontrol, 2005, p. 16).   
 
Commercial Air Service An air transport flight or series of flights for the public 
transport of passengers and/or freight and mail, for 
remuneration or for hire (Eurocontrol, 2005, p. 16).  
 
Goodwill Arises when a company pays a premium on the value 
of the company it acquires. Goodwill is shown in the 
the purchased company’s asset side of the balance 
sheet. 
 
Large Carrier / Airline For the purpose of this thesis, any airline with a fleet 
size of more than 200 aircraft, or more than 40m 
carried passengers per annum 
 
Legacy / Network Carrier Refers to the traditional airline carriers (what used to 
be the ‘national’ airlines) that operate an extensive 
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global route network, in contrast to the new business 
model of Low-Cost Carriers 
Long-Haul Traffic flow, for which every airport-to-airport 
distance is more than to 4000 km (Eurocontrol, 2005, 
p. 13). 
 
Medium Carrier / Airline Any airline with a fleet size of more than 50 aircraft, 
or less than 40m carried passengers per annum 
 
Medium-Haul Traffic flow, for which every airport-to-airport 
distance is more than 1500 km and less than or equal 
to 4000 km (Eurocontrol, 2005, p. 13).    
 
Non-scheduled air service A commercial air service other than scheduled air 
service (Eurocontrol, 2005, p. 16).  
 
Revenue Passenger 
Kilometers (RPK) 
Method to measure demand for air travel by 
calculating the kilometers flown by paying 
passengers; obtained by multiplying the number of 
revenue passengers by the kilometers flown  
(AirlineGeeks.com, 2016) 
 
Scheduled air service 
(scheduled airline) 
A commercial air service operated according to a 
published timetable, or with such a regular frequency 
that it constitutes an easily recognizable systematic 
series of flights (Eurocontrol, 2005, p. 16). 
 
Short-Haul Traffic flow, for which every airport-to-airport 
distance is less than or equal to 1500 km (Eurocontrol, 
2005, p. 13). 
 
Small Carrier / Airline Airlines with a fleet of less than 50 aircraft, or less 
than 5m carried passengers per annum 
 
Vertical Range (of 
Manufacturing) 
The degree of how deep a firms knows the special 
market or segment that it particularly takes care of 
(Trestl, Appendix 11.1.2) 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the topic 
 
The focus of this thesis is the consolidation in the European airline industry, 
especially concerning small carriers competing against the growing influence of large 
players. In the US for example, mega-mergers and industry wide consolidation have 
brought 10 major airlines down to just four big ones – in a time span of only 12 years 
(Yellin, n.d.). Though the American and European markets differ (as outlined under 
section 2), Robertson (2017) reports that similar consolidation trends are to be expected 
in Europe, and are even welcomed. The recent events of the Air Berlin bankruptcy, as 
well as the struggles of Alitalia and just lately Air France (Bryan & Lawson, 2018) are 
growing signs of how the pressure for cost reduction and synergy creation drives 
consolidation.  
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
Consolidation trends in the airline industry suggest that at some point in the future, 
many small carriers may be confronted with mergers and acquisitions (M&A) pressures 
from large players. Recent events in Europe (Alitalia, Air Berlin, Monarch, and Air 
France) also indicate that buyers are reluctant to purchase grounded airlines in one piece 
but rather cherry-pick the parts most suitable to them i.e. tear the companies apart (Enz, 
2018). Overcapacity has increased the reduction of air ticket fares (King, 2017). 
Confronted with these pressures, the question arises how small airlines should respond, 
and what their chances of survival are in this consolidation-driven environment. Thus, the 
research question is: to survive in one piece, could it be beneficial for small sized airline 
carriers to prepare themselves to be sold on their own terms? And to succeed in such 
negotiations, what is crucial in this process and what are the buyer’s areas of interest to 
make him buy the entire airline? To answer this question, the stumbling blocks and key 
success factors possibly imperative in the process of preparation are also examined.  
 
1.3 Knowledge gap 
 
Current research provides extensive information about airline consolidation, the 
M&A-mechanics, and the respective industry trends. Quantitative as well as qualitative 
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industry analyses are easily accessible. However, specific information about how small 
airlines may prepare themselves to be sold and what the respective success criteria might 
look like is missing. Rather, only general information about success factors in M&A 
transactions are available. This thesis aims to close this gap by providing research in this 
field and presenting possible and specific implications of such airline transactions. 
 
1.4 Research objective 
 
The findings of this study should support the understanding of the nature of the 
consolidation trend in Europe and provide a basis for further research. To exemplify some 
cases, focus is put on the Swiss market and the respective players. However, results 
should, to some degree, be generally valid for small airlines. The aim is to lay the grounds 
for developing a framework small airlines may follow in order to set themselves up for 
an auction process. Instead of going bankrupt and then being divided piece by piece, such 
a framework may help small airlines find a way to co-exist amongst large industry players 
without being swallowed by them, while losing their brand and corporate identity 
completely (as has been the case in many US Airline mergers). 
 
1.5 Viewpoint and aim 
 
When referring to the small airline in general, the respective parties targeted in 
this thesis are the executive management and major shareholders. In the most favorable 
case, their intentions are aligned, and this thesis assumes that their goal is to:  
 
1. Ensure the continuation of business operations under their own brand and 
protect the interests of the company stakeholders (such as its employees) and, 
2. in case of a transaction, maximize the generated revenue for the shareholders 
 
The following section will introduce the nature and roots of aviation market 
consolidation and outline the differences between the highly consolidated American 
airline industry and the European aviation sector. 
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2 Introduction to airline market consolidation 
 
This section introduces the dynamics behind market consolidation. Thereafter, it 
presents the current state of consolidation in both the American and European markets. 
Lastly, it gives an overview of the Swiss market and the respective airlines. 
 
 The definition for consolidation used for this thesis is the process of combining 
two entities (companies) into a single firm (Kocic, 2017). This consolidation can take 
different forms and can be executed using different strategic options, such as mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The form and intensity varies according to industry type and the 
respective players competing in the business environment. Christensen (2016) explains 
that industries go through three stages of consolidation (Fragmentation, Acquisition, 
Expansion), with each stage having its own dynamics and offering opportunities for 
companies to expand.  
 
Figure 1 The consolidation curve (own illustration, adapted from Deans et al., 2002) 
 
 
Deans, Kroeger, & Zeisel (2002) went a step further and developed a simple 
model of the industry consolidation life cycle called the ‘consolidation curve’ as seen in 
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Figure 1. In their model, Deans et al. (2002) show that industries go through four stages, 
namely Opening (stage 1), Scale (stage 2), Focus (stage 3), and finally, Balance and 
Alliance (stage 4). According to the authors of the model, the consolidation life cycle is 
usually kicked off by the formation or deregulation of an industry. Moreover, companies 
can, to some degree of accuracy, map their position in the cycle (Deans et al., 2002). 
 
As presented in Figure 1, industries move in an S-curve through the different 
stages, with industry concentration (i.e. combined market share of top three players) first 
dropping before consolidation starts to continuously increase it again. The stages can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Opening 
The new industry forms or is deregulated, and combined market share of the three 
largest players quickly drops to between 10 and 30 percent. This stage features fierce 
competition, new entrants, and start-ups. Deans et al. (2002) state that during stage 1, 
companies should focus on revenue rather than profit, and aim for increased market share. 
 
2. Scale 
Stage two is about building scale, and as consolidation sets in rapidly, large 
players emerge and buy up smaller firms. Deans et al. (2002) conclude that in stage two, 
the top three players will hold combined market share of 15 – 45 percent. The authors 
also mention that airlines are typically found in this stage. They further suggest that 
companies in stage two should direct resources towards their M&A skills, learn how to 
preserve their core cultures and competitive advantage, and develop models for quick 
integration of acquired targets.  
 
3. Focus 
The consolidation frenzy of stage two leaves the top three players in stage three 
holding between 35 and 70 percent market share. According to Deans et al. (2002), 
businesses continue to aggressively outgrow competition, and stage three features a series 
of mega-deals as the goal is to emerge as the undisputed industry leader. Emphasis should 
be put on core capabilities and profitability, quick response to start-up competitors, and 
the identification of other players that are likely to survive into the final stage. 
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4. Balance and Alliance 
As seen in Figure 1, stage four is dominated by the giants that survived all other 
stages – the top three players now claim around 70 – 90 percent market share. Firms stay 
in this stage, and now have to defend their position. This can be done by forming alliances, 
or finding new ways to grow the core business (Deans et al., 2002). 
 
Deans et al. (2002) conclude that it is imperative for companies to manage their 
ability to react quickly, and success depends on how well a firm can “ride up the 
consolidation curve”. Ultimately, slow and weak players are going to become acquisition 
targets and disappear somewhere in stage 2 or 3 (Deans et al., 2002).  
 
The consolidation curve and the respective stages are an important source to 
understand the nature of market consolidation within the airline industry. Specifically, it 
enables the plotting of the industry within the cycle, and helps to show how consolidation 
differs from one market to another (in this case the American and European airline 
markets). 
 
2.1 American market 
 
As proposed by Deans et al. (2002), consolidation in the US market started with 
its deregulation in 1978. Quickly, new entries followed, and fierce pricing competition 
set in (Kort, 2017). According to Hethcock (2017) there were over 400 certified airlines 
operating in 1978. As the industry progressed to stage two of the consolidation life cycle, 
M&A activity increased dramatically, and some 160 carriers filed for bankruptcy in the 
four decades that followed. As elaborated above, Deans et al. (2002) mention that airlines 
are typically to be found in stage two on the consolidation curve. The US Airline industry, 
however, further progressed and the past decade saw some mega-mergers typical for stage 
three – reducing the number of mid and large sized carriers from 18 to just 10 by 2017 
(Hethcock, 2017). Or, to put it differently, from the 11 largest airlines in 2004, measured 
by revenue, five have vanished (Mutzabaugh, 2015).  
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Figure 2 Domestic market share of US Airlines in 2017 (Statista, 2018) 
 
 
The mega-mergers of the past decade further consolidated the top end of the 
industry players, leaving the US domestic market with four major airlines (also referred 
to as ‘the final four’) – American, United, Delta, and Southwest (Kort, 2017). The ‘Focus’ 
stage in the consolidation life cycle features the top three industry players holding 35 – 
70 percent market share (Deans et al., 2002). As seen in Figure 2, American, United, 
Delta and Southwest actually hold a combined market share of over 80 percent – even if 
leaving out the smallest of them (United), the top three still account for 65 percent.  
 
One may conclude that the US airline market has already advanced to stage 3 in 
the consolidation life cycle. Arguably one could also say that with consolidation slowing 
down, the industry is progressing towards stage 4. However, experts and analysts are in 
disagreement about whether the US market will see another mega-merger. Patterson 
(2015) sees further mergers as unlikely, especially due to their riskiness and questionable 
efficiency gains. One may also doubt the approval of a merger within the final four by 
American federal authorities. On the contrary, experts such as Hammond (2016) argue 
that, especially amongst the middle-sized carriers, M&A activity is still probable. 
Unnikrishnan (2016) reports that, according to a study by PwC, further consolidation 
could lead to a fifth large carrier, reducing the market share gap held by the big four.  
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Finally, it is noteworthy to point out how consolidation has affected the 
profitability of US airlines. In the early 2000s, economic downturn and high oil prices put 
pressure on airlines – the total losses of US carriers summing up to over $40bn in the 
period of 2001 – 2005 (Assaf & Josiassen, 2012). Consequently, companies sought 
efficiency gains. The consolidated North American air carriers have thus largely profited 
from optimized cost structures and synergies and therefore posit larger net profits than 
their European counterparts (Powley, 2017). In figures, this means the net profits of US 
Airlines in 2017 of $15.6bn exceeded the European figure ($9.8bn) by almost $6bn 
(IATA, 2017b). EBIT margins (in % of revenues) of US Airlines in 2017 amounted to an 
average of 13.2%, while the Europeans’ was less than half – 6.3% (IATA, 2017a). 
 
2.1.1 Introduction to Virgin America case 
Virgin America is a small airline founded in 2007 by Richard Branson, operating 
mainly domestic US flights (it also serves routes to Mexico). After receiving takeover 
offers in early 2016, the airline decided to reach out to potential buyers within the market 
(Shen, 2016). This process of ‘entertaining bids’ is of particular interest for this thesis, as 
it shows how a small airline decided to sell itself on its own terms, rather than being taken 
over by hostile competitors. 
After receiving different offers, Virgin America was sold to Alaska Air (beating 
competitor Jet Blue in the bid) for $2.6bn (Hackett, 2016). Even though Richard Branson 
was not able to stop the sale, he still concluded: “Consolidation is a trend that sadly cannot 
be stopped” (Branson, 2016). In other words: merge or disappear. This sort of ‘radical’ 
view is in line with the observations made about the American market in the previous 
section. 
 
Ironically, Brandon had originally founded Virgin America as a ‘counter measure’ 
to decreasing service quality within the US airline industry as more and more airlines 
consolidated (Hackett, 2016). Kort (2017) confirms this trend, elaborating on how 
massive consolidation has led to fewer choices for consumers, higher prices, and less 
quality. Interestingly, Virgin America’s share price spiked up 80 percent in the month 
after it had announced the entertainment of bids in March 2016 (Hackett, 2016). 
Following the successful acquisition, Alaska Air first indicated to keep the Virgin brand 
(Calder, 2017). However, as later announced, after April 24th, 2018 the Virgin brand will 
disappear as Alaska Air decided to completely integrate the acquired airline into the 
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Alaska fleet – making Virgin America yet another victim of the very consolidation it tried 
to defy (Genter, 2017). 
 
2.2 European market 
 
As seen before in the case of the American market, the consolidation life cycle in 
Europe was also initiated by market liberalization, which occurred in three stages between 
1987 and 1997 (Dobruszkes, 2009). Especially the third stage from 1993 to 1997 brought 
about almost ‘complete freedom’ for community airlines. Until 1987 for example, it was 
impossible for a German airline to operate flights between two French cities. The EU 
(including EFTA states) liberalized these constraints almost without restrictions 
(Dobruszkes, 2009). (Burghouwt & de Wit, 2015) thus also stress how the liberalized EU 
air traffic market has led to increased competition and new business models as airlines 
needed to react to the suddenly open market form. 
 
Consolidation in Europe, however, differs from the one in the US. Instead of large 
M&A transactions, airlines in Europe tend to grow more organically, inheriting the parts 
from airlines that eventually go bankrupt (Powley, 2017). Unlike in the US, where the 
big airlines have eaten up all the small ones, Europe still features over 100 different air 
carriers (Powley, 2017)(OAG, 2015).  
 
Dobruszkes (2009) describes competition in Europe as twofold. First, he touts 
competition between legacy and low cost carriers as “merciless and unrelenting”. 
Secondly, he suggests that there is a more ‘prudent’ competition between the legacy 
carriers and their traditional routes. Chapter 6 will look into competitive forces in more 
detail – as described in the model of Deans et al. (2002), stage two (Scale) in the 
consolidation life cycle is all about beating the competition to build up size. Prominent 
examples of this trend in Europe are the emerging large players: Ryanair, Lufthansa 
Group, IAG (with British Airways/Iberia), Easy Jet, and Air France-KLM (O’ Dwyer, 
2018). In turn, most prominent and recent ‘victims’ of the consolidation cycle in Europe 
are Air Berlin, Monarch, and Alitalia. 
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Figure 3 European Market Fragmentation (Powley, 2017) 
 
 
Depending on the measurement method, and whether one takes individual airlines 
or the emerging Airline ‘groups’ as a basis, market share of the largest players in Europe 
differs slightly. Counting the four largest individual airlines (Ryanair, EasyJet, Turkish 
Airlines, and Lufthansa), it adds up to about 34 percent as seen in Figure 3 (Powley, 
2017). Counting the four major Airline groups (which control several airlines) Ryanair, 
Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, and IAG, they account for about 40 percent (O’ Dwyer, 
2018). As seen in Figure 3, this is in stark contrast to market share controlled by the ‘final 
four’ in the American market. 
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Concluding, one could say that Europe finds itself in stage 2 on the consolidation 
curve. According to Deans et al. (2002), the three largest players in this stage of the cycle 
hold between 15 and 45 percent market share. As seen in Figure 3, Ryanair, EasyJet, and 
Turkish Airlines control 28 percent of the market. This figure has, however, to be looked 
at with caution, as the rising airline groups control large portions themselves. Analysts 
(e.g. (Robertson, 2017) (O’ Dwyer, 2018)(King, 2017) (Dichter, Hahn, & Maxwell, 2016) 
however, all agree that Europe has yet to see more consolidation, and may even witness 
some mega-mergers in the future.  
 
2.2.1 Swiss market 
The Swiss Civil Aviation carried roughly 51.9m passengers in 2016, and 
contributed around CHF 33.5bn (or 5.6%) to the Swiss GDP (Aerosuisse, 2017). The 
uncontested domestic market leader is SWISS International Airlines (LX), offering 79 
percent of all available seat kilometers (ASK), including Edelweiss flights (WK). The 
two smallest airlines, Helvetic and Skywork, offer only 0.6 percent and 0.3 percent of 
ASK respectively (Böck, 2015, p. 48). Böck further concludes that many small Swiss 
airlines have disproportionally grown their ASK in recent years, and that traffic increase 
is above average (2015, p. 56).  
According to Aerosuisse, eight airline operators were registered in 2017, down 
from nine in 2016 (Aerosuisse, 2017). The number of commercial operators1 has 
decreased from 169 in 2002 (Aerosuisse, 2005) to 62 in 2016 (Aerosuisse, 2017). Some 
small airlines in Switzerland have also been struggling to survive, most recent example 
being Darwin Airline (based in Lugano). After fighting an intense competition war 
against SWISS, the airline was sold by investors in July 2017, and is now owned by the 
same German investment company that owns Adria Airways (Eiselin, 2017). Darwin 
Airlines has lost its license to operate after filing for bankruptcy in November 2017 (Enz, 
2017). 
The case of Darwin shows that the consolidation forces are also at play in 
Switzerland. With SWISS belonging to the Lufthansa Group, small independent airlines 
in Switzerland fight for market share and will have to strategically innovate to survive in 
the future. 
                                               
1 incl. charter airlines 
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2.2.2 Players in the Swiss market  
Table 1 below gives a short overview of the Swiss scheduled airlines used as 
examples in this thesis. All but SWISS can be categorized as small. SWISS and Edelweiss 
both belong to the Lufthansa Group, whereas the other three are not owned by any larger 
airline or airline group. 
 
Table 1 Airlines in Switzerland (own illustration, Appendix 11.3) 
Airline Homebase Fleet size 
Passengers p.a. 
(2017) 
Category 
SWISS* Zurich 83 17m Mid-sized 
Edelweiss Zurich 15 1.7m small 
Helvetic Airways Zurich 12 2m small 
Skywork Berne 6 156k small 
People’s Air Group 
St. Gallen 
Altenrhein 
2 100k Small 
*incl. both Swiss International and Swiss Global Air Lines Ltd. 
 
 
This chapter has identified the nature of consolidation in the aviation sector, and 
has shown that the European industry is in another stage on the consolidation curve. This 
starting position is important as it builds the basis for the trend analysis in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 3 will introduce the concept of the auction process in M&A transactions 
and its underlying mechanism, before Chapter 4 will outline the methodology used to 
answer the research question. 
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3 Introduction to the M&A auction process 
 
The M&A auction is a procedure in which several different vendees opt to 
purchase a target. The seller collects and evaluates the bids according to their 
attractiveness, namely the most favorable price and the best conditions (Chen, 2016). 
 
Of fundamental importance in the auction process is to select the amount and type 
of buyers that are invited to hand in a quotation. Thus the scope of the bidding process is 
determined by the seller and its strategic and financial intentions (Chen, 2016). According 
to (Nead, n.d.) there are three different approaches to an auction – the broad auction, the 
limited auction, and the targeted solicitation. The strategies differ in terms valuation, 
confidentiality, transaction speed, targeted buyers, and market size. While the broad 
auction aims at the most favorable valuation through exposure to as many interested 
parties as possible, the targeted solicitation addresses only a few strategic buyers in a 
faster and more confidential process. The limited auction then is to be found in the middle 
of the two previous examples (Nead, n.d.). 
The auction procedure typically involves several rounds and confidentiality 
agreements as well as a prepared room for due diligence (Chen, 2016). 
 
What type of auction the seller choses depends on his or her intentions and 
whether the aim is to maximize transaction revenue or realize other strategic goals. For 
this thesis however, it is simply important to understand the concept of auctions rather 
than what type is chosen by a specific airline. In any case, this would be a management 
decision and specifically depend on the situational circumstances.  
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4 Methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the different methodological concepts that will be applied 
to answer the research question. It starts with the trend and market analysis and the 
different strategic tools used therein. More so, it describes in detail the major research 
method used, namely the expert interviews. 
   
4.1 Industry trend analysis 
 
The industry trend analysis is conducted by reviewing the most recent events in 
European aviation, the industry results, and what future outlook is expected by different 
scholars or experts. This review sheds light on where the European market is headed and 
provides important indicators for strategic positioning of small airlines. Moreover, it 
addresses the chances of survival for small airlines. 
 
4.2 Market analysis 
 
A market analysis of the European airline market builds the foundation for this 
thesis. Understanding the dynamics at work, and the specifics of market interactions is 
crucial in order to comprehend and evaluate how small airlines may perform in this 
market. Furthermore, the segmentation of the European market brings along key 
challenges for airlines.  
 
Figure 4 Elements of Strategic Analysis (own illustration adapted from Björk, 2017, p. 7) 
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The market analysis will therefore provide the necessary basics upon which this 
thesis derives other factors within the strategic analysis. To follow a step-down approach, 
the respective tools used are Porter’s 5 forces model, Porter’s Value Chain and the 
SWOT-analysis as shown in Figure 4. 
 
4.2.1 Porter’s five forces 
Michael’s E. Porter’s model of the 5 forces constitutes somewhat a benchmark 
when it comes to competition analysis, having been at the center of any management 
agenda since its publication in 1980 (Kort, 2017). The model is a tool to evaluate strategic 
options and positions of a given firm within a given industry. In his model, Porter (2008) 
elaborates on how an industry is influenced by the five forces, and how these shape the 
profitability of that particular industry. Typically, Porter claims high competitive forces 
such as in the airline industry lead to low margins and low profitability. Conversely, if 
competition is absent or benign, firms operate very profitably. 
 
Porter (1998) outlines the five forces as follows: (1) threat of new entrants, (2) 
bargaining power of buyers, (3) bargaining power of suppliers, (4) threat of substitute 
products or services, and (5) the rivalry amongst existing competitors.  
 
Figure 5 Porter’s 5 forces (own illustration based on Porter, 1998) 
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Porter (2008, p 26) states that: 
Understanding the competitive forces, and their underlying causes, reveals the 
roots of an industry’s current profitability while providing a framework for 
anticipating and influencing competition (and profitability) over time. A healthy 
industry structure should be as much a competitive concern to strategists as their 
company’s own position. Understanding industry structure is also essential to 
effective strategic positioning.   
 
Grundy (2006) elaborates on some of the weaknesses of Porter’s model. Amongst 
others, he criticizes the model’s mindset of looking at industries as closed entities. 
Furthermore, the often highly sophisticated industry value chains are broken down and 
displayed to the strategist in an oversimplified manner. Especially the latter gives reason 
to the author of this thesis to also briefly look at the industry value chain of airlines (as 
outlined under 4.2.2). 
 
Thus, analyzing the five forces of an industry gives a comprehensive overview of 
what and who is influencing the profitability of that industry. The knowledge of key 
forces can then be transformed into strategic actions (Porter, 2008). 
 
The five forces model is of particular importance for this thesis. Considering the 
intensity of rivalry in the airline industry and how these forces have been fueling 
consolidation, analyzing the main drivers and strength of these pressures is vital. A small 
airline must understand its position, and to what degree it might be able to gain some 
leverage in a bidding process by reacting to the five forces ahead of time. 
 
4.2.2 Porter’s value chain 
The value chain is a critical part of any organization because it determines how 
the company creates value. It inherently ascertains the value creating activities and costs 
of creating said value. This impacts profitability, as one can assume that the more value 
a firm creates, the more profitable it is going to be (MindTools, n.d.). Or simply put, if 
the value created exceeds the costs of performing the respective activities within the value 
chain, the company operates profitably (Porter & Millar, 1985). 
 
For any organization it is imperative to understand how value is created and where 
in the value chain the company may save resources. Porter (1985) investigated how firms 
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can gain competitive advantage, analyzing critical elements in their value chain. He 
identified a chain of 9 elements, split them into ‘primary’ and ‘support’ activities and 
divided them as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 The generic value chain (Porter, 1985, p. 37) 
 
 
The primary activities (Inbound logistics, Operations, Outbound logistics, 
Marketing and sales, Service) are those relevant for the actual production of the product, 
selling it to customers and supporting the client after the sale. The support activities (Firm 
infrastructure, Human Resource Management, Technology development, Procurement) 
are crucial in catering the needed resources for the primary activities to take place (Porter, 
1985). Porter & Millar (1985) further explain that all these activities are connected 
through ‘linkages’ and that the effective management of these linkages can identify trade-
offs between and across organizational lines. The optimization of trade-offs can therefore 
be an important source of competitive advantage because it is hard for competition to 
identify where a firm improves its value chain. 
 
The concept of the value chain is also evolving; the revolution of information 
technology (ICT) affects all activities in the chain, and creates new linkages and 
interrelations (Porter et al, 1985). Thus, using new systems and concepts (i.e. big data), 
companies can now manage their chains more effectively and integrate suppliers and 
customers more actively. ICT also allows organizations to span activities across 
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geographic locations and interact/cooperate with other players. This role of ICT is crucial 
in creating new synergies and identifying cost saving trade-offs (Porter et al, 1985). 
 
The value chain activities of airlines are rarely isolated and often depend on the 
functionality of the respective activities of other players (Yılmaz & Bititci, 2006). It is 
therefore considered to be imperative to analyze the value chain of airlines, what 
advantages small airlines possess, and how they can align their activities to be easily 
integrated in the buyer’s system. 
 
4.2.3 SWOT 
The SWOT analysis as depicted in Figure 7 is a strategic tool to determine an 
organization’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. In the context of 
decision making it helps managers to evaluate internal and external factors that may 
contribute to the firm’s success or causes of failure. The SWOT analysis ensures the 
consideration of all relevant components to the business organization, positive or negative 
(Ifediora, Idoko, & Nzekwe, 2014). The underlying aim is to identify critical elements 
and use the knowledge to leverage internal and external strengths and opportunities, 
whilst monitoring and minimizing weaknesses and threats. Morris (2005, as cited in Bell 
& Rochford, 2016) concludes that the SWOT follows a circular logic; one cannot know 
what factor might be a strength or weakness without knowing the environmental 
circumstances, and vice versa. This fact underlines the importance of the SWOT analysis. 
 
Bell & Rochford (2016, p 310) also report that in recent times, the SWOT has 
developed into a mere ‘set of checklists’. Likewise, Pickton & Wright (1998) warn of the 
dangers of using SWOT as a simple listing device. Hence, they suggest the use of scoring 
models or other valuation forms to improve the validity of identified SWOT-factors. The 
gathered information in the SWOT analysis can then be used to evaluate strategic options 
and determine how to respond to certain events, circumstances, or trends. The framework 
channels activities into where the firms core competences lie, and ensures the 
strengthening of said competences (Ifediora et al., 2014). 
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Figure 7 SWOT Analysis (own illustration) 
 
 
The SWOT analysis thus is important for this thesis as it provides any given firm 
with core information of the four framework areas. The SWOT is crucial because it lists 
critical success factors of a firm and outlines focus areas to which the firm should direct 
its resources. The SWOT analysis will draw from information gained in the previous 
analyses of Porter’s 5 forces and Porter’s value chain, thus outlining the external and 
internal factors that are of particular importance for small airlines in Europe. 
 
4.3 Merger success factors 
 
Mergers fail more often than they succeed – different researchers produce 
different failure rates, but summarized, the relative number can be believed to lie 
somewhere between 50% and 85% (Heffernan, 2012). Thus, it is imperative to understand 
what differentiates the successful mergers from the unsuccessful ones if a merger 
becomes a strategic option for the future. To comprehend the factors that lead to success 
and derive important aspects for airlines, this thesis uses the dimensions identified by 
Marks & Mirvis (1998). 
 
4.3.1 Five perspectives of Marks and Mirvis 
In their 1998 book “Joining forces: making one plus one equal three in mergers, 
acquisitions, and alliances“, Marks et al.  identified five key dimensions on which 
managers should focus in order to manage a merger successfully, as seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2 The 5 perspectives (adapted from Marks & Mirvis, 1998, p. 275 et seqq.) 
Dimension Meaning 
Strategy Ongoing monitoring of strategic goals and addressing 
changes during the combination 
Organization Improve the organizational setup 
People Consider the people involved, and their respective 
feelings and attitudes towards the merger 
Culture Agree on a new culture 
Transition Management Carefully plan and monitor all elements of the transition 
 
These five dimensions are, in fact, overlapping and interrelated (Marks et al, 
1998).  Using the five areas, managers can prepare a solid case for a merger, and ensure 
to forward as much information as possible to employees, stake-, and shareholders. Given 
that any combination is surrounded by a certain degree of unknown variables, it is 
imperative to attend to the dimensions and the respective questions they imply (Marks et 
al, 1998).  
 
Table 3 The pre-combination phase (adapted from Marks & Mirvis, 1998, p. 276) 
Dimension Pre-combination 
Strategy Clarify strategy, rationale, and search criteria 
Organization Conduct thorough  screening and due diligence 
People Prepare people psychologically 
Culture Respect the pre-combination cultures 
Transition Management Know where you want to go…and what it takes to get 
there 
 
For this thesis, the pre-combination phase as seen in Table 3 is of substantial 
interest. The five areas are used to identify how a small airline can align its interest with 
the potential buyers and build a business case in favor of a sale. 
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4.4 Expert interviews 
 
Due to the qualitative nature of this thesis, expert interviews were chosen as main 
research method. To better comprehend the nature of industry consolidation, its impact 
on small airlines, and the possibility of an auction process, interviews were conducted 
with different professionals within the aviation industry. Table 4 shows all interview 
partners and the respective interview type and length, fully transcribed to be found in 
Appendix 11.1. 
 
Table 4 Interview Partners 
Name Position Organization Interview 
Type 
Interview 
Length 
Werner Enz Editor,  
Aviation Journalist 
 
Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, NZZ 
Face-to-Face 79 min 
Dr. Michael 
Trestl 
Head of Business 
Development 
Swiss 
International Air 
Lines Ltd. 
 
Face-to-Face 60 min 
William Agius Dep. Director 
Center for 
Aviation 
Zurich University 
of Applied 
Sciences 
 
Face-to-Face 70 min 
Dr. Andreas 
Wittmer 
CEMS Academic 
Director & Head of 
International 
Networks 
 
University of St. 
Gallen 
Face-to-Face 25 min 
Thomas 
Krutzler 
Chief Commercial 
Officer, 
Accountable 
Manager 
 
People’s Air 
Group 
Face-to-Face 38 min 
 
 
4.4.1 Method 
The interview partners were selected according to their positions and the 
organizations they work for, in order to capture contrasting viewpoints. Airline executives 
from both a small and middle sized airline were interviewed, as well as different industry 
experts and analysts.  
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4.4.2 Procedure 
All interview partners were personally contacted by email in advance in order to 
schedule an appointment. The interviews took place at the locations chosen by the 
interview partners and lasted between 25 and 80 minutes.  
 
For all cases, the semi-structured interview type was chosen. According to Miles 
& Gilbert (2005), in a semi-structured interview there is a set of prepared questions to 
guide the discussion and clarify the covered topics. However, the conversation is left open 
to deviate from the subject in order to grasp other viewpoints. Miles et al. (2005) further 
explain how semi-structured interviews are ideal in researching qualitative rather than 
quantitative data. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (2008) remarks that due to the 
nature of the semi-free discussion it is hard for the interviewee to take notes. 
Consequently, it is best to tape the conversations and transcribe them for detailed analysis. 
 
As suggested by Miles et al., (2005) the researcher started all interviews with 
briefing the interview partner about the general topic of the thesis and the aim of the 
interview. Some questions aimed directly at finding specific information, while others 
were more directed towards capturing the opinion of the experts. Moreover, as the 
interview partners all came from different organizations and different backgrounds, the 
questions used were not always identical. Hence, the contrasting viewpoints allowed a 
more flexible interpretation of the gathered information.  
 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed word by word. Thus, the 
transcriptions found in Appendix 11.1 reflect the actual course of the interviews as well 
as their grammatical structure.  
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5 European industry trend analysis 
 
The following section analyzes the European industry trends by looking at 
different levels and developments, such as profitability, industry consolidation, and the 
competition between ‘LCC’ and ‘Legacy’ business models. Each section draws 
conclusions on implications for small airlines in the industry, before summarizing the 
trend analysis and the strategic impacts for small carriers. 
 
5.1 Profitability levels 
 
5.1.1 Margins and industry results 
The global aviation industry is currently experiencing excellent results, with 
system-wide operating profits of $62.6bn in 2017 – this equals an average EBIT margin 
of 8.3 percent (IATA, 2017a). In contrast, as seen in Figure 8, the European industry is 
lagging behind, with EBIT margins leveling out at roughly 6.3 percent in 2017. Notably, 
this is a 5.5 percent increase in margins compared to 2011. Hence, the trend seems to be 
pointing upwards, with European airlines stabilizing and improving their profitability 
compared to global average.  
 
Figure 8 Average EBIT Margins in % of revenues (IATA, 2017a, own illustration) 
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The growing margins can also be attributed to increased efficiency that follows 
industry consolidation. As Trestl mentioned: “Getting bigger means we can use more 
economies of scale, we can use more of the cost regression - these are the factors which 
lead to positive effects.“ (18 April 2018, Interview, Appendix 11.1.2)  
 
It is noteworthy that the continuous growth in margins seen in Figure 8 could be 
misleading, as the upward trend cannot be forecasted accurately, and the industry might 
have arrived at a peak (PwC, 2017, p. 2).  
 
5.1.2 Demand and supply developments 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 give a glimpse of the development of Revenue Passenger 
Kilometers (RPK) and Available Seat Kilometers (ASK) respectively. Following 
structural overcapacity, both figures dropped until 2013, with airlines reducing the 
number of flights, and consolidation driving down overall system capacity. Growth has 
since caught on, with both global RPK and ASK growing at almost pre-crisis levels. The 
high percentage figures in 2015, 2016, and 2017 indicate high passenger demand and 
subsequent increases in seat supply.  
 
Figure 9 Revenue Passenger Kilometers (RPK) in % year-on-year (IATA, 2017a, own  
illustration) 
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However, and this can also be derived from the Figures 9 and 10, the forecasted 
numbers for 2018 (F2018) suggest that the fast growth has reached a cyclical peak in 
2017. With the airlines increasing ASK and thus adding capacity, pressure will unfold on 
margins. Koenen (2018) reports that the failures of Monarch, Air Berlin, and Alitalia have 
not stopped the excess supply of seats - a supply that will even grow at 6 to 7 percent 
within the first half of 2018. The results are difficult to predict, and the capability to 
continue producing high margins and subsequent profits will largely depend on how 
efficient the individual airlines can manage their recurring cost structures. This then 
translates into competitiveness, as Enz explained: “In the industry competitiveness, 
connectivity is very important, so the quality of the routes you serve, and what recurring 
cost structure you have, since that is very crucial to remain competitive.” (13 April 2018, 
Interview, Appendix 11.1.1).  
 
SWISS for example has, by introducing the new triple seven to its fleet, produced 
significant overcapacity in its own market – and as the Swiss market is not large enough 
to fill these aircraft, the pressure is on the SWISS short-haul fleet to bring sufficient 
passengers to Zurich. This in return reflects on the pressure that lasts on the short-haul 
fleet and the margins it is able to generate (Agius, 23 April 2018, Interview). 
 
Figure 10 Available Seat Kilometers (ASK) in % year-on-year (IATA, 2017a, own illustration) 
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5.1.3 Oil prices 
Finally, oil prices constitute a major part of airline expenses, and profits largely 
depend on how these prices develop. In the period between 2011 and 2017, fuel expenses 
averaged at roughly 27.6 percent in the global airline P&L (IATA, 2017a). Figure 11 
shows the development of crude oil prices (in $ per barrel, left y-axis) within the same 
period, compared to the system wide operating profits (in $ bn, right y-axis). Though 
other factors such as consolidation and cost efficiency gains play an important part in the 
growth of profits seen in Figure 11, the author sees a correlation between the decrease in 
oil prices and the increase in profits. It is only logical to assume that, should oil prices 
significantly rise again, profits will decrease.  
 
This also means that the capability of any airline to hedge this as risk is crucial in 
their attempt to remain competitive. Amadeo (2018) explains how oil prices have become 
less predictable, and how this volatility drives subsequent insecurities. The significant 
drop in the price of crude oil since 2012 has largely been beneficial for the airline industry. 
With a slight upward trend (seen in Figure 11, increase from $44.6 in 2016 to a forecasted 
$60 a barrel in 2018), it remains to be seen how airlines have adapted their cost structure 
in the meantime to cope with higher fuel expenses.  
 
Figure 11 Relation of Crude Oil Price and Operating Profits (IATA, 2017a, own illustration) 
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5.1.4 Conclusions and implications for small airlines 
The growth in demand for air travel has also benefited the small airlines in Europe, 
and the low oil prices have allowed them to keep fuel costs low. However, the increase 
in capacity constitutes a challenge, as the large carriers can widely benefit from 
economies of scale and in-group synergies. For small airlines, the falling prices that 
follow an increase in supply, and an eventual rise in oil prices could prove to be very 
difficult to cope with in the coming years, especially if the industry has reached a peak.  
 
5.2 Consolidation 
 
5.2.1 General trend 
As discussed in section 2.2, Europe finds itself in stage 2 of the consolidation life-
cycle. It is likely, then, that this trend is going to continue as the industry progresses on 
the consolidation curve. Figure 12 shows the decline in the number of scheduled airlines 
operating within Europe over the time period of 2011 – 2015. In net terms the European 
aviation industry lost over 70 airlines during this period. During the same time span, 
scheduled airlines in the United States have decreased from 95 in 2011 to only 84 in 2015.  
 
Figure 12 Number of scheduled airlines (OAG, 2015, own illustration) 
 
 
The clear downward trend displayed in Figure 12 suggests that more airlines are 
probably destined to disappear. Taking into account the specific nature of the European 
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consolidation, as discussed in section 2.2, market fragmentation may still lead to a higher 
number of scheduled airlines compared to the US – yet they might be flying under the 
name of one of the large airline groups (Ryanair, Lufthansa, IAG, Air France-KLM). The 
consolidation trend in Europe is confirmed by many industry analysts, including Dr. 
Michael Trestl, Head of Business Development with Swiss International Air Lines Ltd.: 
 
I think in general the European market tends to consolidate, so we see this - I don’t 
want to say it’s a mega trend - but it is a certain trend or at least a tendency towards 
consolidation and towards those rather small airlines becoming part of a bigger 
group of airlines. (2018, Appendix 11.1.2) 
 
 
5.2.2 Future development of consolidation in Europe 
The question arises whether consolidation in Europe will remain organic and 
steady, or if the industry will see some mega-mergers as has been the case in the American 
market. Figure 13 shows the most significant M&A transactions in Europe in the period 
from 2003 to 2017. Previously having been the largest airline transaction in Europe (and 
some sort of leading example), the 2004 merger of Air France and KLM has been 
overshadowed by two much larger deals in a little more than a decade – namely the giant 
merger of British Airways and Iberia in 2011, forming the IAG holding (deal volume 
€6.5bn), and the acquisition of Aer Lingus through IAG in 2015 (deal volume €1.5bn).  
 
Again considering the consolidation curve, the following example illustrates how 
Europe might see some mega mergers in the future. If the numbers in Figure 13 are broken 
down into individual deals, out of fourteen, ten involve either IAG or the Lufthansa 
Group. The merger of Air-France KLM, then, is a stand-alone transaction.  
 
As the large airline groups move along the consolidation curve to further build up 
scale, the possibility of IAG or Lufthansa Group trying to acquire Air France-KLM may 
not be unrealistic. Thus, the nature of consolidation may change to more of what the 
industry has experienced in the US: “I would assume that we are going to end up with the 
big three, as in the US. And within that we will probably have the other ones all linked to 
those.” (Wittmer, 25 April 2018, Interview, Appendix 11.1.4) 
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Figure 13 Recent and important M&A deals in Europe (Appendix 11.2, own illustration) 
 
 
5.2.3 Impact on prices 
Consolidation in Europe has not had a significant impact on the general decrease 
in prices the industry has witnessed in the last two decades. Though there might be some 
short-term impacts on certain routes due to market adjustments, such as the monopoly of 
Star Alliance on the Zurich – Vienna route, pressure on prices remains. There appears to 
be no empirical evidence to support the case of rising prices (Trestl, 2018). Krutzler, CCO 
at People’s Air Group also confirms: “[…] people compare prices much more often now. 
So the pressure on price will always be there […]” (25 April 2018, Interview, Appendix 
11.1.5). 
 
5.2.4 Diversity of choice 
In the US, some analysts such as Kort (2017) lament the lack of diversity of choice 
for the customer, resulting from consolidation. In Europe, as seen before, consolidation 
is not as far advanced – and more airlines still operate in the market, automatically leading 
to more diversity of choice. However, this ‘diversity’ has also taken new forms: 
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 Concept of ‘self-hubbing’ 
The market appears to have adjusted, now offering the customer all sorts of new 
possibilities. Due to complete price and fare transparency and a wide variety of 
booking platforms on the internet (Trestl, 2018), a passenger wanting to go from A to 
B can now book a low-cost flight from A to C, stay a night or two, and then continue 
to B. Instead of relying on one airline providing the entire service, the customer is 
much more free in choosing his or her travel itinerary (Agius, 2018). 
 
 Dynamic pricing, buy-on-board, etc. 
New pricing models offer the customer free choice of what he or she wants to purchase 
– whether it is just the flight segment, or any additional service, the passenger can now 
take the offered services apart piece by piece and only pay for the individually desired 
aspects.  
 
5.2.5 Efficiency 
The efficiency gains from consolidation on margins and operating results can be 
observed in the chart presented in section 4.1.1. As the airlines consolidate, gains can 
mainly be realized on the cost side (Trestl, 2018). However, there are also limitations due 
to the nature of the European market. Conversely, in the US the question of location is 
much less important. For example, the Lufthansa Group has not yet centralized its flight 
training for the entire group in the most efficient and effective locations, but rather still 
operates different flight schools in different countries. This has to do with the 
fragmentation of the European market and the emotionality attached to certain aspects of 
the airline industry. Agius (2018) commented: “They are cost effective where they can 
be, and where politics don’t get in the way.” (Appendix 11.1.3). 
Another example would be British Airways and Iberia. Though having merged, 
the differences in language, culture, and geographical location still require them to 
operate support processes at both ends, thus perhaps not fully realizing the possible gains 
in efficiency (Wittmer, 2018).  
 
5.2.6 Conclusions and implications for small airlines 
Consolidation in Europe will continue, as the large airline groups strive for more 
efficient operations. The growing influence of the big airline groups will put pressure on 
  30 
all independent airlines, as will the continuing decrease in prices. New airfare models 
offer the customer an increasing variety of how to arrange his or her travels. Since these 
pricing tools are expensive to construct, small airlines may have trouble keeping up with 
the customer’s expectations. Furthermore, possible mega-mergers in the industry might 
completely change the rules of the game for small players. 
 
 
5.3 LCC or Legacy 
 
5.3.1 Rise of the LCC model 
The concept of the LCCs has stirred up the European market quite significantly. 
As shown in Figure 14, Ryanair and other LCCs have managed to increase their market 
share by almost 10 percent in the time period between 2007 and 2015. Their model, thus, 
is simple and has surprised the traditional network (Legacy) carriers (Enz, 2018). The 
pressure the LCCs have unfolded on market competitiveness will be closer analyzed 
under section 6.1, yet it is important to note that it is likely that their market share will 
increase further in the future. 
 
Figure 14  LCC EU market share growth 2007 – 2015 (Mott McDonald, 2017,  
p. 91, own illustration) 
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5.3.2 Convergence 
What is observable in the market is some form of convergence of the business 
models of the LCCs and the Legacy carriers (Trestl, 2018). Both sides have adopted 
aspects of the other models; in case of the Legacy carriers, this is mainly the abandoning 
of the full-frills, F&B concepts on board. SWISS for example, although trying to position 
itself as premium airline, is now introducing buy-on-board from Geneva, and it will 
probably do so from Zurich as well in the near future (Agius, 2018). In turn, the LCCs 
are now more focusing on customer care, a concept formerly only adopted by the Legacy 
carriers. Interestingly, this convergence of business models makes it increasingly harder 
to distinguish the offered services – thus diluting the products, making it difficult for 
airlines to differentiate themselves.  
 
5.3.3 Constraints and future developments 
The two models are both constrained by infrastructure limitations. Most large 
airports in Europe already operate at full or even overcapacity (e.g. London Heathrow, 
Paris Charles de Gaulle). The trend of which model will prevail is hard to predict, 
however future developments might include one of the following: 
 
 Long-haul and short-haul split 
With increasing pressure on their short-haul fleets, the traditional network carriers 
may conclude that they will completely outsource their point-to-point traffic to a low-cost 
carrier and focus solely on intercontinental-routes. An example could be Lufthansa, 
already trying to outsource it’s commuting traffic to Eurowings (Agius, 2018). 
 
 Regulatory changes 
A possible development could be restrictions on flight duration. This would mean 
that ultra-short connections within Europe would be prohibited and thus outsourced to 
trains or other substitutes. Such a prohibition would free up slots at important hubs for 
new and more lucrative destinations, and would eliminate parts of the competition – 
which would be welcomed by both the Legacy and the Low-Cost Carriers (Agius, 2018). 
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
5.4.1 General conclusions 
From the trend analysis, the following general conclusions can be derived: 
 
 Stable profitability, yet to be enjoyed with caution 
The European industry enjoys, along the global trend, stable profitability and has 
managed to continuously increase margins within the last five years (2012 – 2017). This 
is partly due to consolidation and cost synergies realized, but also attributable to a 
significant fall in crude oil prices. Though both ASK and RPK have grown in the last 
years, the failure of Air Berlin or Monarch have not resulted in less, but in more capacity. 
This over-supply of seats may put future pressure on margins. Forecasted profits also 
indicate the industry has reached a peak. Combined with a possible rise in the prices of 
jet fuel, the stability of the industry profits has to be looked at with caution. 
 
 Consolidation continues 
The European aviation industry has not reached the end of stage 2 on the 
consolidation curve. The large players will continue to build up scale and the sector might 
witness some mega-mergers in the future. The nature of consolidation may also evolve to 
more like what happened in the US, yet market fragmentation, at least for now, ensures 
the pursuit of multi-branding and multi-hubbing concepts by the large airline groups. 
Their efficiency gains are also limited to the extent to which the political and cultural 
landscape in Europe allows them to, whilst prices are anticipated to remain low or even 
decrease further. 
 
 Convergence of business models 
The LCC and Legacy business models will further converge, as the market tries 
to balance the two. For any smaller carrier, especially operating on short routes, the 
competition between those two models may pose a significant business risk. Furthermore, 
growing traffic and infrastructure constraints may lead to future changes in the business 
environment with significant impact on ultra-short routes. 
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5.4.2 Chances of survival for small airlines in Europe 
Drawing from the conclusions presented above, the chances of survival for small 
airlines in Europe are ambiguous and to a certain degree very low. Considering the 
consolidation trend in the industry, and rising pressure on margins and prices combined 
with the growing influence of large airline groups, small airlines in Europe face an 
increasingly difficult business environment. Their importance for the market is also 
questionable, for example Helvetic and Skywork in Switzerland: “In my opinion, 
Helvetic and Skywork are both negligible, these airlines are not really needed for the 
market, (…), they are not relevant for the connectivity of Switzerland (…).” (Wittmer, 
2018, Appendix 11.1.4). 
 
Thus, consolidation forces will coerce these airlines to react and adapt to the 
evolving market situation in Europe. In conclusion, this means that small airlines will 
face a takeover rather sooner than later. Krutzler (2018), also confirms that he anticipates 
an offer in the future. “The question is more: a buyer for the group or just for the airline.” 
(Appendix 11.1.5) 
 
Subsequently, this investigates the market forces in Europe, and the opportunities 
and threats for small airlines. Furthermore, the following chapters focus on identifying 
strengths that can be leveraged in a future M&A negotiation process, as well as finding 
possible stumbling blocks that need to be addressed in advance.  
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6 Market analysis Europe 
 
The following section analyzes the European aviation market in more detail. It is 
important to note that the market for long-haul traffic is excluded from any analysis. 
Specifically, this section examines the competitive forces at work within the industry and 
their impact on small airlines. Moreover, it identifies the critical aspects in the airline 
value chain for the efficient value generation of small airlines before presenting their 
internal and external strengths and weaknesses in the SWOT analysis. The findings in 
this section are based on the conducted interviews, fully transcribed to be found under 
Appendix 11.1. 
 
6.1 Porter’s Five Forces, European airline market 
 
6.1.1 The Five Forces in detail 
 
Figure 15 The Five Forces at work in Europe (own illustration based on Porter, 1985) 
 
 
The analysis of Porter’s Five Forces as displayed in Figure 15 depicts the 
European aviation industry as a highly competitive sector with strong forces at work that 
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impact on the overall industry performance. Below, each of the forces is analyzed in more 
detail. 
 
6.1.1.1 The core: Industry Rivalry 
Throughout the analysis, the intensity of rivalry within the intra-European 
aviation sector has been rated as very high. This can also be seen in the achieved margins 
of the industry compared to the global average (see Figure 8 under section 5.1.1). Due to 
the fragmented nature of the sector, still a large number of airlines is competing in a rather 
small market compared to the US for example (Trestl, 2018). The lack of large catchment 
areas (such as for example mega-cities like Tokyo or Mexico City) and thus the 
overlapping of these areas reinforces the airline’s difficulties to attract enough passengers 
to fill their aircraft. The limited organic growth options of large players are fueling 
consolidation, and are leading Lufthansa Group and Co. to acquire more and more airlines 
(Enz, 2018).  
 
The growth in demand for air travel has led the European airlines to produce 
significant overcapacity, which translates into heavy pressure on air fares. Moreover, the 
aggressive pricing strategies of LCCs has resulted in the paradoxical effect that, in their 
effort to become more competitive by lowering their costs by all means, most airlines 
have diluted their product to the extent that it has become hard to distinguish one from 
the other – in the end making them less competitive (Agius, 2018). This homogenous 
product, and subsequent price pressure, makes it increasingly difficult to justify their full-
frills, F&B service onboard. Instead, more and more airlines are introducing new concepts 
such as buy-on-board, which limits the ability of the cabin crew to interact with the 
passengers, and thus allows them to only provide an adequate service level to those 
willing to pay extra. Agius (2018) underlined this trend: “If you are not willing to do that 
[pay extra for the food, A/N] - and I have noticed that myself - if you stick your ear plugs 
in you can go a whole flight and have zero interaction with the crew.” (Appendix 11.1.3)  
This mechanism worsens the Legacy carrier’s capability to distinguish their on-
board service from those of the LCCs (on intra-European routes). 
 
In addition, the European aviation sector is operating at the brink of maximum 
capacity; almost all major airports are unable to increase the traffic volume any further 
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(Trestl, 2018, Agius, 2018, Wittmer, 2018). These infrastructure constraints amplify the 
strain on airlines to attain sufficient slots at lucrative destinations, such as London 
Heathrow or Paris Charles de Gaulle. Since such slots are a scarce resource, an optimal 
way to obtain them is by acquiring the airlines that are in their possession. A recent 
example thereof could be Ryanair, buying Laudamotion and with it the slots it owns at 
important German hubs (Krutzler, 2018).  
 
The intensity of rivalry, then, has led to a change in how competitiveness may be 
defined within the European market. Considering that the main service of most airlines 
now takes place exclusively outside the aircraft, the respective level of customer care is 
the benchmark for competitiveness; that is, even Ryanair, formerly taking pride in 
completely neglecting the concerns of its passengers, has now adopted this philosophy 
(Trestl, 2018, Agius, 2018). The more exclusive, comprehensive, satisfactory, and 
complete an airline’s customer care before and after the flight service is perceived by the 
market, the more competitive it is compared to its competition.  
 
6.1.1.2 The Threat of New Entrants 
According to Enz (2018), the aviation industry has lower entry barriers than 
other business sectors. Though needing to fulfil an extensive set of regulations, rules, and 
procedures, new entrants can quickly obtain an AOC by hiring industry experts. Given 
that there is a solvent investor behind the venture, new airlines can establish their 
operations relatively easily (Trestl, 2018). Plus, there appears to be a certain ‘sexiness’ in 
owning an airline – famous examples of billionaires trying to stir up the airline market 
are Nikki Lauda or Virgin Group Founder Sir Richard Branson (Enz, 2018). 
In the European market, there seems to be no feeling of market saturation, nor has 
the industry reached any form of ‘end state’ (Agius, 2018) . However, recent events such 
as the failure of Alitalia, Monarch, and Air Berlin, combined with an intense industry 
rivalry, have lowered the risk of new entrants. Moreover, the already mentioned 
infrastructure constraints make it substantially more difficult for new entrants to establish 
operations at important hubs (Trestl, 2018). Political limitations and ongoing 
protectionism also shelter the industry from the influence of any foreign competitor, 
entering the market on a larger scale. Such ventures have enjoyed limited success, as the 
Air Berlin / Darwin Airline case has shown (Enz, 2018). 
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 Rather, the risk is focused on M&A transactions that level the playing field 
amongst the large groups, such as the merger of British Airways and Iberia or the 
acquisition of Air Berlin trough the Lufthansa Group. 
 
6.1.1.3 The Power of Buyers 
The power of buyers has grown since the liberalization of the aviation industry. 
The internet and the buyer’s ability to access information has resulted in complete price 
transparency. Internet portals such as booking.com or Trip Advisor ensure full customer 
satisfaction transparency, along with the possibility of self-hubbing (Trestl, 2018, Agius, 
2018). That is, the customer can put the service together the way he or she likes.  
 
Through the rise of the LCCs, air travel has become a means of transportation for 
the masses. Very price sensitive customers now constantly compare fares and services, 
basically lowering their switching cost to the level of virtual non-existence. This gives 
them the power to select the carrier with the most optimal connection and the cheapest 
price, and the passenger’s loyalty is decreasing vis-à-vis the product quality (Agius, 
2018). Combing back to the paradoxical effect mentioned before, this means the power 
of buyers has resulted in the airlines blending their products into one, solely focusing on 
lowering ticket prices.  To mitigate the power of the customer, airlines now need to put 
emphasis on services provided around the actual flight from A to B. 
 
6.1.1.4 The Power of Suppliers 
The power of suppliers depends on the commodity provided. Any supplier 
offering infrastructure usually enjoys high bargaining power, as there are constraints that 
cannot be stretched. These suppliers often operate in monopolistic environments. An 
example in Switzerland is Zurich Airport. Though the location is very lucrative and 
favorable, the growth options are tightly limited and often blocked by public or political 
initiatives (Trestl, 2018). This means any airline wanting to operate in and out of Zurich 
has to take whatever the airport offers, at the price dictated by the airport management. If 
you are unwilling to pay the respective fees, another airline will gladly take over the few 
available slots. 
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Furthermore, the suppliers providing the frame conditions also enjoy high 
bargaining power. Regulators still hinder certain developments within the industry 
(Krutzler, 2018). Altenrhein’s People’s Air theoretically experiences sufficient customer 
demand to be able to increase its number of flights. However, constraints put on opening 
hours of the airport by the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and Austria hinder 
such developments.  
 
Lastly, continuous growth of the industry has led to long waiting lists and 
respective backlogs in the books of aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus. 
Limited competition amongst these suppliers (mainly Airbus and Boeing) also increases 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis the airlines (Wittmer, 2018). 
 
6.1.1.5 The Threat of Substitutes 
Thus far, the aviation industry has only seen limited substitution, mainly in the 
form of more sophisticated train connections. Since it is easier to establish new air-routes 
than on-ground train lines, the risk is somewhat limited (Krutzler, 2018). However, 
innovation and digitalization of mobility may increase the threat of substitution in the 
future. Trains pose a significant risk for regional routes, whereas technological 
advancements such as autonomous driving and virtual / augmented reality may give birth 
to new modes of transportation (Trestl, 2018). 
 
6.1.2 Conclusions and implications for small airlines 
From the above presented analysis of Porter’s five forces, the following 
conclusions can be drawn for small airlines: 
 
 Inability to compete 
The intensity of industry rivalry, combined with the fragmentation of the market 
make it almost impossible for small airlines to compete on lucrative routes. The pressures 
on prices worsens the competitive force, as small airlines cannot realize economies of 
scale. 
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 Development constraints 
Limitations put on infrastructure and the power of suppliers thereof make it 
difficult for small carriers to expand their network to lucrative destinations, as new slots 
are extremely rare and very costly to acquire. 
 
 The forces are fueling consolidation 
The interplay of the five forces at work play into the hands of consolidation. That 
is, the limited possibilities put on corporate developments by the power of the different 
forces can be somewhat circumvented by the means of M&A transactions. Thus, 
combined power can be leveraged against the other forces within the industry, and 
competitiveness can be increased by creating system-wide synergies in a consolidated 
group. For small airlines, this means their market positions are all but safe, as the big 
airlines increase their ‘shopping’ activity in search for lower costs and higher margins. 
 
 The threat of substitution is highest for the smallest 
As small airlines often service short-haul routes and regional connections, the 
threat of any substitute products is higher for them than for airlines also flying long-haul. 
This means the regional connections can easily be served by trains or other, future means 
of transport that might come up through technological innovations.  
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6.2 Value chain of small airlines 
 
The above presented analysis of the competitive forces at work showed how 
airlines are pressured to constantly lower costs to remain competitive. As conceptualized 
by Porter, the value chain contains the major cost drivers as well as sources of 
differentiation (MindTools, n.d.). Identifying such activities within the chain is crucial in 
developing efficiency and competitive advantage.  
 
This section therefore aims at identifying the key factors in the value chain of 
small airlines, and in what activities within the chain they might possess an advantage 
compared to larger airlines or consolidated airline groups. 
  
6.2.1 Airline value chain 
Transporting passengers from A to B is the main activity of any airline. The 
provided service, however, relies on an extensive set of activities that need to take place 
in sequence or simultaneously. The supply of infrastructure (such as airports, slots, frame 
conditions) allows the airline service to be performed and prepared on ground, while the 
manufacturing industry supplies all the equipment needed such as aircraft and spare parts. 
These suppliers stand at the very beginning of the airline value chain.  
 
Figure 16 Airline Value Chain (Albers, Koch & Ruff, 2005, p. 2) 
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Figure 16 shows the generic airline value chain as conceptualized by Porter 
(1985), divided between primary and support activities. Therein, Albers et al. (2005) 
identified the subsequent activities performed by the airline after the initial infrastructure 
and frame conditions are set. 
 
6.2.2 Efficiency and its obstructions 
According to Trestl (2018) and Krutzler (2018), efficiency in the airline value 
chain starts with operations. This entails the initial setup of the aircraft layout, seat 
configuration, network design, and subsequent operating model. “I would really say that 
we for ourselves have to set a good foundation for efficient operation. And then 
everybody else has to feed in it.” (Trestl, 2018, Appendix 11.1.2) 
 
As seen in Figure 16, Inbound Logistics also cover constrained supplies such as 
airport slots and the production resources. As seen in the Porter’s 5 forces analysis under 
section 6.1.1, an airline cannot simply require an increase in the delivery in slots. Trestl 
(2018) described how the providers and suppliers within the value chain all need to ‘sit 
at one table’ and work towards the joint goal of efficient operations. The previously 
mentioned power of suppliers, especially of infrastructure, influences the airline’s ability 
to improve its own efficiency in these activities, and must be negotiated constantly.  
 
Furthermore, small airlines cannot perform all activities by themselves but have 
to outsource certain aspects. “[…] there are many areas which we cannot handle ourselves 
because we are simply too small. For example, maintenance which we buy from a supplier 
that already has this efficiency in house […]” (Krutzler, 2018, Appendix 11.1.5) This 
means any small airline has to identify the activities it can perform most efficiently on its 
own, and then leverage those value drivers to improve their cost structure. 
 
6.2.3 Key value chain factors for small airlines 
Unlike large airlines or consolidated airline groups, small carriers can hardly 
realize any economies of scale within their value chain (Wittmer, 2018). The question 
arises as to what activities act as the value factors for small airlines in order to reduce 
costs or keep them at a low base.   
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6.2.3.1 Human Resources 
Wittmer (2018), Krutzler (2018), and Agius (2018) all agree that the most 
important factor for small airlines lies in Human Resources. Krutzler (Appendix 11.1.5) 
stressed that “[…] the big advantage of us as People’s Group is that our staff is basically 
multi-functional. […] So our efficiency lies in the HR or staffing function.” That is, most 
employees do not just execute one job, but rather cover multiple profiles and perform 
different tasks as needed.  
Agius (Appendix 11.1.3) described how “They [small airlines, A/N] have a much 
lower cost base, both in terms of salaries and in terms of the costs that are required for 
the production of their services” and that “The airline industry is very labor intensive”. 
Trestl (2018, Appendix 11.1.2) supports this argument, stating that “[…] very often the 
cost structures are very favorable in terms of regulation.” Krutzler (2018) adds: “A large 
advantage if you are small and independent is also that you are not bound by collective 
wage agreements.” (Appendix 11.1.5) Wittmer (2018) delivers a practical example of 
how Helvetic Airways is leveraging the HR function: 
 
If we look at Helvetic and SWISS, it would be easy to just take over Helvetic. 
These planes fly already for SWISS and it would be rather easy. What’s the reason 
SWISS is not doing this? It’s very simple: Helvetic pays lower salaries than 
SWISS does. SWISS unions demand higher salaries, pilots earn more, so for them 
it’s a good deal to keep them in a separate company. (Appendix 11.1.4) 
 
By implication, this means the HR function is a crucial driver in the value chain 
of a small airline. Other influential factors for small airlines are to be found in logistics 
as well as marketing and sales. 
 
6.2.3.2 Logistics 
This especially includes the activities of Crew Planning and Scheduling. Small 
airlines often serve short and regional routes and focus on a very specific niche. 
According to Trestl (2018, Appendix 11.1.2), small airlines tend to “[…] having a high 
degree of specialization which means high customer orientation, and also a high degree 
of vertical range.” This results in ‘speed to market and flexibility’.  
This view is supported by Enz (2018, Appendix 11.1.1) stating that “[…] they are 
maybe more flexible in adapting certain flight plans.” Whereas large airlines are more 
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bound by customer expectations to ‘always offer that flight to Kiev’, smaller carriers can 
react faster, and adapt their schedules accordingly if a route cannot be operated profitably.  
 
Lastly, less regulation on labor or less obstruction through unions also allows the 
airline a higher degree of flexibility in their crew planning. For example, Krutzler (2018, 
Appendix 11.1.5) mentioned that “We have people employed both as cockpit and cabin 
crew.” This fact, combined with “[…] the strong company spirit often seen within small 
firms […]” (Enz, 2018, Appendix 11.1.1) enables the small airline to react quickly. 
Furthermore, any employee executing more than one job profile also permits the company 
to save costs and resources, as certain tasks of familiarization must be performed only 
once instead of twice or more.  
 
6.2.3.3 Marketing and Sales 
Agius (2018) and Krutzler (2018) both identified Marketing and Sales as another 
key factor for small airlines. First, small airlines do not have to maintain expensive 
frequent flyer programs. However, according to Agius, this is not only an advantage since 
it is precisely these programs that attract recurring passenger streams. Second, the 
resources saved on costly promotion programs can then be invested in other tools to boost 
the regional service. Krutzler (2018) explains that “[…] these days you can have very 
cheap and efficient marketing.” (Appendix 11.1.5) He further elaborates on the 
importance of making use of the wide range of new tools available today. This way, a 
small airline can leverage its position despite not having a high marketing budget. 
 
6.2.4 Value chain integration 
Consolidation offers the possibility of integrating the value chain into a larger 
system of activities, hence to profit from synergy potential that arises through said 
integration. For small airlines, this means they might be able to leverage their value 
drivers while simultaneously benefiting from efficiency gains. 
 
Wittmer (2018) stressed the fact that support processes can easily be integrated, 
and therefore synergies can be created to improve efficiency. However, he also explained 
that “[…] because you are in geographically different locations […] you need support 
processes and firm infrastructure on both sides. There it is questionable how much 
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integration you can generate.” (Appendix 11.1.4) Wittmer further elaborated on how 
airlines can create synergies in procurement, technology development, and in operations. 
Interestingly, procurement was identified as an essential weakness in the value chain of 
small airlines by Trestl (2018, Appendix 11.1.2): “So if such a small airline wants to 
purchase an aircraft you are more or less really then alone on the market, so you are not 
able to leverage on any purchasing synergies which you might have as part of a bigger 
group […]” This lack in purchasing power is also reflected in People’s Air’s difficulties 
in financing its fleet expansion, which in turn is important to improve efficiency 
(Krutzler, 2018).  
 
According to Wittmer (2018), integration is supported by alliances and networks, 
and airlines that operate within such systems. Prominent examples of airlines that only 
fully merged after having harmonized their value chains over many years are Air France-
KLM (Sky Team Alliance) or BA-Iberia (one World Alliance). Wittmer (Appendix 
11.1.4) concludes “[…] and then integrate fully by merging - it is just the last step of a 
long process which you have conducted in the network and by going through different 
levels in the alliance.” However, Wittmer also outlines that Alliances have more revenue- 
than cost synergies, and if an airline is looking for cost reduction, merging is the logical 
choice. Alliances then, have their raison d’être, but Trestl (2018), confirms that the more 
attractive leverages are on the cost and not the yield side, which is essentially why the 
above mentioned companies eventually merged. 
 
Finally, the value chain integration offers strategic possibilities for small airlines, 
especially in the activities in which they can operate more efficiently than large carriers 
such as Human Resources. Integration, then, does not necessarily mean full integration, 
but can also take place on the basis of e.g. ACMI services as in the case of Helvetic 
Airways, which has specialized in providing wet-lease services to other airlines because 
it can do so on a cheap basis (Trestl, 2018). Moreover, Krutzler (2018, Appendix 11.1.5) 
adds that “If you have cheap and efficient staff that is an advantage, because every 
consolidated group is searching for cheap platforms to put pressure on the expensive 
ones.”  
Agius (2018) elaborates on the pressure the Legacy carriers experience on their 
short-haul fleets and how outsourcing this activity could improve margins. Thus, he 
suggests the point-to-point traffic will be left to those operators that can execute these 
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flights most efficiently, while the long-haul connections will be the domain of the 
traditional legacy carriers. Some of these processes are already ongoing, as seen in 
Lufthansa’s endeavors to keep up with the LCCs capabilities by outsourcing parts of its 
short-haul traffic to Eurowings. Agius even envisions that this is only the start: “So 
theoretically we could also end up in a situation where all of Lufthansa’s short-haul traffic 
is outsourced to Eurowings - out of necessity.” (Appendix 11.1.3) 
Consequently, this means that small airlines could serve as cheap platforms for 
the large carriers and their groups, leveraging the key factors in their value chain – mainly 
cheap human resources and flexible scheduling. 
 
 
6.3 SWOT of small airlines 
 
Figure 17  Summary of SWOT Analysis of Small Airlines in Europe (own illustration) 
 
 
As outlined in section 4.2, the market analysis first investigated the external 
forces influencing the market and its players before the value chain analysis identified 
the key factors for small airlines within the chain. To follow the proposed step-down 
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approach, this section will ascertain the internal strengths and weaknesses as well as the 
external opportunities and threats for small airlines. 
The most relevant topics found per category are summarized in Figure 17. Thus, 
the analysis as outlined below shows that small airlines have a very distinct set of 
internal and external factors that influence their chances of survival. 
 
6.3.1 Strengths 
Some of the key strengths of small airlines discovered throughout the analysis are 
flexibility, fast reaction time, and speed to market (Trestl, 2018). Through a high degree 
of specialization and customer orientation, such airlines can quickly adapt their flight 
scheduling. Since they are so specialized in very concrete niches, small airlines often have 
a high degree of vertical range, that is, the degree of how well they know their specific 
market segment (Trestl, 2018). An example is People’s Viennaline, only serving the route 
Altenrhein (CH) to Vienna (A), but multiple times a day and for a very specific customer 
segment. Should this segment demand an earlier departure of the first morning flight, 
People’s will be able to not only quickly pick up the sentiment but also amend its flight 
plans. Wittmer (2018) adds “Smaller companies, more flexible and more dynamic, can 
react better on markets […]” (Appendix 11.1.4) Thus, the resulting strengths is speed, 
which can be used to react more quickly to shifts in customer expectations or market 
needs.  
 
Furthermore, lower salaries and a subsequently lower cost base contribute to the 
advantages small airlines hold over larger players (Agius, 2018). This is supported by less 
pressure from labor unions or less restrictive regulation, as Trestl (2018) argues “[…] 
often the cost structures are very favorable in terms of regulation, so very little regulation 
given by unions or labor regulation.” (Appendix 11.1.2) The lack of pressure from such 
unions is reflected in the absence of collective wage agreements, allowing small airlines 
to keep costs low over a long time period (Krutzler, 2018).  
 
Additionally, small firms often profit from shorter decision-making processes, flat 
hierarchies, and a strong company spirit. This allows small carriers to more easily align 
their staff with the company vision and its strategy and plays into the mentioned strength 
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of speed and fast reaction time. Thus, everyone is more involved, leading to a higher 
degree of company identification (Enz, 2018). 
 
6.3.2 Weaknesses 
Interestingly, some of the aforementioned strengths are, to some degree, also 
weaknesses of small airlines. Though they can react faster on markets, small carriers are 
also more dependent on them (Wittmer, 2018). A prominent example are airlines relying 
on ACMI contracting, such as Helvetic Airways. Since actual demand for air travel is 
hard to predict, so is the degree of utilization of airline fleets, and subsequently the market 
need for ACMI contractors (Krutzler, 2018). Some cost advantages also turn out to be a 
weakness of smaller airlines, as Agius (2018) pointed out: 
 
They have less costs because they are kind of not burdened down by thing as a 
rule - like having to operate an effective hub. They don’t have to maintain any 
frequent flyer programs which are incredibly costly. But on the other hand it’s 
precisely things like frequent flyer programs or operating kind of a hub / network 
that kind of attracts customers. And I think that’s what most of the smaller airlines 
in Europe struggle with. (Appendix 11.1.3) 
 
Another major weakness of small carriers is their inability to realize any 
economies of scale to optimize the efficiency of their operations (Trestl, 2018). Moreover, 
they usually serve short and not very lucrative routes with small planes that often seat less 
than 100 passengers. Because the costs per passenger are higher on small aircraft, this is 
an essential weakness, impacting on profitability and the revenues small airlines can 
generate. Finally, it is hard for small airlines to attract sufficient passengers in their small 
markets to fill their aircraft (Wittmer, 2018). Generally formulated, this can be 
summarized as follows: “Any plane that has less than 100 seats is not really getting you 
into profits.” (Wittmer, 2018, Appendix 11.1.4) 
 
Trestl (2018) also finds the limited purchasing power and lower financial 
capabilities to be an essential weakness of smaller players. Furthermore, they lack the 
ability to profit from any purchasing synergies which large airlines might have due to 
their consolidated nature. Consequently, this limits the small carrier’s ability to compete 
on lucrative routes with high growth in demand for air travel, since large airlines can 
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quickly increase their capacity. A simple example thereof is Skywork, trying to compete 
on the Basel-Vienna route:  
 
[…] inevitably the consequence was that no sooner had they announced that they 
would open the route, that EasyJet started operating the route, and Austrian 
Airlines shifted from a Dash 8 to the Embraer 190 - kind of eliminating the 
competition by capacity. (Agius, 2018, Appendix 11.1.3) 
 
6.3.3 Opportunities 
The fragmented European market still offers opportunities for small airlines, such 
as operating in very specific niches and monopolistically exploiting such segments 
(Wittmer, 2018). Moreover, the fewer constraints put on such small players through the 
mentioned absence of labor unions provides further opportunities to grow or enter certain 
segments that would be unattractive otherwise (Enz, 2018). Such real market niches may 
continue to exist within the European market. Furthermore, within these niches small 
players are not exposed to the same market risks as large airlines (Trestl, 2018).  Enz 
(2018) also sees opportunities in tapping markets that are looking for connectivity: “Here 
or there you might be able to establish something new if you have the right market feeling 
for it, maybe also in cooperation with the airport authorities in the target country.” 
(Appendix 1.11.1) 
Another opportunity arises from providing services to large airlines that 
experience pressure on their short-haul fleets. As elaborated under section 6.2.4, small 
airlines can thus leverage their cost advantages to act as cheap platforms. Wittmer (2018) 
suggests this could also mean that a large airline ‘buys’ itself a small airline to operate 
these short flights on a more profitable basis. 
 
Lastly, certain opportunities could arise from strategic advantages a small carrier 
might hold. This includes for example possessing valuable airport slots, a modern fleet, 
or serving a customer segment another player is particularly interested in. As to why 
SWISS bought Edelweiss in 2008, Trestl (2018) explains: “[…] because it was a 
favorable cost structure, it was also enabling SWISS and with SWISS the Lufthansa group 
to tap into the leisure segment here in Switzerland with an already existing customer 
base.” (Appendix 11.1.2) 
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6.3.4 Threats 
Small airlines face numerous threats that could potentially endanger their 
existence in the future. In particular, this includes the fact that small carriers need an 
investor that is willing to support the venture with capital (Wittmer, 2018). As Narkhede 
(2017) explains, liquidity is a key indicator of financial health of airlines. Thus, as seen 
in the example of Skywork, the difficulty in finding an investor can be a credible business 
threat (Schmid & Flottau, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, the dependency of airlines relying solely on ACMI contracting is a 
threat waiting to materialize. According to Agius (2018), Helvetic “would definitely not 
have such a large fleet as they do now if it weren’t for SWISS” and “everything that 
Helvetic has tried in the past de facto failed” (Appendix 11.1.3) Krutzler (2018) adds that 
this business form is “very difficult to calculate and difficult to predict” (Appendix 
11.1.5) 
 
Other threats are to be found in the growing competitive pressure and the 
increasing influence of LCCs in Europe (Enz, 2018). The inability to compete on price 
threatens the very existence of small airlines. Adding to this the threat of pursuing an 
undiversified business model (Krutzler, 2018), and the lack of a real niche means to 
compete against the large players, which in reality a small airline cannot beat: “Austrian 
Airlines and EasyJet are only trying to kill Skywork, and once they have achieved that 
we can assume that Austrian will return to using the Dash 8 and the prices will go up 
again.” (Agius, 2018, Appendix 11.1.3) 
 
Finally, small airlines are also threatened by substitution and the risk that their 
markets prove to be too small to attract enough passengers. Especially in markets with 
low purchasing power it can be very difficult for regional carriers to even cover their 
recurring costs (Krutzler, 2018). Thus, substitute products may offer a more convenient 
way to cover these regional distances, as Trestl suggested “[…] especially for those kind 
of smaller airlines focusing on regional routes, you could ask if it’s more practical and 
also more efficient for someone to take a self-driving vehicle to go from Zurich to Geneva 
or to Lugano.” (2018, Appendix 11.1.2)  
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However, Krutzler also pointed out that “[…]  out of Switzerland it makes perfect 
sense that routes that aren’t necessarily high frequent ones are being served by regional 
carriers.” (2018, Appendix 11.1.5)  
 
Concluding, one can say that it has been showed that this only works if such 
airlines serve a very specific niche (such as People’s Viennaline) and are able to attract 
sufficient passenger streams with adequate purchasing power. 
 
This chapter has conclusively shown where small airlines hold strengths and 
weaknesses, and has identified external opportunities and threats. The following chapter 
aims to determine whether proactivity can be beneficial to achieve a higher transaction 
price. Further, it will derive key success factors for small airlines imperative to leverage 
the gains promised by proactive action. Thus, the conclusions from the previous analyses 
substantially contribute to the findings in Chapter 7.  
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7 Merger success factors for small airlines 
 
This paper proposes that, in light of industry consolidation, small airlines in 
Europe will be faced with takeover threats sooner or later. As seen in chapter 5 and 6, the 
market forces within Europe are heading towards more intense M&A activity, and this 
trend is congruent with the identified threats for small airlines. 
 
Thus, this section will analyze if a proactive approach to sell oneself can be 
beneficial for small airlines. Furthermore, by using the five perspectives of Marks and 
Mirvis, it aims at identifying the Key Success Factors (KSFs) for small airlines in order 
to successfully build a business case for an M&A transaction. The findings are based on 
the conducted expert interviews, in full to be found in Appendix 11.1. 
 
7.1 Benefits of proactivity   
 
Almost all interviewed experts agreed about the fact that a proactive approach can, 
from a management point of view, be beneficial in the attempt to maximize the transaction 
revenue. That is, the position from which a small airline starts negotiating can be more 
advantageous if the airline actively reaches out to potential buyers (Trestl, 2018).  
Wittmer (2018) suggests this to be a ‘smart way of thinking about it’ and adds that 
“Otherwise you are taken over. And if you are taken over, you are taken over at the rules 
of the other party, and you don’t have much to say.” (Appendix 11.1.4) 
Agius (2018), however, disagrees, stating that “[…] basically what you are saying 
is that we’re becoming increasingly desperate. And once it becomes apparent to your 
opponent that you are desperate, they dictate the price.” (Appendix 11.1.3) 
Trestl (2018) concurs with this viewpoint, underlining that “if you have to sell 
yourself because you are in a for example bad financial situation and you are looking for 
relief […], the price which you might be able to achieve for your airline could be lower 
than if you would proactively approach airlines.” In essence, this means that, unless the 
firm finds itself in financial trouble, the proactivity gives one an important edge “because 
you are flexible. You don’t need to sell - you can sell.” (Appendix 11.1.2) 
The underlying question of whether such a strategy makes sense is also to be found 
in the business model and the current market situation (Trestl 2018, Krutzler, 2018). The 
management must question its business model sustainability, and how their niche markets 
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might develop in the future. Markets can move incredibly fast, and a convenient situation 
can become inconvenient quite quickly (Enz, 2018).  
 
Finally, selling also means giving up control, and with it the entrepreneurial 
freedom. As elaborated under 6.2.4, the integration process however can be supported by 
first entering into alliances, and thus interests can be aligned over time. Hence, it could 
make sense to take a ‘slow-motion’, yet proactive approach, as Wittmer (2018) explained: 
“This way you could rather find a partner and say let’s integrate in five years from now, 
and in those five years we work towards it in close collaboration.” (Appendix 11.1.4) 
 
In conclusion, it has been shown that a proactive approach towards an M&A deal 
can indeed prove beneficial for small airlines, considering the different factors behind 
such a decision. Thus, three distinct KSFs were identified that are crucial for small 
carriers in their attempts to develop a business case for a potential buyer. 
 
7.2 KSF 1: Strategic Niche 
 
The first key factor is the strategic niche. The niche is important because it gives 
the small airline the reason to exist; since it cannot compete on the highly frequented 
routes, it must specialize in a niche where there is a certain demand for air travel within 
a certain segment, all whilst competition is benign in that very segment. “Small airlines 
need niches, otherwise it doesn’t work”, Wittmer (2018, Appendix 11.1.4) emphasizes. 
If the segment or niche is attractive enough, it can prove to be a KSF when entering into 
negotiations with a large player. Marks et al. (1998) highlight how the strategic fit impacts 
the integration process. That is, if the strategy of the buyer does not align with that of its 
target, the integration will prove difficult. The niche however offers the buyer something 
he is potentially interested in, such as quick market access or tapping a specific customer 
segment (Trestl, 2018). Furthermore, the niche may also offer an extension to the buyer’s 
network, basically ready-made (Agius, 2018).  
Though the strategic fit is the first aspect to look at, Trestl (2018) elucidates that 
even if an airline offers a strategy in line with the intentions of the buyer, the frame 
conditions may prove to be less favorable. This leads to the second KSF presented below. 
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7.3 KSF 2: Organizational Fit 
 
Marks et al.' (1998) dimension ‘organization’ entails the building of a better firm, 
leveraging the advantages the combination offers. The second important factor therefore 
contains the actual assets the seller has to offer, and how well these assets fit into the 
organization of the buying airline (Trestl, 2018). For Wittmer (2018) this is primarily 
reflected in the cost structure and the availability of planes, as well as airport slots. Here 
it is important to note that the buying airline is first and foremost interested in the offered 
assets (Wittmer, 2018) and the increased market access these assets bring (Enz, 2018). A 
modern fleet, tight organization, flight hierarchies, and favorable cost structure are 
therefore a key success factor for small airlines in their negotiation attempts. Krutzler 
(2018) summarizes “If you are reliable and have a good service, you have something to 
show, which helps you to leverage your stand point.” (Appendix 11.1.5) 
The importance of organizational fit is underlined by a statement a Lufthansa 
executive made to Enz (2018), saying that “(…) but do we have to buy an entire airline 
or do we just need new planes? Planes which we can acquire much cheaper this way than 
if we buy them from Airbus directly.“ (Appendix 11.1.1) 
 
Hence, the KSF of organizational fit contains the small airline’s ability to trim its 
organization, maintain a modern fleet, and know the asset worth in its books such as the 
value of airport slots in its possession. This combination may motivate the buyer to 
purchase the entire firm. 
 
7.4 KSF 3: People and Staff 
 
The third factor, and maybe most important, is the dimension termed ‘people’ by 
Marks et al. (1998). This involves the actual humans affected by the transaction, their 
feelings and attitudes towards the deal and their subsequent behavior. To be informed 
about the sentiment within the company is crucial and “Combinations have the potential 
to affect employee morale and productivity, work processes and quality, group and 
intergroup relationships, customer service and satisfaction, and practically every other 
aspect of organizational life.” (Marks et al., 1998, p. 258)  
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As the airline industry is highly emotional (Agius, 2018) and people consider 
having aviation as part of their DNA (Wittmer, 2018), this dimension quickly identified 
as a KSF.   
 
One of the main advantages of smaller airlines is their lower cost base due to 
generally lower salary structures, as explained in chapter 6. This strength can be leveraged 
when negotiating with a potential buyer. However, and here it becomes tricky, the small 
airline must ensure the alignment of its staff with the strategic intentions. That is, once 
the transaction is announced, the airline staff will get into direct contact and subsequently 
demand equal pay (Agius, 2018). This means the cost advantage of the small carrier, and 
with it one of the prime arguments, vanishes. Such a scenario can be avoided by creating 
different firms and by not fully integrating, as has been the case after Crossair had bought 
the bankrupt Swissair in 2002. The new companies were named SWISS Global Air Lines 
Ltd. and SWISS International Air Lines Ltd., respectively (Wittmer, 2018). Reconciling 
this issue however took SWISS several years, as the involved people were all but happy 
about the situation (Agius, 2018). For years, the pilot corps were split into “the Swissair” 
and “the Crossair” guys, creating a sense of hostility within the company. Even so, the 
example of SWISS is not necessarily representative, as it is logical to assume that people 
working for the same company demand the same salary for the same type of work. Thus, 
the risk may also be mitigated by keeping separate brands, as is the case with Edelweiss 
(Trestl, 2018). Therein, Edelweiss management has somehow accomplished that their 
employees accept lower salaries than their SWISS colleagues (Wittmer, 2018).    
 
This alignment of people and staff, then, is imperative in retaining the advantages 
of a small airline as outlined under section 6.3. Thus in the case of Helvetic being acquired 
by another airline for example, Wittmer (2018) explains that “you could just say let’s 
keep it as it is, run it as Helvetic. But own it and integrate it better into your network.” 
(Appendix 11.1.4) The challenge therein would be to ensure the support of such a strategy 
by the entire Helvetic staff.  
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8 The auction process as strategic option 
 
The previous chapters have analyzed the European market in detail and have 
specifically outlined the strengths and weaknesses of small airlines. The evidence from 
this study therefore suggests the following: 
 
1. Consolidation in Europe will continue, and it will pick up speed and scope 
2. Small airlines will be faced with consolidation pressures sooner or later, as the 
competitive forces in Europe will further put further pressure on costs 
3. The large players will grow even larger, as has been seen with Lufthansa and IAG. 
Very recent events such as the turmoil of Air France imply the happening of future 
mega-mergers 
 
The findings from this study further substantiated the fact that, to increase their 
chances of survival and maximize the transaction revenue, small airlines should consider 
to proactively sell themselves. Hence, the following section outlines different possible 
scenarios small airlines are confronted with, the lessons learned from the Virgin America 
transaction, and finally key criteria and stumbling blocks identified by the author. 
 
8.1 Consolidation scenarios of small airlines 
 
As explained in chapters 2.2 and 5.2.2., the fragmented nature of the European 
aviation industry still offers small airlines some opportunities to continue to operate 
independently. Summarized, the author sees the following scenarios: 
 
1. Continue niche operations independently: if there is a strategic niche, and there is 
sufficient demand for air travel, high customer buying power, and organic growth 
potential, the airline can continue operating independently for the foreseeable future 
 
2. Join them: If the situation equals scenario 1, but the airline queries the long-term 
sustainability of its niche operations, already highly depends on others, questions 
scalability or growth potential, or foresees an increase in competition then it can join 
the large players by selling itself, or initially entering an alliance 
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3. Icarus: If there is not a real niche nor a real strategy, insufficient market size, inability 
to compete, and increasing pressure from consolidation then the airline will either fail 
or get taken over on the sole terms of the buyer 
 
This study has shown that all these scenarios are possible. However, in terms of 
surviving as an airline brand and in the shareholder’s interest to maximize transaction 
revenue, it can be beneficial to act as proposed in scenario 2, before market forces catch 
up. 
 
8.2 Lessons learned from the Virgin America case 
 
The acquisition of Virgin America through Alaska Air as presented under section 
2.1.1 was a novelty in the airline industry, as it showed how an airline can strategically 
approach consolidation in a proactive manner. In hindsight, three specific lessons can be 
derived that are of interest for any airline attempting such a strategic maneuver: 
 
1. The management of Virgin achieved an excellent transaction price. By proactively 
approaching interested buyers it bumped up the deal revenue to $2.6bn. According to 
Zhang (2016) this is almost double of what the airline was trading at. Virgin 
shareholders earned $75 per share. In the year preceding the transaction, the highest 
value amounted to $37 per share. Evidently, Alaska paid roughly $1bn in Goodwill.  
 
2. Alaska Air did not pay this much premium because they had abundant cash and simply 
liked the Virgin executives. Rather, the seller’s management knew what it was offering 
the buyer (Zhang, 2016), and it leveraged its position – as Trestl (2018) argued “You 
don’t need to sell - you can sell.” (Appendix 11.1.2)  
 
3. The Virgin America brand did not survive the transaction. Though initially promised 
by Alaska Air management as elaborated under section 2.1.1, the last flight branded 
as Virgin America landed on April 25, 2018 (Dorsey, 2018). This means the objective 
to continue to operate as ‘own’ brand was not achieved by the deal.  
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8.3 Key criteria  
 
Results from the Virgin America case empirically support that proactivity can 
yield a profit in an M&A transactions. Combined with the observations made in the trend 
analysis in chapter 5, the author also sees the possibility that in the European market, the 
chances to survive as a brand under the new owner are higher than in the US. So far, all 
large airline groups in Europe are pursuing a multi-brand strategy. Hence, the following 
are considered key criteria in the small airline’s attempts to build a business case for a 
future auction. 
 
8.3.1 Proactivity and foresight 
Evaluating market trends is crucial for any business venture. Having said this, in 
the case of airline industry consolidation and the very distinct European market, small 
airlines must comprehensively understand where the industry is headed and comprehend 
as a matter of prudence whether their business model is sustainable in the long term. 
Rising oil prices, for example, constitute a classical example of a threat that must be 
reckoned with.  This foresight, however, must extend beyond the usual market analysis 
as it then enables the management to consider to proactively move forward, as seen in the 
Virgin America transaction. This means that the peculiarities of the fragmented European 
market offer opportunities for small airlines, but proactivity is imperative in order to 
capture them.  The inevitable, then, is that small airlines will face takeover in the future. 
Foresight lays the fundament that will help them to trim their operations and align their 
staff, and the proactivity will weaken the effect of perceived desperation and improve 
transaction value. 
 
8.3.2 Internal efficiency and leverage of success factors 
As small airlines cannot realize economies of scale, strengths within the value 
chain must be identified and leveraged in order to improve efficiency. Moreover, 
resources should be directed towards the key success factors as identified in chapter 7, 
namely the strategic niche, the organizational fit, and the staff.  To enhance the 
attractiveness to the potential buyer, the small airline’s management should monitor the 
KSFs, and analyze in detail as to what organizational benefit the buyer would gain by 
acquiring the airline.  
 
  58 
8.3.3 Clean operational history 
Some airlines get handed over from one investor to the next, funding the venture 
until operations are halted. The lack of strategy and unawareness of market forces does 
not favor a clean operational history, and thus will not be attractive for any buyer. Hence, 
KSFs cannot be leveraged to increase transaction value and the brand survival, as the 
prime argument of the buyer to depress the price will lie in the operational history. Having 
a superior product, providing a timely service, financial stability, and favorable cost 
structure is a key argument in the auction process, as it ensures the buyer that there will 
be no bad surprises and operations can smoothly be integrated. 
 
8.4 Stumbling blocks 
 
Given that the small airline’s management concludes that an auction could be a 
strategic choice in the future, the following stumbling blocks may obstruct such 
intentions.  
 
8.4.1 Alignment of the airline staff 
As seen in chapters 6 and 7, the small airline’s staff is a major success factor that 
can be leveraged in negotiations. However, failure to align the employees with the 
strategic intentions can dismantle this advantage. Extensive costs and efforts may have to 
be directed towards solving issues related to labor unions, lowering the impact of 
synergies gained from the transaction.  
 
8.4.2 Inability to concede 
Examples within the industry provide evidence that the inability to make 
concessions is a major stumbling block. This is connected to the aforementioned staff 
alignment; if the entire organization is not directed towards change, and the inevitability 
of market forces is not conveyed thoroughly, the firm will not be bought in one piece but 
rather split apart, and the brand will not survive. Carefully projected, this threatens the 
existence of not only Alitalia, but more recently now also Air France. 
 
8.4.3 Lack of a raison d’être 
A small airline without a reason to be will not survive consolidation, as there is 
no need for their services. The lack of a real strategy, as is the case with Skywork, 
  59 
ultimately results in an investor losing money until the airline gets sold to the next 
investor. Without some raison d’être, the airline cannot make valuable arguments towards 
a potential buyer, as it has nothing to offer; consequently, it cannot leverage any KSFs 
towards such a goal, and is therefore destined to disappear at some point. 
 
8.4.4 Perceived desperation 
The last stumbling block is that the seller is perceived as acting desperate, which 
impacts on the price. This can be avoided by leveraging the KSFs and presenting a solid 
business case. The proactivity mentioned above is therefore imperative as it indicates that 
the organization could potentially continue on its own, even if no buyer is found. 
 
 
8.5 Closing remarks 
 
The European aviation sector is moving forward on the consolidation curve. This 
thesis has shown where the market is headed, how competitive forces are at interplay, and 
where small airlines can draw imperative strengths and weaknesses from. Some threats 
are faced by all airlines, while others are more dangerous for the small players.  
 
The recent times of higher profitability levels, high growth in demand, and lower 
oil prices has allowed some airlines to continue operations even though a real strategy 
was missing. As some of these factors have reached an industry peak, it is questionable 
that such carriers can survive an industry downturn. Consequently, if ill prepared, they 
will face severe threats to their business. 
 
 This thesis has shown that there are strategic ways forward, such as the proactive 
M&A auction. The fragmented European market and the different political entities will 
not allow a similar form of consolidation as has been observed in the US, which offers 
opportunities for smaller players to survive as a brand. However, the presented key 
criteria and their impact should be carefully considered and studied within the 
organization before moving forward.   
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9 Conclusions 
 
9.1 Summary 
 
The aim of this thesis was to provide the reader with a wider understanding of the 
nature of industry consolidation within the European aviation sector. A further objective 
was to clarify the strategic options for small airlines, and whether it could be beneficial 
for them to proactively sell themselves before facing a hostile takeover. Finally, the goal 
was to provide key criteria and stumbling blocks small airlines should be aware of before 
considering the auction as a possible way forward. 
 
The first chapter provided specific information about the aim and objective of this 
thesis, before Chapter 2 introduced the nature of consolidation in the American and 
European markets, as well as the differences in the dynamics of industry consolidation. 
It showed how the American market has progressed to stage 3 on the consolidation curve, 
whereas the European sector is still more fragmented, and finds itself in stage 2 on the 
curve. Chapter 2 also introduced the Swiss market and the respective airlines used as 
examples throughout the thesis, before Chapter 3 gave a quick introduction to the M&A 
auction process. That is, several buyers concurrently hand in offers to buy a potential 
target.  
 
Chapter 4 introduced the methodology used within the thesis, namely the market 
analysis and the respective tools used to conduct it. Furthermore, it presented the expert 
interview as the main research methodology and gave an overview of the selected 
interview partners. 
 
The fifth chapter covered the trend analysis of the European aviation sector. It 
provided information about the profitability levels, the general trend, as well as the future 
developments concerning consolidation. The chapter concluded that industry profitability 
is stable but seems to have reached a peak. Further, it revealed that consolidation will 
pick up speed and scope, and that the business models of LCCs and Legacy carriers are 
converging and integrating. Lastly, the trend analysis proposed that chances of survival 
for small airlines are low, and that they will face consolidation pressure rather sooner than 
later. 
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Chapter 6 entailed the market analysis of the European aviation sector. It used 
Porter’s model of the five forces to plot the competitive landscape as well as Porter’s 
model of the generic value chain to identify key activities of small airlines. Moreover, the 
SWOT analysis was applied to extract internal and external factors that are of strategic 
importance for small airlines. The chapter provided evidence about the strong competition 
in the industry and showed how the forces are fueling consolidation. It also proved why 
small airlines cannot compete against the large players. The value chain and SWOT 
analysis identified key value chain factors, that can subsequently be turned into strengths 
and opportunities.  
 
Chapter 7 drew from the previous conducted analysis’ in Chapter 6 and elaborated 
on whether it could be beneficial for small airlines to proactively approach an M&A 
transaction. Using the five perspectives of Marks et al., the chapter then presented a list 
of three Key Success Factors an airline should leverage in such an approach, namely the 
strategic niche, the organizational fit, and its people and staff. 
 
Chapter 8 combined the knowledge gained in the previous chapters to answer the 
research question. It presented a list of consolidation scenarios for small airlines and 
elaborated on the lessons learned from the Virgin America case and why they are 
important for this thesis. After stating that it could indeed be beneficial for small airlines 
to take a proactive approach towards consolidation, the chapter presented a list of key 
criteria and stumbling blocks, all of which should be addressed by the organization in 
order to increase its attractiveness for a potential buyer. The chapter concluded that due 
to the fragmented nature of the European industry, small airlines have a higher chance of 
surviving as a brand than their American counterparts. 
 
9.2 Contribution 
 
The findings of this thesis support the understanding of the current state of 
consolidation within the European aviation sector and provide information about what is 
to be expected by small airlines in the future. The thesis specifically shows where the 
strengths and opportunities lie for small airlines and where respective company resources 
should be directed to. It also provides a signal for small airlines about the threat of 
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consolidation to their businesses and makes them question the sustainability of their 
niche. 
This study also serves as a basis for further research and will help to establish new 
strategic ideas that could help smaller airlines in Europe to find a way to co-exist amongst 
the large industry players.  
 
9.3 Limitations and further research 
 
This thesis has several limitations. First and foremost, it only consulted experts 
from the Swiss market, and used mainly airlines from Switzerland as examples. To 
comprehend the full market trends, industry experts from other European countries should 
be questioned, as the individual countries still act as sovereign entities and are entitled 
put constraints on the aviation sector. This for example entails the careful study of the 
impact of state subsidies. 
 
Second, the underlying processes behind the Virgin America case and the 
differences between the European and American markets could not be reconciled fully. 
Detailed analysis of the Virgin case, as well as legal requirements and differences would 
need to be examined to fully comprehend the procedure of an airline M&A auction. 
Moreover, no evidence was found of another, similar case within the aviation industry. 
Thus the representativeness of the Virgin America case must also be carefully considered. 
Herewith, researchers are advised to conduct wider investigations into success factors and 
best practices concerning airline auctions. 
 
Third, there have been few academic studies on the possibility of an airline 
auction. To predict how the market in Europe would react, and if there is an actual interest 
for such a process, was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Further research in these areas is therefore recommended. Moreover, as explained 
under 9.2 the information gathered in this thesis should be used to conduct wider research 
as to what strategies small airlines in Europe can apply to survive. Having identified 
important key criteria and stumbling blocks, it would be interesting to see how a 
framework would help a small airline’s management to build a solid business case for an 
auction.  
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11 Appendix 
 
11.1 Transcribed Interviews 
 
11.1.1 Werner Enz, Editor, Neue Zürcher Zeitung NZZ  
 
Transcript: Interview with Werner Enz, editor and aviation journalist at NZZ 
 
Interviewer:   David Egli, Student IM 
Interview partner:   Werner Enz 
Editor, Aviation journalist, NZZ 
Date:     Friday, April 13th, 2018 
Time and Location:  14:30 
Falkenstrasse 11, Zurich 
Language:    Swiss dialect (de) 
 
 
 
 
Interviewer: What do you think about small airlines in Europe? What are their 
advantages/opportunities and disadvantages/threats? Some scholars say SWISS would be 
a middle sized Airline, so as an example I would take something smaller than SWISS, for 
example Helvetic Airways. 
 
Werner Enz: Yes, Helvetic is very small. All in all, they have about 400 employees since 
they also handle the maintenance part. So yes, what should I say about those small airlines 
- what is special in this industry compared with banks or insurance companies is that the 
market entry barrier is relatively low. If someone has a little money and thinks this is 
interesting, he can get a permission with 2 or 3 planes, show his business plan and just 
start at some point.  
In Europe, roughly said, we have for sure more than 100 airlines. But those that really 
count are maybe 20 or so. Helvetic Airways was built up by Mr. Ebner piece by piece 
with the strategy of a niche player, constantly checking the ‘bigger concert’, and offering 
flight services from Switzerland. So this means obviously they don’t service a speedway 
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like Berlin or Madrid with their Fokker that sits roughly 100 people. A) they rather offer 
tactical services such as servicing certain holiday destinations like south Italy and B) 
they’ve been maintaining important wet-lease contracts for years, also acting as a capacity 
modulator for SWISS. Skywork Airlines then would be even smaller yet, with their home 
base Berne - a hard business with even smaller airplanes, and Berne also isn’t the center 
of the world. And to be honest, the distances within Switzerland are getting smaller and 
smaller, also with the increase in quality of the public transportation system. So to take 
the car or train to Basel or Zurich and then fly from there is more convenient for most. In 
maybe a radius of 300-400 km the railway is often the better way of transportation.  
 
Interviewer: So what would you then say could be a specific advantage of small airlines, 
or let’s say Helvetic. I mean they have managed to stay around for a couple years now, 
so they kind of have their raison d’être, wouldn’t you say? 
 
Werner Enz: So one advantage could be that they are maybe more flexible in adapting 
certain flight plans. If you are SWISS you are maybe more exposed to the customer’s 
expectations that you always offer that flight to Kiev, whilst as a small carrier you may 
adjust your schedules more often. Apart from that you also have the strong company spirit 
as often seen within small firms, one knows each other, decision paths are shorter, and 
everyone is more involved. In turn what has become difficult in Europe, as a small carrier 
you can’t serve very lucrative routes as there is lots of competition - rather one serves a 
niche, making sure to not disturb the big ones. This way one can follow sort of an adjusted 
strategy. Or one serves a completely different segment, such as the business aviation. 
Here or there you might be able to establish something new if you have the right market 
feeling for it, maybe also in cooperation with the airport authorities in the destination 
country. Another trend is that the point-to-point connections are getting more important, 
the so called ‘city pairs’. So suddenly there’s someone who says „Ok I’m just going to do 
it now“ - like right now, after the Air berlin failure, is the supply side really optimal? So 
for example Berlin-London offers chances, also for small players.  
 
Interviewer: In the US, the last 15 years have seen immense consolidation. How would 
you describe the European aviation industry trend in general? Specifically, the big 
challenges for small airlines?  
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Werner Enz: If you think about what Lufthansa has bought in the last 10 years, it’s 
enormous. Austrian Airlines, Brussels Airlines, Swiss, parts of Air berlin - and it can be 
generally observed that the top dog in a country eats the small ones. Here and there, there 
have been strategically courageous moves such as Air France-KLM, or the idea of British 
Airways to acquire Iberia plus Vueling, despite their strong London hub and north-
Atlantic position. So for me within the IAG it is de facto still BA at the controls. 
Consolidation in general is not as far advanced in Europe as in the US, but it will continue. 
Another factor still observable is the continuing increase of LCC market share within the 
European market. And I would venture to say the Legacy carriers have underestimated 
this.  The fact how easy you can win customers with a cheap machinery such as Ryanair 
is unbelievable. Plus, the European airline industry still experiences growth. 
 
Interviewer: So this is a challenge for a small airline, as it basically gets eaten sooner or 
later. Or how would you interpret this, from the point of view of Helvetic or Air Baltic, 
also not a very big player. 
 
Werner Enz: Well that also depends on who’s behind it, and if they are seeking new 
investors. So if you think about it, there’s been a time when Ryanair was really small, or 
when Wizz Air was really small, and they sometimes grow extremely fast. If their product 
is well received, they are like a wheel where everything just works, and that wheel gets 
bigger from year to year. So this means there are some small carriers doing their 
homework quite well, and they grow. Then there are some small ones that disappear 
again, or get liquidated, and the big ones inherit the parts. Then there’s some without a 
growth strategy, and without special ambitions to gain market share but the goal to stay 
small and serve a niche segment. So for a Helvetic Airways in the current setup, with the 
current owner structure, this means there won’t be big changes unless they get investors 
on board with higher aspirations. They will stay in the Swiss market, strategically 
operating in the shadow of SWISS, maintaining their close contracts with SWISS. The 
share of wet-lease orders from SWISS on Helvetic’s capacity is very high, more than 50 
percent. So these contracts aren’t changed overnight, and if something is abandoned then 
it’s usually for a longer period. And SWISS also has other ‘wild cards’ in store, through 
the Lufthansa Group. What we have seen in recent years is that Edelweiss as brand has 
been pushed extremely, and that it plays and important role in the Lufthansa calculations 
by serving important travel destinations here and there. This is also due to the fact that 
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for example Belair has financially crashed. Now Belair is gone, the Arab investors are 
gone, as you might remember how one tried to stir up the market with Etihad Regional. 
For Darwin it was not at all beneficial to sell stakes to the Abu Dhabi investor, who, from 
my point of view, made large strategic mistakes by investing in Alitalia and Airberlin.  
 
Interviewer: In your opinion, how do you think consolidation in Europe differs from the 
US?  
 
Werner Enz: In Europe consolidation is not as far advanced. And even though we have 
a European Single Market concept - if I have my HQ in Vienna I can practically fly 
anywhere - there’s also quite some protectionism. So if you are Etihad, liked or not, you 
cannot buy an entire European airline. Then it basically loses the intra-European 
freedoms. So in net terms the European aviation market constellation is neither very witty, 
nor innovative, nor liberal. I mean neither are the Americans, as it is forbidden as a 
foreigner to hold more than 25 percent of a company’s shares. So also very nailed up 
concerning ownership structures.   
 
Interviewer: Yet there we see that Delta buys another airline and it all becomes Delta, 
whereas here, Lufthansa buys Swiss and Swiss is still Swiss. 
  
Werner Enz: In contrast, the US is ‘one big nation’, whereas in Europe, Union or not, 
what prevails is still the societal image of individual nations. And it would for sure be a 
strategic mistake of the highest order if you would just erase the brand SWISS, and say 
„well you know dear colleagues, as you know we have bought this 13 years ago, it’s about 
time and we’re going to restyle everything, and it all becomes Lufthansa.“ The brand 
Lufthansa is so far ok in Switzerland, but one would simply be giving up market 
opportunities if one would abandon the brand SWISS. The emotionality in the aviation 
business should not be underestimated. On the other hand, if you go and check how many 
airlines still carry the national flag on their tail - there aren’t that many anymore. Then 
there’s those who aren’t that proud of it anymore, for example Alitalia.  Just recently it 
was announced that the selling process was prolonged because the state now faces the 
problem that Alitalia is under state receivership. But the markets are moving fast and if 
under European freedoms I can fly to Rome or Bergamo, why should I buy stakes of 
Alitalia, that wouldn’t make sense. About half a year ago I wrote an article reading 
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„Ryanair makes Alitalia obsolete.“ Alitalia is not needed, and if you would turn it off 
from one day to another, it would be horrible for the employees etc. but concerning the 
service quality, you would find a situation not very different from today within a few 
weeks. Here and there we see rescue maneuvers by governments that don’t necessarily 
concentrate on the quality of certain services, but simply on protecting jobs. 
I am awed every once in a while, as the EU always talks about the prohibition of state 
subsidies, but why then was it ok with Olympic Airways, or now Alitalia? I mean, they 
get supported with hundreds of millions of Euros again and again - where’s the business 
case, where’s the liquidation plan? Nowhere. And that makes the European market 
supervising body vulnerable. And as long as Rome doesn’t comply, what are you going 
to do, really.  
 
Interviewer: Considering Porter’s five forces – Industry Competitiveness, Threat of New 
Entrants, Power of Buyers, Power of Suppliers, Threat of Substitutes – how do you 
perceive these forces at work within the European market?  
  
Werner Enz: Industry Competitiveness: Everything is more or less ‘regional’ within 
Europe. And you basically have no gadgets anymore, so you have a very homogenous 
product, i.e. flights from A to B. Maybe you have a checked luggage, but the sandwich 
you can basically bring yourself. So in terms of on-board service, you have some sort of 
commodity. In the industry competitiveness, connectivity is very important, so the quality 
of the routes you serve, and what recurring cost structure you have, since that is very 
crucial to remain competitive. It also depends on the routes, some are frequently used by 
business travelers, others are pure holiday destinations with very price sensitive 
customers. For this reason, there can be airlines you wouldn’t expect operating very 
strongly on some routes. But overall, Ryanair is definitely number one for me at the 
moment. They are mainly so successful because the model is so simple - lean, identical 
fleet, short rotations. Threat of New Entrants: For me that’s not a threat but rather an 
opportunity, since entry barriers are low, compared to other industries. And it is 
apparently also sexy to be part of this aviation-machine. There’s a billionaire here and 
there who wants a landmark. Niki Lauda for example just can’t stop, he’s still in the 
business. First negotiating with Lufthansa, then IAG, and then all of a sudden with 
Ryanair. Or if you consider Olympic Air, back in the day one of the worst led airlines, 
now operating profitably and growing under the new name Aegean. In general, since I’ve 
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been writing about this, mobility together with increased income levels is still growing. 
There’s not really a feeling of market saturation. And I also haven’t seen a very strong 
substitution thus far. It’s not as if we would be saying the route Switzerland-France is 
totally old and unattractive for airlines. Overall seen there’s a lot of market potential in 
this area. Power of Buyers: Ryanair has something around 100m passengers a year, 
Lufthansa as well, though that’s consolidated over the group. So an average Ryanair flight 
maybe around 1800km while with Lufthansa it might be something around 4000km. And 
it will be interesting to see if this multi-brand strategy of Lufthansa works out, with 
Eurowings as a counter action. They have grown very fast in the last two years, which 
shows that within the Lufthansa group one can work out a different cost structure, focused 
on low-cost point-to-point routes. Power of Suppliers: That really depends on the kind of 
service. So in terms of ground handling, Swissport is a very strong player.  
 
Interviewer: So would you also see the possibility of backward integration? So 
Lufthansa or Swiss say ok, we’re going to buy Swissport back? 
 
Werner Enz: Yes, for sure. I’m a strong believer in the concept that there are more 
favorable shareholders for some firms than others. So if a main carrier or a shareholder 
can’t make use of something other than ruin or drain it, sooner or later there the question 
of ‘what now’ will arise. Lufthansa for example is very diversified: own catering and own 
maintenance, which is also strategically important.  In contrast, there are many airlines 
who are glad that there are ‘independent’ firms such as SR Technics.  
 
Interviewer: Lufthansa and Co. have so far renounced to incorporate acquired airlines, 
but rather form large groups and let the subsidiaries operate under their own brand. This 
differs from the approach of US airlines, forming massive carriers under a single brand - 
do you think this European ‘fragmentation’ provides opportunities for small airlines?  
 
Werner Enz: Well that doesn’t just depend on the brand, but is also due to the fact that 
for example Lufthansa doesn’t have a very strong home market - here one speaks of a so 
called ‘catchment area’. An example would be Cathay Pacific in Hong Kong. This means 
with the natural stream of customers from that area (large city, metropolitan area) you 
can already achieve a lot. This is definitely not the case for Lufthansa. Neither Frankfurt 
nor Berlin are that large. So a multi-hub strategy seems to be the natural result. And that 
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is what they are doing - basically a sub-hubbing in Munich, Vienna, and Zurich. So then 
it seems perfectly fitting to have an own brand for each market. You also have to keep 
the customer’s emotional attachment in mind - America is different, they don’t have the 
need of a ‘Nebraska’ or ‘Wyoming’ airline. It’s not the same perception of state 
belonging. And I see this as something that continues, though it probably won’t last 
forever. For example, AXA buying Winterthur insurance - first one kept the orange in the 
logo, then it became blue, and in a couple of years AXA Winterthur in Switzerland will 
simply be AXA. From this process I would not exclude airlines explicitly, but for sure for 
a couple of years, and many years in Switzerland. In Switzerland there are also ties to the 
old aviation foundation through which also the Swiss government brings itself into play 
and postulates that the Swiss economy has the need of intercontinental connections. Also 
you still have the system of bilateral agreements based on the Chicago convention of 
1944. This means also a Lufthansa has to come to an agreement with the Swiss 
government.  
 
Interviewer: Are you familiar with the Virgin America case? 
 
Werner Enz: So Virgin stands for Branson, right? I mean he’s a very successful 
billionaire, with his brands Virgin Atlantic, Virgin Australia and then also Virgin 
America. As far as I know they’ve been bought by Alaska Air roughly 2 years ago and 
are following sort of a niche strategy within a certain geographical area, that is US west 
coast.  
  
Interviewer: In light of industry consolidation, do you think it could be beneficial for 
small airlines to sell themselves on their own terms (before getting taken over or being 
pushed out by competition), and if so, why? What could be possible advantages / 
disadvantages? 
 
Werner Enz: So the way you are framing this basically describes the case of SWISS. 
Basically on the ruins of a grounded airline, and in a combined effort of state and private 
firms, one operated a at the beginning very large fleet. And after struggling to survive 
they were thinking, well, how can we solve this. I mean, Nestlé, Swiss Re, the two big 
banks, some other private Companies, and most of all the Swiss state, they all jumped in 
with the idea to establish a new base. And then the markets showed that if you want to 
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become attractive you have to do your homework. So that meant to strongly reduce the 
fleet, depreciate some assets, and negotiate on a new basis. So in a not very golden 
situation one finally had a business case and sold the airline to Lufthansa.  
  
Interviewer: But one also has to say that SWISS was acquired very cheaply, and didn’t 
have a lot of arguments left - so basically the airline was on the ground, and not in a very 
favorable position to negotiate. 
  
Werner Enz: 2003/2004/2005 I have experienced it all, it was a difficult situation, the 
company was losing tons of cash. At the beginning they started of with what, CHF 3-
4bn? And because everything was on the ground it was all very lean, good conditions 
with the leasing contracts, and everything on the left and right was basically gone. But 
still it didn’t work. But the price really wasn’t one of the three most important aspects 
back then. More important was to find someone from the industry with experience and 
the willingness to take on the risk, I mean you couldn’t sell the airline to the baker from 
next town. Secondly one needed someone who opened the door to the marketing alliance, 
one of the three big ones. Those were mainly the deciding factors.  
 
Interviewer: So to maybe specify, I mean SWISS wasn’t a very healthy company by the 
time they were sold. What I’m more interested in is if I’m a small, healthy airline with a 
good product, could it also be a strategic option to sell now instead of wait until 
consolidation forces me to? 
 
Werner Enz: Yes, I mean SWISS was relatively large after it had been rebuilt, and it was 
also a direct competitor of Lufthansa.  And Lufthansa didn’t have the urge to hand out 
presents at all. So a small one here or there, like Helvetic Airways, it’s the owner who 
has to think about how to further develop his company in the future. And one option, like 
you say, is always to look for a stronger partner. And then it might also not be that 
important if the brand survives for a couple decades or not. 
 
Interviewer: So then if you look at Air Berlin, I mean this gets ripped apart now and 
divided by the different buyers, and the Air Berlin brand is gone forever. Or Virgin 
America, where everyone was happy at first that the brand would continue to exist, and 
now everything will disappear anyway.  
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Werner Enz: Well it always depends on the circumstances of the acquisition or merger 
of equals. But I mean if you can’t progress strategically and you are 10 times smaller than 
the one who buys you, you also shouldn’t be too naive. And this is always the case, the 
one who buys the risk makes the decisions. I mean who else.  
 
Interviewer: Marks and Mirvis (2010) defined five overlapping perspectives in M&A 
transactions. Considering a small airline that wants to sell itself, where would you see  
 
1) Key arguments/possibilities for small airlines  
2) Key Success Factors (KSFs)  
3) Stumbling blocks 
 
Werner Enz: So if I want to sell despite having a healthy organization, it’s basically 
admitting that someone is stronger or better. This also means I actively give up control. 
To sell means to give up the claim to create. So a small firm that is sold, it’s interesting 
from a management perspective. In small firms often the management members hold 
large stakes in the company. So there would be the option of management buyout or one 
finds a good partner. The result are chances to grow with the new setup, and it also makes 
a good story for the employees, and if it’s all about repositioning or growing 
internationally, it might be that two small ones get together. The guy from Lufthansa it 
talked to at the IATA conference last summer said it quite bluntly from my perspective. 
He said „Look, the European market is extremely fragmented, we are far behind the 
Americans. Of course we see that Airberlin has problems, but do we have to buy an entire 
airline or do we just need new planes? Planes which we can acquire much cheaper this 
way than if we buy them from airbus directly.“ 
And then there’s something completely different adding to this, if you look at Alitalia, 
they aren’t interested in the company or the employees, but in the Italian customers. This 
is the important aspect, and you always have to make sure not to lose the focus in this. 
From my point of view, Alitalia cannot be integrated. It’s been tried many times, for 
example by Air France more than 10 years ago, and they all failed. And the markets move 
extremely fast - if I’m not mistaken, Ryanair is much bigger than Alitalia in operating 
flights from and to Italy. Ironically their largest airbase is neither Rome nor Milano, but 
Bergamo.  
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Interviewer: Probably we can say that Alitalia as a whole cannot be integrated, as it is 
too late for them. But if I am a smaller Airline and I want to be integrated, then I can 
direct resources accordingly and prepare myself - or would you say that is utopian? 
 
Werner Enz: I think yes. If you hear what Qatar is doing with Meridiana Airlines in 
Olbia, second largest airline in Italy. So if anything happens it’s about me, calling the 
minister of transportation and telling him „Dear minister, you have a problem and I can 
help you. But you have to give me the bilateral freedoms from and to Italy.” But then it 
has to be a setup with a majority of the shares lying with a European investor. So this is 
how this works, or how I would expect it to happen. And every second there are tickets 
sold, decisions taken, and the markets shift - for example in Cargo Alitalia is number 8 in 
Italy. That means there are 7 airlines ahead of it, delivering more cargo than them. 
 
Interviewer: So yes again, Alitalia is kind of a dead horse. But if we look back at Virgin, 
I mean they had good arguments. They went to Alaska and said well, we are strong on 
the west coast and you want to be stronger positioned here, so we have a good match.  
 
Werner Enz: Well as far as I understand they are kind of in trouble now, with the brand 
disappearing. And if I pay 2.3bn dollars for a company, and we talked about this branding 
issue, if I can build a strong case with Alaska Air then that is cheaper in many aspects 
than pursuing a multi-branding strategy. If we look at Europe, I mean it’s different. The 
name IBERIA for example still exists. That’s also because the name above really doesn’t 
mean anything - IAG, you cannot use this for marketing purposes. Doesn’t make sense, I 
mean it’s lacking depth - so it’s purely functional. 
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Interviewer: What do you think about small airlines in Europe? What are their 
advantages/opportunities and disadvantages/threats?  
 
Michael Trestl: I think it very much depends on how you define small because if you 
compare on like on a global competitive scale even SWISS would be a rather small player 
in the market. But in Europe there are a number of smaller airlines which are focusing 
more or less on specific niche markets, be it more on a regional scale, like, you mentioned 
the example of Helvetic which is I would say is a very rare example of how an airline can 
exist because they have specialized fully, more or less fully on providing wet-lease 
services to other airlines, especially to SWISS. So their own sort of commercial 
responsibility is there but it is very limited. I mean of course you have to negotiate from 
a Helvetic perspective the long-term wet-lease contracts with your partners, but you are 
not exposed to those kinds of market risks like for instance SWISS would be, for selling 
tickets directly on the market. And so I see, you know, if we compare or if you take the 
example of Helvetic. I mean there are other examples in Europe, in France and there are 
  80 
other examples also in Great Britain with smaller airlines that are really specialized in 
their market niche, or regional routes. Some have even specialized in serving just one or 
two routes with a high degree of commuting traffic - take the example of Altenrhein’s 
Viennaline, with I think only 2 aircraft serving only a handful of markets, which gives a 
high degree of specialization. So this is I would say one of the advantages that exists in 
regards to those small airlines, having a high degree of specialization which means a high 
customer orientation, and also a high degree of vertical range (Fertigungstiefe) to a certain 
extent - the degree of how deep you really know your special market or segment that you 
particularly take care of. With those advantages definitely come speed to market and 
flexibility. So speed I would say is one of the big advantages. And also one advantage 
before we come to the disadvantages, without knowing those regional and smaller airlines 
in every detail, but from what we know and what we understand from the situation is that 
very often the cost structures are very favorable in terms of regulation, so very little 
regulation given by unions or labor regulation. Which again contributes to the dimension 
of flexibility. On the other hand, the disadvantages I would see in purchasing. So if such 
a small airline wants to purchase an aircraft you are more or less really then alone on the 
market, so you are not able to leverage on any purchasing synergies which you might 
have as part of a bigger group or as a bigger airline. So purchasing power of you as an 
airline is rather low.  Same with the bargaining power which you have with your suppliers. 
There is very little leverage that you have through economies of scale because you are 
small. 
 
Interviewer: How about the chances of survival for small airlines in Europe/Switzerland 
such as Skywork and Helvetic? Are they even needed?  
 
Michael Trestl: It’s difficult to predict the future of course, nobody knows you know 
what is happening the day after tomorrow - tomorrow we even don’t know but we tend 
to know a little bit better than for the day after tomorrow. But I mean especially those 
examples which you list here, like for instance Skywork, is one example where we have 
just recently seen the thin line between success or failure. I think in general the European 
market tends to consolidate, so we see this - I don’t want to say it’s a mega trend - but it 
is a certain trend or at least a tendency towards consolidation and towards those rather 
small airlines becoming part of a bigger group of airlines. Nevertheless, I believe certain 
niches will remain on the market which will also provide a solid ground for the very small 
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airlines, the Skywork or Helvetic of this world, also to survive in their particular niches. 
But you have to ask the question of the scalability and of the future perspective if at a 
certain point you realize there’s no growth option. Or if you are also exposed to certain 
risk associated to only one aspect. For example, Helvetic - and this is just a hypothetical 
sentence which I am now saying - but if SWISS would come to the conclusion to end the 
contract with Helvetic there would be a very low probability of survival, probably. In this 
dimension of today.  
 
Interviewer: Helvetic is very dependent on those contracts with SWISS, too. That’s what 
you are saying, no? 
 
Michael Trestl: It is a consequence of Helvetic’s business model, which is to provide 
wet-lease services to other airlines, to be dependent - more or less - on other market 
players. It’s like if you are selling milk as a farmer and you are only selling it to one 
supermarket and if the supermarket today or tomorrow decides to buy from another 
farmer, then either you find another supermarket or you….(chuckles). 
 
Interviewer: SWISS belongs to the Lufthansa Group that owns a significant number of 
airlines. Is SWISS itself interested in buying other airlines? What could be possible 
reasons to do so?  
 
Michael Trestl: I think there are two dimensions to this. The first dimension is indeed, 
as you say, that SWISS is an integral part of the Lufthansa group and as such also part of 
the creation of something new, in the name of the Lufthansa group. So we are more or 
less deep involved in those M&A transactions which are currently on the table, like Air 
Berlin was last year and maybe others will come this year or next year. We are involved 
and in the end of the day SWISS can also benefit from these transactions. The second 
dimension, you are asking if SWISS itself is looking for M&A deals on the market and I 
have to say that we are observing and constantly monitoring, but we don’t have such an 
appetite to go on a purchasing tour. We rather more or less contribute to this overall 
consolidation which is driven by the group. But in particular for us, as we are the 
responsible airline for the market Switzerland within the Lufthansa group, we are very 
much monitoring of course what is going on here in our local market, and especially in 
those partnerships which we have mentioned before - would SWISS be interested in 
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buying Helvetic, you know these questions come up on a periodical basis but there is also 
not real interest in it at the moment. So to answer what could be possible reasons to do 
so, to enhance the cost structure or to enhance market presence, or to better tap a certain 
customer or market segment. To give one example, in 2008/2009 - there was indeed kind 
of a local M&A transaction - when SWISS as the driving force, but in the end also 
Lufthansa group, decided to buy Edelweiss from Kuoni. Why, because it was a favorable 
cost structure, it was also enabling SWISS and with SWISS the Lufthansa group to tap 
into the leisure segment here in Switzerland with an already existing customer base.  
 
Interviewer: Considering Porter’s five forces – Industry Competitiveness, Threat of New 
Entrants, Power of Buyers, Power of Suppliers, Threat of Substitutes – how do you 
perceive these forces at work in Europe?  
 
Michael Trestl: So industry competitiveness as first one is still on a high level even 
though the consolidation is going forward. There is still a very fragmented landscape of 
countries in Europe and with this a fragmentation of airlines. Still we have a very strong 
country specific culture, like France and so on which are rather small markets if you 
compare with the US, you know, a huge market, ‘all is one‘ so to say - in Europe we don’t 
have this structure. Which also leads to the fact that the number of airlines which are 
active on the market is rather high. The threat of new entrants I would say it has gone 
down a little bit, I think the new entrant phase in the market has reached its peak. Still 
there are smaller players coming up, like we also see now with the transaction of Air 
Berlin which then went into Lauda Motion when he bough back his shares from Niki and 
then again went into partnership with one of the big player, which in this case was 
Ryanair. So I would say here is a certain threat of new entrants of course, on the one hand 
it’s also a little bit complicated to open up a new airline because you have to adhere to all 
these safety standards and regulations and have a fast bureaucracy involve. On the other 
hand it’s nothing which is not feasible to do. You just need to hire people who know the 
industry and then you can set up your airline basically. I would rather see what could be 
a threat for such new entrants is the infrastructure constraints, because even though if 
today someone came up with the idea to open up a new airline and to operate here in 
Zurich the he or she would very quickly come to the conclusion that there are only very 
few additional slots available, there are infrastructure constraints, and there are all kinds 
of difficulties on a political level which erode the attractiveness of doing so. The power 
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of buyers it is also still high, I think if you consider the customer as a buyer, it’s getting 
more and more intense to cope with those future customer needs. With new technology, 
with e-commerce, everything has become so transparent. Nobody is going into a travel 
agency anymore to buy a plane ticket only. So you have full price transparency on the 
internet and you also have full customer satisfaction transparency through all these portals 
which rate the airlines according to their quality and customer satisfaction. So power of 
buyers is definitely very high. Power of Suppliers is also high but we have to differentiate 
between those suppliers which supply infrastructure - there I would say it is high, because 
very often they are in monopolistic situations like there’s only one airport here in Zurich, 
so you have to take what this airport is offering. So more or less you have to take what 
you get. Of course you can negotiate and try to get better deals, but if you are in a 
monopolistic situation, it’s very difficult. The threat of substitutes I think is a very 
interesting point if we are thinking about innovative and new modes of transportation. So 
innovation, digitalization in mobility. For example, today getting from A to B, to get on 
an airplane is the most convenient and time saving way of traveling. But if you think for 
example of autonomous transportation - if you go down 10, 15 years down the road, 
especially for those kind of smaller airlines focusing on regional routes, you could ask if 
it’s more practical and also more efficient for someone to take a self-driving vehicle to 
go from Zurich to Geneva or to Lugano. And use the time to work, or sleep, or do 
whatever you want in that new form of transportation. So I would say with new 
technologies and all these kind of evolving business models and innovations and also 
digitalization in the field of transportation and mobility, threat of substitutes is increasing. 
However, still we have to say that for long haul flights there was this kind of threat and 
everybody said with the introduction of video-conferenceing capabilities, nobody will go 
on a business trip anymore - but this threat has not materialized. Because we still see a 
lot of people going on business trips, since the personal interaction is still more important. 
But of course I mean also in that way, if you go down the road five, ten, fifteen years you 
can meet in person through holograms, more or less without you as a person having to 
physically travel anywhere. With virtual reality and augmented reality and all kind of 
things which could come up, it could also be a threat of substitution.  
 
Interviewer: Is flying a commodity nowadays, and are Legacy carriers becoming LCCs?  
 
Michael Trestl: It’s a tricky question to answer because we as SWISS as a premium 
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positioned airline definitely try to differentiate ourselves from the competition through 
premium product propositions. For example, more legroom, we still have a business class 
on European flights, we still offer full service F&B concept - even though in Geneva we 
are now trying something new, but which is also no low cost product, with the high quality 
premium partner which we have down there. On the one hand yes, the two business 
models Legacy and LCC, point-to-point airlines are coming towards each other more and 
more, but also maybe there is a tendency that the Legacy airlines are adopting some 
elements from the low costers. Vice versa the same effect happens. If you think of Ryanair 
for example five years ago, no one thought about the customer. It was all about the 
revenue, and efficiency, and about time, and nobody really cared how the customer feels 
and where can a customer complain, and so on. But recently the strategy has changed as 
well. Even though they are offering a low cost product they have adopted the philosophy 
of customer care which in former times was only to be found within the Legacy airlines. 
So it’s coming together but I would not say that it has yet come to the stage where flying 
is a commodity. I would say if you want to see where it’s really a commodity you would 
need to go to the US, because there it has really eroded and everything is more or less the 
same. But also there, if you think of market players as for example Jet Blue, who want to 
differentiate themselves also have quite a success in the market. So maybe we also see 
more or less a life cycle, everything more or less coming together, consolidating and 
consolidating, getting more and more homogeneous, but once it has reached this stage of 
‘commoditization‘ it spreads again.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the impact of consolidation on: 
 
a. Efficiency in terms of margins 
b. Prices 
c. Diversity of choice 
 
Michael Trestl: Lets start from the back, diversity of choice: even though with ongoing 
consolidation, diversity of choice remains. Because there are the big markets which we 
have in Europe, and there is the demand in those markets, so I would say the diversity of 
choice remains. And even though if we look back 12-14 months, a lot of media coverage 
happened, especially in regards to the acquisition of Air Berlin throgh Lufthansa in 
Germany, with the intra-German market. Is competition eroding, and is the evil big 
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Lufthansa taking over an ‘milking‘ the whole market and so on. On the one side we have 
to be very self-critical, we have to say that on certain routes there have monopolistic 
situation arisen. On the other hand, the market capacity has not gone down, right the 
opposite happened. It has increased because even though this one transaction happened 
and consolidation went forth, at the same time competition also increased. Because they 
weren’t just looking what somebody is doing, so all of a sudden placed 10 aircraft or 
whatever in Berlin and started to operate, so this has led to the effect that even though 
this media coverage was there, if we look at our figures, prices continued to go down. So 
it was not the effect, from empirical evidence, based on our pure numbers and figures, 
that through the consolidation in the particular example of this transaction last year, the 
purchase of Air Berlin, that all of a sudden prices have exploded. Yes, there were some 
particular points where also in the cause of this transaction, in the first weeks and months 
the whole systems had to adopt and adjust to the new situation. And some situations have 
occurred, but this was not structural but more a particular situation which was picked up 
by the media and pushed forward. But the general trend in this particular case was and is 
favorable for the customer. So how can airlines then benefit from the consolidation if we 
are not like milking the customer? Getting bigger means we can use more economies of 
scale, we can use more of the cost regression - these are the impacts which lead to positive 
effects. This is the target, also for the shareholders, to achieve higher margins and to 
achieve more a level of profitability which is more sustainable. But the big leverages are 
on the cost and the efficiency side and not on the market price and yield side.  
 
Interviewer: SWISS is operating very profitable. In the airline value chain, what do you 
consider as the most important aspect(s) for efficient value generation?  
 
Michael Trestl: I think efficiency is key. You have to start with your own production 
where you have to see how can you really set up your operation, your production in the 
most efficient way. This starts with the layout of the aircraft, how many seats do we have, 
how many classes do we operate, and then it comes down to the operating model. So how 
do we plan networks and schedules to offer a good customer experience. I would really 
say that we for ourselves have to set a good foundation for efficient operation. And then 
everybody else has to feed in it. If we want to be efficient we also have to demand 
efficiency from our suppliers. If we want to have an efficient operation here at Zurich 
airport we have to define and negotiate with the different stakeholders at Zurich airport 
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how can we achieve that efficiency. And in the end everyone needs to sit at the table and 
also needs to want to go towards one joint goal in terms of that efficiency. Be it the ground 
handler, the airport itself, Skyguide and so on. We are constantly trying to improve our 
efficiency in the different processes that we have.  
 
Interviewer: In light of industry consolidation, do you think it could be beneficial for 
small airlines to proactively sell themselves on their own terms (from a management point 
of view - before getting taken over or being pushed out by competition), and if so, why? 
What could be possible advantages / disadvantages?  
 
Michael Trestl: I think it very much depends on the situation because it depends on the 
ownership, the interst of the shareholders of that small airlines. If they want to sustain on 
the market, if they still want to continue to be an independent player or if you want to 
become part of a bigger airline. I think there’s once aspect which you need to consider if 
you as a small airline if you don’t have the interest to stay on the market as your own 
independent entity this proactivity which you describe could potentially give you and 
advantage in negotiations, because you are flexible. You don’t need to sell - you can sell. 
But if you have to sell yourself because you are in a for example bad financial situation 
and you are looking for relieve of the whole situation through an acquisition by a bigger 
airline, the price which you might be able to achieve for your airline could be lower than 
if you would proactively approach airlines. In the end it comes down to the strategic intent 
of the ownership of the small airline. Why should you even consider offering your airline 
if you have a different strategic intent and if you want to stay in the market as an own 
entity. There is no ground to do so. So you first have to consider your strategy and where 
you want to go and do you see yourself as a sustainable market player or not.  
 
Interviewer: So can you compete against the ongoing consolidation - it is more in light 
of that in which I am raising this question. So can I, as a small airline, continue to operate 
or will I be faced with that question sooner or later. 
 
Michael Trestl: Yes exactly, do you have as I have said before a solid ground to exist in 
the market, do you have a market niche or market segment which you can serve and in 
which you can grow and which you can further exploit in the future. Can you differentiate 
and in this niche be successful through specialization or cost leadership or whatever 
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strategy you pursue - these questions might be helpful to answer in a first stage. And if 
you come to the conclusion, and maybe you see a future of only two or three years before 
you come to an end of growth opportunities and an end of sustainable business making 
and profitability because something also might change in the market, then such a step 
could be a good option. But I think there is no generic answer to that question, it depends 
on the particular case and on the particular market, the segment and the whole 
constellation of the market players.  
 
Interviewer: In your opinion, what are the major costs of mergers/acquisitions? 
  
Michael Trestl: Usually in such M&A transactions there is a lot of particular knowledge 
and expertise required. I would say usually no organization is able to cope with those kind 
of challenges by itself. So you need to have consultants, you need to have lawyers, tax 
guys, financial advisors, you need to have all sorts of different advisors around the table 
which of course cost money and somebody has to pay for. There are all kind of different 
costs which are involved in the different stages of such a transaction. If you just think 
about the phase of due diligence - so if you would consider buying another airline, first 
you make up your mind and get some strategic ideas, but then if you are getting more and 
more concrete, there might come the stage of where you have to conduct a due diligence. 
And this due diligence stretches over the most relevant part, from operations to cost 
structures, so you really have to investigate the subject matter in all detail and from many 
different points of view, in order to get a really good understanding of whether this is 
really a company which you want to buy or not. So there are all different kinds of costs 
involved in that kind if activity. 
 
Interviewer: Say, hypothetically speaking, a small airline intends to sell itself. Marks 
and Mirvis (2010) defined five overlapping perspectives in M&A transactions. For a 
successful bid/purchase and later integration, as potential ‘buyer’, what are you looking 
for i.e. where do you see:  
 
1) Acquisition Trademarks (important/interesting for the buyer)  
2) Key Success Factors (KSFs)  
3) Stumbling blocks 
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The five overlapping perspectives: 
- Strategy 
- Organization 
- People 
- Culture 
- Transition Management 
 
Michael Trestl: I would say you have to see the different perspectives; the financial 
perspective, the market perspective, the operational perspective. And you have to 
combine all the perspectives into one holistic. If I would like to buy an airline I would 
need to make up my mind about what is the real asset which I am buying. Is it for example 
a strategic acquisition on order to get slots at a certain airport or is it also a different 
market perspective because I want to enhance my reach, coming back to the example of 
Edelweiss. SWISS wasn’t in the leisure segment so with one acquisition the leisure 
segment was integrated. Then the financial perspective. Does the airline which I intend 
to buy have a favorable cost structure, and can I leverage this cost structure also for the 
future. So what does that mean in terms of my cost base for the operation. And especially 
when it comes to airlines the operational structure, the operations perspective is also very 
important to analyze. It’s really also the asset side of the balance sheet, what is in there, 
how is the capital structure also of the fleet - is the fleet up do date, is it old, is it new, 
high or low depreciations involved, are the aircraft owned or leased and if they are leased 
how flexible and how favorable are those contracts. Would I like to get those contracts 
with the transaction or would I rather intend to cut. So I think if speaking about trademarks 
it’s these kind of market perspectives, slots for example or get tapped into a new market 
segment like leisure or you could also buy a brand. Operations and financial perspectives, 
I think these make up the whole picture.  
 
Interviewer: So the KSFs would be more from the point of view if you as a management 
want to sell your organization or in this case your airline. Considering these five 
overlapping perspectives where would you have to look or where would you have to 
direct resources to for a successful bidding process.  
 
Michael Trestl: I think the strategic perspective which you mention here is the beginning. 
Because if you want this transaction to materialize and become successful I think there 
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must be a strategic fit between the two parties. So the buyer needs to be interested in what 
the seller has to offer. So could it be the market, favorable cost structures, slots. I think 
this is a very important aspect which from my understanding also stands at the very 
beginning, to see if there is a market for a certain transaction. I think the remaining topics 
they are certainly of relevance but I would say they are secondary. But they must not be 
neglected, because they can also be stumbling blocks. To give you an example, one 
current M&A transaction we as a group are involved in a due diligence for a bankrupt 
airline in Italy, and if this first aspect, the strategic fit, you can tick and say ok, if I buy 
this airline I can significantly improve my market presence in Italy. Maybe not all of Italy 
is attractive but certainly the north, Milano and Rome, also to set up a certain operational 
structure, to expand market reach, to get slots, etc. So strategic fit: ok. But - if I have now 
a look in the due diligence, what is the organizational structure, what is the efficiency, 
what is the financial structure -  I’m loosing the breath. Because even though there might 
be a strategic fit all of a sudden you will realize the frame conditions are not suitable. And 
if the frame conditions would continue like that, ultimately it would fail. So we would 
continue in the same bankrupt manner as now, just with a different shareholder, bearing 
that financial risk. And so this can be a stumbling block to say in a transaction „you, 
seller, if you want to sell your airline you have make certain concessions, and you have 
to make compromises.“ I have a certain strategic interest, but I don’t need to buy you for 
all price. So if you don’t make concessions in regards to this and that - exactly the things 
you mention, the organization, the organizational structure, the cost structure, the IT 
systems, and all related regulations which come with it. Including labor and union 
regulations, and if you as a seller are not able to make substantial concessions towards a 
state where I as potential buyer see it feasible, you will not come into business.  
 
Interviewer: So it could be beneficial to address these points way beforehand. For the 
bankrupt carrier it maybe too late, to address these issues early enough to successfully 
find a new owner for the entire firm.  
 
Michael Trestl: So like I’ve said before, is there a generic answer to this and I would say 
no, because in this particular case - there always needs to be a certain pressure, a certain 
point of crisis until someone realizes oh, I really need to change something. In this 
particular case, for decades of bankruptcy always more money from the taxpayers - and 
this is public knowledge - was put in and so nobody cared and continued with business 
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as usual. So it would be interesting to see if the crisis is now really so deep. So if there 
would be a real interest to be attractive for a potential buyer then this proactivity which 
you mentioned is of course helpful to trim yourself already in such a way how you would 
envisage the potential buyer would see you as attractive. 
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Interviewer: What do you think about small airlines in Europe? What are their 
advantages/opportunities and disadvantages/threats?  
 
William Agius: Well I think the advantage in most cases is that they have much lower 
cost base, both in terms of salaries and in terms of the costs that are required for the 
production of their services. But in a way that is to a certain extent also the disadvantage. 
They have less costs because they are kind of not burdened down by thing as a rule - like 
having to operate an effective hub. They don’t have to maintain any frequent flyer 
programs which are incredibly costly. But on the other hand it’s precisely things like 
frequent flyer programs or operating kind of a hub / network that kind of attracts 
customers. And I think that’s what most of the smaller airlines in Europe struggle with. 
That they are actually unable to attract enough passengers to have a market of their own. 
If you look at Helvetic Airways in Switzerland - they would definitely not have such a 
large fleet as they do now if it weren’t for SWISS. Since most of the flights are operated 
sort of on a wet-lease basis most of the time. Everything that Helvetic has tried in the past 
has de facto failed. And if you look at Skywork which isn’t aligned with anyone of the 
Swiss carriers, nothing they have ever tried has been a success. They even failed on the 
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Basel to London-City route, which they had a monopoly on. Now they are doing Basel-
Vienna and inevitably the consequence was that no sooner had they announced that they 
would open the route, that EasyJet started operating the route, and Austrian Airlines 
shifted from a Dash 8 to the Embraer 190 - kind of eliminating the competition by 
capacity. So in a way the advantages are also their disadvantages, or their weakness. And 
I think all the smaller carriers in Europe don’t actually have a chance of surviving unless 
they are aligned or sort of have an affiliation with a larger entity. But that’s not always 
that easy to achieve, of course.  
 
Interviewer: How about the chances of survival for small airlines in Europe/Switzerland 
such as Skywork and Helvetic? Are they even needed?  
 
William Agius: I think Skywork will not survive because there is no need for them. Berne 
as a market is too unimportant and too small for Skywork to be relevant. Also I think the 
days of the small turboprops, kind of commuting between the sort of secondary airports, 
those days are over. EasyJet does that now and they do it very well actually. As for 
Helvetic Airways, I think it doesn’t have a chance of survival either unless they have 
closer ties with SWISS. Which I think is about to happen anyway. I know this is just a 
minor detail but it just strikes me that the registrations of the C-Series are in the same 
sequence as those of Helvetic Airways. So it’s JV-something. So I suspect probably what 
we will see happening in the near future is that SWISS’ regional fleet will be transferred 
to Helvetic Airways and operate under their AOC. And that will be the only chance for 
survival of Helvetic Airways because their own operation has never made any money. 
Things like Bordeaux, London-Gatwick, they’ve always been loss making.  
 
Interviewer: So the chances of survival are indeed small for small airlines. 
 
William Agius: Yes, and I think Helvetic Airways will only in the long-term survive if 
they manage to get a larger part of the cake of SWISS’ business. They probably would 
no longer even exist as a brand, but just as the holder of an AOC. But of course that’s not 
going to happen from today to tomorrow because obviously that would cause a lot of 
upheaval within the group of pilots and flight attendants working for SWISS who may or 
may not want to shift to Helvetic Airways.  
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Interviewer: That’s an interesting concept. I have never though of the SWISS fleet being 
operated under the AOC of Helvetic. As far as I understand the C-Series are being bought 
by SWISS. 
 
William Agius: Yes - but they can always lease them out. It also looks nicer on the books. 
You can actually say you are generating an income on the aircraft by leasing them out to 
somebody else who can operate them for you at a cheaper cost base. This has always been 
a topic. When I worked for Swissair the topic was outsourcing the Fokker 100 fleet to 
Crossair, and there was a conflict because Swissair had the Fokker 100 and Crossair had 
the Avro RJ100. Swissair went bankrupt before that materialized and they got rid of the 
Fokker 100 anyway. There was a reason why SWISS created Swiss Global Air Lines and 
Swiss International Air Lines - it’s something that I think so far SWISS has always been 
a bit reluctant to do because of the consequences that it would have for things like career 
planning. But I think the way things are going right now it will become inevitable because 
the costs to produce the flights are increasing, while the revenues are close to collapsing 
anyway.  
 
Interviewer: In the US, the last 15 years have seen immense consolidation. How would 
you describe the European aviation industry trend in general?  
 
William Agius: We are generally going in the same direction as the US, which might 
prove to be a niche for smaller operators. There is nothing to say that Helvetic couldn’t 
also operate thinner routes for - I don’t know - Air France? Or Alitalia? It’s not likely to 
happen because obviously the Italians and the French could produce at an even lower cost 
than Helvetic, but theoretically as long as Switzerland participates in the kind of open 
skies that we have in Europe, theoretically there’s nothing to stop them which is what 
happened in the states. There you have these small commuter airlines who have part of 
the fleet in service for United and another part of the fleet operated for Delta, for example. 
So that could happen in Europe, too. The difference though is that the market in Europe 
is actually much smaller. It’s a much smaller market than the US, so I’m not really 
convinced that it will happen. I think probably what you are going to see in Europe is 
more that the small carriers will disappear and the regional carriers will disappear 
completely. What you will have is that the market will be divided up between the 
insignificant point-to-point rubbish, which the big airlines aren’t interested in and which 
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will be left to the low-cost airlines like Ryanair or Wizz Air or EasyJet or whoever - while 
the connecting traffic - the hubbing - will be left to the traditional network carriers. 
Although having said that, if you look at Lufthansa for example, originally the idea was 
that they would have Eurowings that would operate from all over Germany to kind of 
keep EasyJet, namely, out of the market, and only feeding traffic going into Frankfurt and 
Munich would still be Lufthansa. Now the situation has changed. Now Ryanair has based 
aircraft at Frankfurt, Lufthansa’s hub, so I’m not really quite sure for how long Lufthansa 
will be able to keep that up. So theoretically we could also end up in a situation where all 
of Lufthansa’s short-haul traffic is outsourced to Eurowings - out of necessity. And then 
of course the same thing would happen with SWISS, although I think then in that case it 
would be outsourced to Helvetic as the most likely candidate. Even though Edelweiss 
already operates the A320, Edelweiss’ cost base is not that much better than that of 
SWISS. So the gain from that would be not as good as if they would outsource everything 
to Helvetic.  
 
Interviewer: The positioning of Edelweiss though is also not the sort of point-to-point 
traffic.  
 
William Agius: No and also the whole thing would have to be rebranded. Right now 
Edelweiss sees itself as kind of a boutique airline. So to reposition themselves as sort of 
a low-cost carrier could be done but the financial effort would just be too great. So 
Helvetic is the most likely candidate.  
 
Interviewer: And now the LCCs, Ryanair for example, is also attacking this hubbing 
concept. They used to only station planes in the middle of nowhere, and now they are 
coming to the big places. 
 
William Agius: Yes exactly. And I think one of the most recent and most interesting 
developments which - funnily enough the press didn’t really pick up on - is if you go on 
the Ryanair website you see Ryanair has teamed up with Air Europa now. And on the 
Ryanair website you can now book a ticket from Basel to Buenos Aires. I don’t know 
how it works ticketing wise, if it’s two separate tickets so that no airline is responsible in 
case of a missed connection - I have now idea. But the fact that you can do it, that they’re 
teaming up, already says a lot. EasyJet and Emirates already do the same in Milano. 
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EasyJet has quite an operation in Milano Malpensa, and they are actually officially 
cooperating with the Emirates flight. Emirates has one flight that goes from Dubai via 
Milano to JFK. And EasyJet does as far as possible feed in that flight. And that’s actually 
quite interesting because it’s a very new development, very unique. So it will be 
interesting to see how it works. If we compare again the situation with the states, in the 
US we’ve reached a stage where even the Legacy carriers, the service they provide on 
board is on a par with that of a low-cost carrier in Europe. And as the revenues continue 
to decay in Europe I think it’ll be inevitable that we will have the same standard in Europe. 
So you might as well outsource the whole thing to a low-cost carrier anyway. Unless 
you’re kind of willing to dilute your brand to that extent that you say, yeah we are the 
great Lufthansa but still on short-haul you don’t anything for your money.  
 
Interviewer: Swiss didn’t sound like they want to give it up. Other than in Geneva 
anyway, where they are under a lot of pressure, so they need to adapt.  
 
William Agius: Yes and I think in Geneva they are going to introduce it and not before 
long they will be doing the same from Zurich, they can’t afford to do anything else. 
 
Interviewer: Considering Porter’s five forces – Industry Competitiveness, Threat of New 
Entrants, Power of Buyers, Power of Suppliers, Threat of Substitutes – how do you 
perceive these forces at work in Europe?  
 
William Agius: They are very much at work I think in the European aviation sector, and 
they are kind of working against the industry. Again an example from Lufthansa, which 
I think is interesting. Lufthansa has decided that to kind of save money, so to increase it’s 
industry competitiveness basically, they are going to standardize the cabins. So that all of 
them, from the inside, will look the same. They’ll all have the same seats, the same seating 
configuration - whether you are on Lufthansa, Eurowings, Swiss, Austrian Airlines, or 
SN Brussels Airlines. On paper the whole thing makes sense but the truth of the matter is 
that Lufthansa is not willing to kind of design a European economy class seat, specifically 
for it’s purposes. So they basically use the same seat that Iberia has installed, BA has 
installed, and EasyJet has installed. So in a way the need to become more competitive by 
driving the costs down has led to a situation where the product is being increasingly 
diluted to the extent that there is nothing to distinguish one product from the other. If you 
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add to that the fact that BA has introduced buy-on-board and SWISS is introducing buy-
on-board in Geneva and probably very soon from Zurich, if you think about it, what 
means do you have to distinguish yourself from the competition. If the cabin, so the look 
of the aircraft is no longer a criteria because once you’re in the plane you don’t know if 
it’s an Iberia, a Vueling, or a Lufthansa anyway because they just look the same - gray in 
gray. The only other possibility you have is the interaction you have with your crew. But 
if service is buy-on-board only then that means that the opportunities for any interaction 
between the cabin crew and the passenger are only limited to those cases where the 
passenger is willing to fork out a fairly high amount of money to make an on board 
purchase. If you are not willing to do that - and I have noticed that myself - if you stick 
your ear plugs in you can go a whole flight and have zero interaction with the crew. I am 
not blaming them, it’s in the nature of the beast. The result of that is that the products are 
being increasingly diluted to the extent that you can no longer distinguish one from the 
other. So coming to the power of suppliers, the thing is that the airlines have no other 
solution, there’s no way out of the situation they find themselves in. That is not exactly 
helping their case. So mainly the competitiveness and the need to be more competitive is 
having a paradoxical effect in that it is making them less competitive because it’s all 
becoming the same. Interestingly enough one of the airlines that is kind of different in 
that respect is KLM. KLM has realized that the possibilities to distinguish themselves on 
board or with their aircraft are fairly limited. What KLM for example does really well is 
customer service - in case of an irregularity they will proactively deal with passengers, 
rebook them etc. - that is something for example Lufthansa and SWISS are absolutely 
atrocious at. There is zero customer service at SWISS. If there is an irregularity it’s 
essentially your problem.  
 
Interviewer: So you would define competitiveness as… 
 
William Agius: I would say nowadays it is the service level an airline is able to provide 
it’s passengers. But the interesting thing is that even though it’s an airline and airplanes 
are their business, the service delivery happens exclusively outside the aircraft. 
Completely outside the aircraft. And that is the only means of being competitive that the 
airlines have nowadays. The financial pressure is on for all of them, that does not 
distinguish them but rather is what unites them in fact.  
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Interviewer: We also see Ryanair, all of a sudden conducting customer care. 
 
William Agius: Yes exactly, that’s precisely it. In the beginning, Michael O’Leary prided 
himself in being a complete asshole. There was something very arrogant and sort of this 
German attitude of „Geiz ist Geil“. That was maybe sexy in the beginning when the low-
cost carriers emerged on the market but what we’ve actually seen is that the distinction 
between the low-cost and full-frills airlines can no longer be made. I wonder if actually it 
ever could be made. The thing is nowadays no one actually cares if you say „We are 
Ryanair, we’re a low cost carrier“. So what? I can get the same product for pretty much 
a similar price if I book with SWISS. So that’s not an excuse anymore. And it has put on 
the pressure on the low cost carriers too. It has made flying a lot more attractive for the 
general public, which is part of the problem. It has become too attractive because now 
people who never otherwise would have stepped a foot on a plane are now flying, leaving 
to all sorts of other problems.  
 
Interviewer: How would you rate the Threat of New Entrants into the industry? 
 
William Agius: There is always the threat of new entrants, and the thing is we haven’t 
reached the end. This is not the final state of the intra-European aviation industry. I think 
there is a risk but it’s hard to say what that risk is or in what way it will sort of manifest 
itself. It’s like looking into a crystal ball right now. The threat exists, but in a way I think 
again in Europe we are not quite that far yet. The pressure is not on enough - new entrants 
emerge out of necessity to meet a market demand. And I think right now the market is in 
a state where it’s actually slowly stabilizing after a lot of upheaval. But I think the elapse 
time before the next upheaval is going to be much shorter than it’s been so far. The big 
ones in Europe - be it IAG, Air France-KLM, or Lufthansa Group - have had to do a lot 
of changes in very short time. But the changes they have implemented will be of fairly 
limited duration before the next big thing comes. But what that will be is difficult to say.  
 
Interviewer: Do regulators in Europe differ from other markets (US, Asia) and if so, 
how?  
 
William Agius: Well if you look at Nikki, that really blew up in Lufthansa’s face. If you 
look at Zurich, the upshot of Lufthansa even trying to manipulate the regulator is that this 
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summer there will be two 737s of Ryanair parked in Zurich, operating out of Zurich. 
That’s what they got from trying to manipulate the market. It really has backfired on them, 
this is not what they had in mind or what they had anticipated. But this is the consequence 
because the Austrian regulator eventually said enough is enough. The one laughing all 
the way to the bank is yet again Nikki Lauda. But the result is that there are now Ryanair 
aircraft in every one of the Star Alliance hubs, in every of Lufthansa’s hubs. This is not 
how this was supposed to work out. The thing is that in the US there is one regulator only 
whereas in Europe there is a regulator in every country. If you’re lucky it’s an EU country 
but there are also a few non-EU countries. And those regulators are still very much 
concerned in making sure that they can protect their markets. Because they already know 
that they’re at a disadvantage by not being a member of the EU. The same thing also goes 
for Asia. There are markets which are opening up, for example Japan. Japan is definitely 
not quite as closed and regulated as it used to be, but the Japanese market is still very 
much a closed up market. I think in Europe what we see right now is that the regulators 
are fighting the airlines to ensure competitiveness because that is on the agenda of the 
European Union. Whereas previously it is safe to say that the regulators were the servants 
of airlines and they did as the airlines dictated, to protect national interest. But they are 
no longer able to do that so the role of the regulators has changed quite a lot in Europe I 
think. Within a European context there isn’t really that much the European Union 
countries can do anymore. A very good example of that was Brexit. No sooner was Brexit 
announced had EasyJet transferred its AOC to Austria and now every aircraft is registered 
in Austria, to ensure that they still have access to the EU market because they couldn’t 
have that from the UK, or they don’t know if they could have it from the UK. The only 
thing that is left for the regulators is to protect the long-haul traffic. As you could see with 
Emirates. Emirates wanted to fly from Dubai via Zurich to Mexico City. That was really 
a case where the Swiss regulator said „Do whatever you like with Basel and Geneva, but 
you are not touching Zurich“. Even though I very much doubt that any other airline will 
be flying from Zurich to Mexico City anytime soon, but still just to protect the market the 
automatic reaction is always no.  
  
Interviewer: Is flying a commodity nowadays, and are Legacy carriers becoming LCCs? 
  
William Agius: Yes it is. It’s hard to say which way the trend of Legacy and LCC carriers 
is going, I think they are aligning to sort of meet somewhere in the middle. Maybe what 
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we’ll see is not necessarily a new entrant but maybe we’ll see the rules of the game 
changing.  The airports in Europe have too much traffic. The only airport that doesn’t is 
Madrid Barajas, but all the other ones are really at full or overcapacity. If you take an 
airport like Heathrow - I was talking to a guy from Eurocontrol - in actual fact, in 
Heathrow the arrival sequence is determined before the aircraft even enter British 
airspace. By the time they enter British airspace it’s too late for sequencing. All the 
airports are like that, Charles de Gaulle is reaching that point, Amsterdam is already there, 
Frankfurt exactly the same thing. So one possible future development might be that there 
might be a move within the European Union to put a limit on what is permissible in terms 
of flights duration or flight length. So that for example flights of less than - I’m just 
inventing something - 500 km will no longer be allowed within Europe. There is a 
likelihood of something like that happening. Which the airlines would actually be quite 
happy with. The traditional legacy carriers would be happy because it would eliminate 
part of the competition, because a lot of the routes the low-cost carriers operate are very 
often 500 km or a bit less, so they wouldn’t mind. Secondly it would free up slots at the 
hubs for possibly more lucrative destinations. And that is something that also needs to be 
factored in, the alternative then is taking a train. The trains are trying to catch up too now. 
An excellent example of that is Basel. A very long time ago there was Air Inter, and they 
actually had wide-body services between Basel and Paris, more than one a day in an 
A300. Now we’ve reached a stage where Paris Charles de Gaulle is usually served with 
an EMB170 four times a day, and Orly with an ATR 472. That’s it. Eight flights a day to 
Paris is still a lot but it’s a lot less than what they used to have because the TGV has taken 
over a lot of that traffic. So that might be a development in the future, that the railways 
will start competing the airlines in the European market. And that then is the benefit of 
the European market that compared to the US Europe is a much much smaller 
geographical sort of entity.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the impact of consolidation on:  
 
- Efficiency in terms of margins 
- Prices 
- Diversity of choice 
 
William Agius: I think if you look on a large scale - lets say the 1990s until today, a span 
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of nearly 30 years - I think you can say that prices have gone down considerably. Not just 
the prices but also the fare rules that are attached to the prices. Before the low-cost carriers 
came into being, there were all these rules where a one-way ticket within Europe cost a 
really scandalous amount of money. There was a chance that for a one-way ticket from 
Zurich to London you could pay something like 2,000 - 2,500 Francs, and that was in 
economy class. That is something that the low-cost carriers have stopped. Today most 
legacy carriers don’t have one-way pricing anymore, or they do but one-way pricing has 
become equivalent to what used to be the half return. So they have actually brought down 
the prices. The question is what will happen as consolidation continues. If we end up with 
just a few players in the market, then inevitably this would mean that the prices would go 
up which is obviously what the airlines are trying to do. The example we had before of 
Basel-Vienna: Austrian Airlines and EasyJet are only trying to kill Skywork, and once 
they have achieved that we can assume that Austrian will return to using the Dash 8 and 
the prices will go up again. They will have the business traffic and EasyJet will have 
everybody else. But until then you can definitely say that the prices generally have gone 
down. Diversity of choice: I think what has changed is because of the low cost carriers, 
the customer has a much lower expectation. So previously if you wanted to fly from 
somewhere in Scandinavia to Spain for a bit a sum, there was a bit this expectation of it 
had to be a non-stop flight if you don’t mind, and I think now with the low cost carriers 
what we have seen is more and more self-hubbing. So you don’t buy a ticket with SWISS 
from Copenhagen via Zurich to Malaga, but that you figure „Ok, I can take a low-cost 
carrier from Copenhagen to Paris and I know that Transavia has a flight from Orly to 
Malaga. So theoretically I could fly to Paris, maybe spend a day or two there and then 
continue.” So you no longer rely on one airline to provide the whole service from A via 
B to C. So there is more diversity, I think the market has adapted and learned that you 
don’t need to rely on a non-stop service and you don’t need to rely on one airline to 
produce the service you need. You can piece it together the way you like. Having learnt 
their lesson, if something goes wrong, even the legacy carriers are not necessarily willing 
to help you, because they have lowered their standards to those of the low cost carriers. 
Efficiency: That’s really a difficult one to say. If you look at SWISS they have decided 
that the Geneva operation has to become profitable. And to that end they are replacing all 
the airbuses there with the C-Series. SWISS’ management has already said that they are 
not going to consider the connecting long-haul traffic - so the flights to New York, the 
United service from Washington, and the Air Canada flight from Montreal are not part of 
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the equation. So they really want to see that the point-to-point traffic from Geneva is 
actually running at a profit. Good luck with that. I am not quite sure how on earth they 
actually expect to be able to take that apart. What the legacy carriers have that the low-
cost carriers don’t have is that they can chose if they want more or less connecting traffic. 
So theoretically SWISS can say “ok the flight from Madrid to Zurich we’ll open it up for 
connecting flights”, or not. That’s something they can easily steer. Having said that 
though, now that they have the triple seven, the truth of the matter is SWISS has produced 
significant overcapacity in its own market. The triple seven cannot be filled from Zurich 
alone, on no route. Whether it’s Hong Kong, Singapore, it doesn’t matter. You cannot fill 
a triple seven from Zurich. So in a way no matter how cost effective they want their short 
haul operation to be, because of certain changes that have been implemented on their mid- 
and long-haul fleet, they now have to rely on filling their aircraft with connecting 
passengers. So that again the efficiency of the short-haul product becomes quite 
diminished. For SWISS, the cost synergies from the group are not as significant as one 
might think. Just because Lufthansa has A320s and SWISS, and Austrian, and SN 
Brussels does not necessarily mean they’re going to close down every flight training 
organization and only do their training for the whole Lufthansa group in one place, which 
would be the most effective thing to do. There, politics come into it. It would be the most 
effective thing probably to move everything to Austria and Belgium, they have the lowest 
salary base. But that hasn’t happened. We still have flight training organizations in all 
these countries that cater to the needs of Austrian, of SWISS, or whoever. That won’t 
change. So they’re cost effective where they can be, and where politics don’t get in the 
way. Lufthansa still has a pending order for the A350 - they’ve launched a competition 
amongst the Lufthansa group, basically Brussels, Vienna, or Zurich will get the 350s 
depending on who ends up being more profitable. And that’s just about who has the most 
sales and best revenue management, that’s about it. It’s not like they’re fully taking 
advantage of any synergies. Except when they make a bulk order for seats that they can 
install in all their aircraft. They could do much better, but they can’t go down that road 
yet. They will have to decide at some point if they really want to make the effort to paint 
a few airplanes in red and white and operate them out of Zurich, or if everything will just 
be identical and there will be a Lufthansa group livery for example. With a Lufthansa 
group uniform, Lufthansa group service, etc. Because with what they have right now there 
is no reason why SWISS’s triple seven should have a different business class than 
Austrian Airline’s triple seven. There really is no point. But of course one has to accept 
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that that will dilute the product significantly. The question is if they’re willing to go down 
that road and I think they will eventually, but as I mentioned before, the pressure isn’t on 
enough yet. It hasn’t become that bad yet, but it will. 
 
Interviewer: In the airline value chain, what do you consider as the most important 
aspect(s) for efficient value generation?  
 
William Agius: I would say the Human Resources. That is one of the biggest problems. 
The airline industry is very labor intensive. If you take an airline like Emirates or any 
airline that operates the A380, your crew alone to operate a flight from Zurich to Dubai - 
which is really short actually, just 6 hours - you need 56 crew. Just crew! That’s before 
everything on the ground, that’s before doing any form of maintenance on the aircraft, 
that’s before having sold a single ticket. That costs a lot of money. That really costs a 
painful amount of money. And that is obviously something that Lufthansa has identified 
and Air France, I think, and that they’re trying to tackle. The only problem is though that 
they’re really moving on very dangerous ground right now, especially Lufthansa. The 
people that work for Eurowings, and I think this will inevitably also come for Lufthansa, 
don’t work for Eurowings. The people who work for Eurowings have a contract with a 
contractor who offers them a contract that’s limited for 3 years, without the possibility of 
extending it and without the right to participate in a union. Quite simply, the people who 
work for Eurowings couldn’t give a shit. It’s whether they’re working for Eurowings or 
they’re working for Lufthansa, or they’re working for Air Portugal is totally insignificant. 
It’s not important. There is zero identification, which again starts the spiral going of yes, 
basically the products of the European airlines becoming so interchangeable that you 
cannot distinguish one from the other. So you can try to bring down the cost by 
outsourcing your human resource, but I think that may end up blowing up in their faces. 
Because there is zero identification. And the airline industry seems to be an industry 
where a lot relies on brand recognition and brand identification. And as that becomes 
more and more diluted, the pressure increases to be able to do something to attract more 
customers. There’s no loyalty from your customer base anymore.  
 
Interviewer: In light of industry consolidation, do you think it could be beneficial for 
small airlines to proactively sell themselves on their own terms (from a management point 
of view - before getting taken over or being pushed out by competition)? What could be 
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possible advantages / disadvantages?  
 
William Agius: I don’t think that would work. Because basically what you are saying is 
that we’re becoming increasingly desperate. And once it becomes apparent to your 
opponent that you are desperate, they dictate the price.  
 
Interviewer: If you are desperate. SWISS for example was desperate, losing tons of cash 
etc. But if I have a product like Helvetic for example - they’re not desperate I would say. 
They’re just relying on the contracts they have with SWISS. But if they would say „Ok if 
these contracts are terminated, we’re gone, so it could be better for us to be bought by 
SWISS.“ 
 
William Agius: But what would be the benefit of SWISS taking over Helvetic? If they 
take over Helvetic, the very first thing that will happen - because I witnessed that when I 
still worked for SWISS – is this: When Lufthansa took over SWISS, within literally two 
hours of Lufthansa announcing that they were taking over SWISS, the union of the Swiss 
pilots Aeropers had already had the first meeting with Lufthansa’s pilots union. The pilot 
unions were incredibly well organized. Much better than the rest of the airline. And 
exactly the same thing would happen. The pilots would immediately meet, because that’s 
what they did with Lufthansa and Swiss. And they signed a (pact). They would not work 
against each other. Lufthansa pilots promised, and the Swiss pilots did the same, that they 
would not do anything that could jeopardize the other people’s salaries. They would not 
create a situation where they would be in competition, to protect they’re old, what they 
consider ‘god given rights’ as pilots. That hasn’t changed. The first thing that would 
happen if SWISS announces we’re taking over Helvetic, you can assume it will take less 
than two hours because they’re in the same country. The Helvetic’s pilots union would 
definitely get in touch with the Swiss pilot’s union. And with that, the advantage of 
operating as Helvetic goes to shit. Because Helvetic’s big advantage is that their salaries 
are much cheaper. But you ruin that by taking them over. For SWISS, Helvetic as a wet-
leaser is far more attractive than full out ownership. Why on earth should they want to 
take over Helvetic.  
 
Interviewer: Well SWISS said this question arises periodically, so evidently there are 
some reasons in favor of a future takeover, no? 
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William Agius: I mean it can be, but only in very exceptional cases. Just as an example, 
many moons ago Air France took over Sabena, and because they really are such a bad 
airline, Sabena did actually bankrupt Air France, did you know about that? Air France 
officially went bankrupt. You are probably too young to remember but there used to be a 
company which was called UTA - Union de Transports Aériens -  so what happened was 
the French government sold all of Air France to UTA for 1 Franc. But they decided that 
Air France had better brand recognition so the name UTA was eliminated and the new 
entity continued to operate as Air France. But the Air France we have today is actually a 
bankrupted company that was bought by a private company. Does that ring a bell? 2002, 
Crossair buys Swissair. There obviously they couldn’t be quite so outrageous about it as 
the French were, so they couldn’t keep the name Swissair, they couldn’t even keep SR 
code. So the whole thing turned into Swiss International Air Lines. This happens over 
and over again, it’s the same thing that happened in Austria when suddenly Lauda Air 
bought Austrian Airlines but miraculously, surprisingly, the brand Austrian Airlines was 
maintained and not Lauda Air. In such a situation yes, we might reach a point one day 
where Helvetic may have to purchase SWISS, because SWISS has become too expensive, 
that may happen. But in case that ever happens, strategically it’s far more convenient to 
not own these carriers. But to have a very strong dependence, which is what we have right 
now. Without SWISS’s sales platform an Edelweiss would be nowhere, and without all 
the wet-leasing they do for SWISS, Helvetic would be bankrupt.  
 
Interviewer: The interesting fact remains though that Edelweiss is still Edelweiss, it’s 
operating under its own name, it has lots of freedoms, and a very strong brand. 
 
William Agius: Now they have what, 4 wide-bodies? The sad rejects that SWISS doesn’t 
want any more, two A340s and two A330s. Let’s face it, the 340s are being operated on 
behalf of SWISS, that’s a fact. For an airline like Edelweiss it makes really absolutely no 
sense to operate to Buenos Aires or to Rio. They’re not such sexy holiday destinations to 
warrant a holiday airline flight to those destinations. But they are very attractive to SWISS 
to do a bit of experimentation. See how the market will react. I don’t think the market 
will react very well because they have such few flights, I mean it’s something like three 
times a week which is ridiculous. It’s really useless. If you can fly daily with Iberia via 
Madrid and daily with Air France or Lufthansa via Paris or Frankfurt, I really don’t think 
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the market will be too impressed by three direct flights by Edelweiss. Especially given 
that the market between Switzerland and Argentina simply isn’t big enough.  
  
Interviewer: Still they’re making money, no? 
 
William Agius: But again there’s a question of transparency. To what extent you can 
clearly absolutely say that Edelweiss is making money is I think questionable. Of course 
they are making money if SWISS is footing the bill every time they operate a service on 
their behalf. Every time SWISS sends an Edelweiss A320 to Amsterdam, and they do that 
quite often, SWISS foots the whole bill. It’s not like Edelweiss has to pay for any of that, 
they get paid to do it. So no wonder they’re making money. But as a whole - I wouldn’t 
be quite so sure. It’s not quite as rosy as they make it out to be, let’s put it that way.  
 
Interviewer: Say, a small airline intends to sell itself. Marks and Mirvis (2010) defined 
five overlapping perspectives in M&A transactions (see next page). For a successful 
bid/purchase and later integration where do you see:  
 
1) Acquisition Trademarks (important/interesting for the buyer)  
2) Key Success Factors (KSFs)  
3) Stumbling blocks  
 
William Agius: What would make anybody take over an airline is the access to the 
market the takeover would give them. That’s it. Which is probably why for example 
Virgin America was so attractive because Alaska still operates out of a niche, stuck up in 
the sort of north-western corner of the US. They have an extensive network; I’m not 
saying they don’t but by merging with Virgin America they have significantly increased 
their network. Without the burden of having to buy additional aircraft, and all of that. 
They taking it over and it’s already sort of ‘ready made’. That again is kind of the 
American context, but I think in Europe - I mean I know for sure that’s what it was for 
Lufthansa or for BA when they bought SWISS - the only thing Lufthansa was interested 
in when they took over SWISS was not the fleet, it was not their staff, it was not the slots, 
it was only the frequent flyer data. That was Swissair’s biggest asset. Because Switzerland 
is such an affluent market. The CEO of BA, Willy Walsh, he actually said once - it was 
quite funny, I met him in Zurich – “The Swiss market is really wonderful, it’s just a shame 
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it’s so small.“ Because it’s true, the buying power in Switzerland is really still very high. 
It’s a very attractive market. But that also means you have to make sure you get the biggest 
chunk of that market because it’s so limited. So with Lufthansa it was just the frequent 
flyers, that’s what they paid for. Everything else what kind of nice to have but not really 
that important. It really is the market access and how easy the M&A will allow you to 
expand your market.  
 
Interviewer: So the KSFs and the stumbling blocks are more to be seen from the point 
of view of the management of the seller. So Virgin America for example, they knew 
Alaska wanted access to the west coast, and they could offer it. They leveraged this to 
drive up the price, and I mean they got a really good price. So that was beneficial for the 
Virgin management and shareholders. 
 
William Agius: They got an excellent price, absolutely. But if you look at SWISS for 
example, they got a really bad deal both with Lufthansa and with BA. Because they were 
really desperate and everybody knew it. I remember when BA took over SWISS one of 
the first things that happened was they handed over something like 8 slot pairs to BA. But 
the purchase price that BA paid for SWISS was how much? Not very much. But those 8 
slot pairs in Heathrow would have cost a lot more than what BA was going to pay for 
Swiss. But they were so desperate they didn’t have a choice. And BA said „thank you 
very much we’ll take those slots and run with them“,  they never gave them back, 
coincidentally.  
 
Interviewer: So the KSFs or the stumbling blocks, where would you see them in the five 
perspectives of Marks and Mirvis? 
 
William Agius: The stumbling bocks for the entity that would buy? 
 
Interviewer: For the entity that would sell. 
 
William Agius: Again I think the staff. They would be the stumbling block. You would 
be up against a lot of opposition. Some of it purely emotional. That you know, people 
identify with their company. It was the same thing with SWISS. When I left SWISS we 
were still very much ‘are you a Swissair or a Crossair guy’, there was a lot of animosity 
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within the company. And the best thing that could have happened to SWISS was that they 
were taken over by Lufthansa because then everybody was united in hating Lufthansa. So 
that kind of helped. But there is also the thing with the pilots. Not so much for the seller, 
but that I think is something they would have to contend with. Because of course on paper 
it looks very sexy if you can say we only pay this and this much in terms of salary, but 
it’s unlikely they’d be able to uphold that in case of a take over.  
 
Interviewer: It would be interesting to know what happened in the Virgin America case, 
if the pilots met. 
 
William Agius: In that respect the states are very different to Europe because in the states 
you don’t have things like unions.  
 
Interviewer: You have a pilots union though. 
 
William Agius: You do but they are not so strong. They are definitely not as strong as 
they are in Europe. What you have in the states usually is that during the kind of affluent 
years when it really was a pilots market and all the airlines were expanding and really 
desperate to get their hands on pilots, what happened is that many airlines introduced 
these ridiculous scope clauses. They said that if the airline starts expanding they can use 
a regional airline or regional aircraft but only up to a capacity of 100 seats. Everything 
that’s more than a 100 seats would have to be operated by the main line fleet, to protect 
the pilots. These are things some of the American carriers still struggle with today. That 
you don’t have to that extent in Europe yet. So in that respect they are different. The 
power of the pilots unions is not as big as it is still in Europe. Realistically speaking we 
can expect Lufthansa to head in the direction of more strikes in the future.  
 
Interviewer: So say you can align your staff, or especially the pilots, with your intention 
to sell, then you can turn a stumbling block into a KSF.  
 
William Agius: Yes, then you have a chance. But it really is a big stumbling stumbling 
block. It’s kind of the elephant in the room.  
 
Interviewer: The question is also whether at some point someone might come to the 
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conclusion that proactively selling is a good option, before going bankrupt or facing a 
hostile takeover.  
 
William Agius: I think it’s becoming increasingly difficult for niche players to find 
valuable arguments that would make them attractive for a big player to take them over. I 
don’t think there have been any, have there? I mean there was Air One and Alitalia but 
again that was the Italian government cooking the books because Alitalia went bankrupt 
for like the 40th time in as many years. Olympic and Aegean, where Olympic kind of was 
merged partially into Aegean. But again there were all fairly crass examples that occurred 
in a situation where really the national investment was at stake. The investment of the 
Greek or Italian government was in jeopardy and so out of necessity the airlines were 
given the task of taking over parts of these airlines that should actually have gone 
bankrupt decades ago. So that was a different situation.  
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Interviewer: What do you think about small airlines in Europe? What are their 
advantages/opportunities and disadvantages/threats?  
 
Andreas Wittmer: Advantages are maybe that they are more flexible. Smaller 
companies, more flexible and more dynamic, can react better on markets but the negative 
effect of that is that they are dependent on the market, dependent on big ones. Helvetic 
for example is, with the wet-lease agreements, completely dependent on SWISS, 
otherwise it’s difficult. So small airlines do not realize and do not get the scale and scope 
economies you actually need to survive. Second of all often these smaller airlines operate 
rather small planes and are in niche markets, so in smaller markets. If you have a real 
niche that can work, if you don’t have a niche and are just a small airline without a specific 
niche, then it’s really difficult. So for a small airline with small planes is difficult - small 
planes for me are all the planes that have less than 100 seats. A general statement could 
be „Any plane that has less than 100 seats is not really getting you into profits.“ So if you 
have to fly with planes smaller than 100 seats you are most likely not getting into profits 
anyway, so you should not do it. Except in a certain niche. For example, People’s Airline 
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here (in Altenrhein, A/N), flying to Vienna four times a day, having the people from 
Voralberg who need to go to the Headquarters in Vienna, is filled every day. At least in 
the morning and the evening and then they fly a couple times during the day where it’s 
maybe not as filled, but overall good because they have the specific niche. They can 
charge 300-400 Euros for a return flight because they are in that niche and have no 
competition, basically have a monopoly on that route. Because they are owned by the 
airport they have synergies in the whole management and support processes, so by this it 
works. These are 70 seat something planes, so that works fine here. But otherwise; other 
example Skywork - no specific niche, small home market, small planes - every couple 
years you have a new investor that pumps money in it and then loses it. And that’s clear, 
it’s probably not going to work. So small airlines need niches otherwise it doesn’t work 
and minimum size of planes are 100 seats, that’s when you are able to generate some 
value. Although even then it is difficult, because you need about 100 seats just to cover 
the costs of operations.  
 
Interviewer: How about the chances of survival for small airlines in Europe/Switzerland 
such as Skywork and Helvetic? Are they even needed?  
 
Andreas Wittmer: They depend on investors that are willing and emotional to just spend 
money on them, if you look at really small ones like Skywork. Or Helvetic, they just 
depend the big brother or let’s say the big SWISS that gives them the wet-lease contracts 
- Helvetic without those contracts would not have the same amount and definitely not the 
same size of planes. So in my opinion, Helvetic and Skywork are both negligible, these 
airlines are not really needed for the market, they are not really relevant for the market, 
they’re not really relevant for the connectivity of Switzerland, not for Europe or anything 
else. They are just there because one is sponsored by someone who loses money and the 
other one is just sponsored by SWISS and gets some work to do for them.  
 
Interviewer: In the US, the last 15 years have seen immense consolidation. How would 
you describe the European aviation industry trend in general?  
 
Andreas Wittmer: Well we have the consolidation as well, be aware that we have three 
big airlines in Europe - we have IAG with BA and Iberia, Lufthansa with all the subsidies, 
and Air France-KLM. We have the same integrations but have kept the brands. Then we 
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have the low-cost carriers that are separate and we have certain regional carriers still on 
the market. I think for big airlines these small airlines are not so relevant, it’s more about 
the assets. So if you own planes, and if an airline wants to grow and needs planes, and 
Airbus has a waiting list of eight years to get a new Airbus A320, what do you do? Lets 
assume Helvetic would have A320s and SWISS needs a couple A320s but would have to 
wait eight years to get them. You better just buy Helvetic. And then you have those planes, 
paint SWISS on them, and start operating. It’s a way of buying planes - you can buy 
airlines, but you are basically buying planes. And the second thing you buy is slots. Slots 
at airports are scarce resources. If you don’t have slots, and airports are full, then if an 
airline has certain slots you are interested in and if it has certain planes you’re interested 
in, you buy planes and slots. And then you just look how much the value is. Actually, an 
airline could have a rather low market value, especially regional carriers. Maybe the 
market value of airlines is sometimes lower than the actual value of their planes would 
be if they just sold the aircraft. So actually it could be a good deal to buy an airline instead 
of new equipment. And I can even get the slots for it on top. It’s different if you have an 
airline that leases all the planes. So if you have leasing contracts, the question then is if 
you want to take over those contracts. Still it’s interesting because the aircraft are there 
and ready to be operated, and so are the people that operate them. You don’t have to 
employ new staff, you can just take them over. And you don’t have to order a new plane 
and wait eight years. You can get it right now, and that’s valuable. In the life cycle of the 
industry, when you have growth that really goes fast, you need it now - in five years from 
now we might be in a downturn and you won’t need it.  But now you do, so you can go 
into a wet-lease contract, just lease another airline to operate for you or you can just buy 
one. So the buy thing would be interesting.  
 
Interviewer: So you would say we are going to end up with a lot fewer airlines in the 
future? 
 
Andreas Wittmer: Yes, I hope so for the industry. I would assume that we are going to 
end up with the big three, as in the US. And within that we will probably have the other 
ones all linked to those.  
 
Interviewer: In the airline value chain (below: Porter’s Value Chain), what do you 
consider as the most important aspect(s) for efficient value generation?  
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Andreas Wittmer: You can always integrate support processes. Although because you 
are geographically different, with different locations - if you take Iberia and BA, with 
locations in Spain and England - you need the support processes and firm infrastructures 
at both sides. There it’s questionable how much integration you can generate. But you 
have synergies in procurement, in technology development, and in operations. You can 
actually integrate and harmonize your networks. So maybe you look at what slots you 
have at which airports, and then you maybe have complementary slots which work quite 
well together in the network. But for me very relevant is also culture, structure, and 
strategy. How can you align the strategy, how can you implement the structure over the 
companies, and how can you align the culture. And that is usually the big challenge in 
these companies. Airline companies are really emotional. Look at SWISS, it took them 
more than 10 years to fully integrate the former Crossair pilots and the former Swissair 
pilots into one pilots union. They had two unions and two fleets, with Swiss International 
Air Lines and Swiss Global Airlines. Swiss Global Air Lines operates in Europe - former 
Crossair - and Swiss International is former Swissair operating intercontinentally; and it 
took them more than ten years to integrate those two. And it only happened when the 
former CEO of SWISS said: „Well, the new triple sevens are going to Swiss Global Air 
Lines.“ So the former Crossair pilots that operate European flights are getting the new 
flagship. Only then, former Swissair people in their union said: „Hey stop, that can’t 
work!“, and started to negotiate. So you see, sometimes it’s a costly challenge afterwards, 
to really integrate. I think in the airline industry, integration is supported by airlines that 
go into alliances. If you are in an alliance, lets say you are working together at Star 
Alliance for ten years, collaborate and harmonize your network, sell together and realize 
some synergies in the alliance and then integrate fully by merging - it’s just the last step 
of a long process which you have conducted in the network and by going through different 
levels in the alliance. And that is more success oriented. If you look at BA and Iberia, 
they were in the same alliance (one World, A/N) and moved closer and closer up to the 
point where they integrated fully. If you look at KLM and Air France, they collaborated 
in the Sky Team alliance and moved closer together. If you look at Lufthansa, it’s Star 
Alliance - so is SWISS, Austrian, SN Brussels. LOT for example, the Polish airline, is 
also Star Alliance. So I wonder how long it will take until LOT is bought by Lufthansa - 
probably not too far away. Scandinavian Airlines is also Star Alliance so the question 
there is the same. This is the obvious way, you integrate within your network and over 
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time integrate more and more revenue and cost synergies. Interesting is that in the 
Alliance you have a great number of revenue synergies, whereas in the full integration 
you more focus on cost synergies. In an alliance you do not have a lot of cost synergies. 
It’s probably 90/10, 90% of the synergies you can generate are rather on the revenue side 
and maybe only 10% on the cost side. So mergers make complete sense, if you want to 
reduce costs then you need to merge. If you want to increase revenues you can go into an 
alliance.  
 
Interviewer: In light of industry consolidation, do you think it could be beneficial for 
small airlines to proactively sell themselves on their own terms (e.g. like Virgin America 
- from a management point of view, before getting taken over or being pushed out by 
competition)? What could be possible advantages / disadvantages?  
 
Andreas Wittmer: Well I find this a very interesting aspect and a very interesting idea. 
If you look at the industry and see consolidation, and you’re one of the small ones and 
you know that you are probably not going to survive anyway, why not proactively making 
sure you get most out of that situation by actually searching and looking for integration 
on your side. I think it’s a smart way of thinking about it. Otherwise you are taken over. 
And if you are taken over, you are taken over at the rules of the other party, and you don’t 
have much to say. This way you could rather find a partner and say lets integrate in five 
years from now, and in those five years we work towards it in close collaboration. And 
again you increase the success rate in a kind of slow motion, and start to realize synergies 
in certain terms. If we look at Helvetic and SWISS, it would be easy to just take over 
Helvetic. These planes fly already for SWISS and it would be rather easy. What’s the 
reason SWISS is not doing this? It’s very simple: Helvetic pays lower salaries than 
SWISS does. SWISS unions demand higher salaries, pilots earn more, so for them it’s a 
good deal to keep them in a separate company. The pilot salaries at Helvetic are much 
lower, a pilot earns maybe CHF 4,000 or 5,000 a month and with SWISS they earn CHF 
8,000 -12,000 a month or so. 
 
Interviewer: And the lower cost base is a major advantage that disappears if the staff 
demands equal pay. 
 
Andreas Wittmer: Yes. But lets assume Helvetic is a stock rated company. And SWISS 
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buys 51%. Or 100%. But keeps it a separate company - like Lufthansa bought 100% of 
SWISS but left it a separate company, they have different salary structures at Lufthansa.  
 
Interviewer: That could be more beneficial for Helvetic then, concerning their long-term 
survival. Belonging to SWISS rather than relying on the contracts that could be 
terminated at some point. 
 
Andreas Wittmer: Exactly. I mean Edelweiss is one of those. SWISS or basically 
Lufthansa fully took over Edelweiss. But by looking at the incomes of Edelweiss captains 
you see that they are maybe making between CHF 120k and 150k a year, whereas SWISS 
captains maybe  earn CHF 180k to 230k or something. So an A340 pilot of Edelweiss 
earns significantly less than an A340 pilot of SWISS – CHF 50k or 60k less, so that’s a 
good deal. 
 
Interviewer: Say a small airline intends to sell itself. Marks and Mirvis (2010) defined 
five overlapping perspectives in M&A transactions (see below). For a successful 
auction/purchase and later integration where do you see:  
 
Andreas Wittmer: Cost Structure and availability of planes. I mean strategic fit for me 
is the question ‘are you a low-cost carrier or a network carrier’. If it’s a low-cost you are 
not going for it, because of the completely different mind set of people you cannot use 
the employees, and the completely different setup that is hard to change, so you would 
need to keep it as a low-cost carrier. Or you could argue we want to become more cost 
efficient and want to have some people that come from the low-cost business to change 
our culture and our way of thinking. But that would be more difficult. Usually strategic 
fit is more the business model fit, so for me the organizational part seems to be more 
important. People is a big challenge, but I don’t see the issue - so if you have a choice of 
going to a bigger and better airline, while being in one that you know is maybe not going 
to survive without a bigger partner, I think most people see that as an opportunity. I think 
the value of tiers is small because I think in a case of a regional airline everyone is always 
aware that they might lose their job. I guess everyone is rather seeing the benefits of an 
acquisition or of an integration rather than the opposite. Culture is always a challenge. 
But they have the similar industry. I usually look at national cultures, industry cultures, 
and organizational cultures. So national culture, the background of the employees, 
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obviously depends but may not be the major issue in such a case. But the industry culture 
is the same, you have the aviation culture; they have the aviation DNA in their blood, 
they are aviators and all love planes and love to fly and all have this kind of heart for it. 
And they cannot get rid of it. Just yesterday I met a person who said „I’ve considered to 
leave the aviation business but I just couldn’t, because it’s so interesting, I cannot get out 
of this industry.“ So you have this DNA of aviation, independent of what airline you have 
worked for. And that helps because you have a common denominator. So from a culture 
perspective you can say similar industry culture but of course the organizational culture 
might be very different. That’s why I say if you have a low-cost carrier culture, so like 
Ryanair, and a SWISS culture, it might be quite different. That might be a big challenge. 
But that’s probably why Ryanair would not be the target SWISS would look at. But a 
Helvetic, which is a regional airline with a lot of Swiss and German people working there 
that are similarly minded then within the aviation culture this is probably an easy take.  
 
Interviewer: And from the seller’s perspective? 
 
Andreas Wittmer: I think from the seller’s perspective it’s just about ensuring 
sustainable existence on the market somehow and getting the most out of it. The seller is 
the owner of the company and the company owner would like to get as much money for 
a company as possible. So his goal must be to not just sell planes for the depreciated price 
they have in the books but to make sure to get some extra. If you sell your company just 
for the price you have in the books then you lose a lot of money I guess. If the question 
is how much can you charge for the available slots you have at certain airports, that is the 
relevant thing. You have slots at airports at hopefully good times of the day, and there 
you could say ‘ok I sell you my planes and I sell you my reputation and I sell you the 
slots’. That would then give him a hopefully fair price. From a seller’s perspective I just 
see that he want’s to sustainably keep the airline on the market and get as much out of it 
as possible. If we look at Helvetic as an example, Ebner is a professional investor. He has 
invested in Helvetic to earn money with it, and not to play games. So he’s not interested 
in loosing money, but in making money - so if he sells his airline at a certain time, he will 
figure out a way to make money with it.  
 
Interviewer: So in another interview the person mentioned that the staff would be a major 
stumbling block; so that once the deal is announced, the pilots would immediately meet 
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and sign some sort of pact, agreeing to not jeopardize each other’s salaries. Which means 
the cost advantage of the seller basically disappears. How do you perceive this, and what 
could be a strategy for the seller to lower this risk? 
 
Andreas Wittmer: It’s a question of whether the airline buys another airline and keeps 
it as it is or whether an airline buys another airline and changes the brand to its own and 
integrates it all. You don’t need to integrate, you can just buy the airline and leave it as it 
is. And just put it optimally in your network and operate the planes accordingly. It doesn’t 
mean that you have to integrate your people at all. You can have a separate entity. As I 
said, Swiss Global and Swiss International Air Lines are already two airlines, being 
Crossair and Swissair from the past. They just integrated the brands and they had huge 
discussions about the salary structures of the former Crossair and Swissair people, the 
latter earning much more of course. But they were long haul and the other ones short haul, 
that was the argument. Then they put them into two different entities because they wanted 
to have different companies and different salaries and didn’t want that the former Crossair 
people suddenly earned twice as much. So they took care of that in a more or less 
integrated way, but behind there are two different companies, under one brand. And if 
you take Helvetic as a case you could say ok, we merge it with Swiss Global Air Lines 
which is the former Crossair. Or you could just say lets keep it as it is, run it as Helvetic. 
But own it and integrate it better into your network. There’s different ways and 
opportunities of how you integrate. Of course having more brands is more expensive, so 
there’s pro’s and con’s of course.  
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Thomas Krutzler: So I will just elaborate a bit on the topic, and maybe you can integrate 
what I am saying into some of the questions. From my point of view there’s the following 
perspective of consolidation. It is correct that the industry is filled with consolidation, on 
the other hand one has to say that globally there has never been a time with more airlines. 
And the numbers are growing. For me, consolidation is rather a step to buy weak airlines 
at an optimal point in time. Conversely though every year there are more airlines 
operating (globally, A/N). In Europe there are airline groups like Lufthansa group for 
example, but then there’s also single players like Ryanair, EasyJet, or Wizz Air, ordering 
planes as if there were no tomorrow. And they will enjoy much more sustainable growth 
than the airline groups. And that’s also Lufthansa Group’s raison d’être, that they just 
cannot organically grow that much anymore without buying up other airlines. Also very 
important for the European market is the issue of slots. So the issue is securing slots at 
important locations - Ryanair didn’t buy Laudamotion because of fun, but to better 
manifest their position in Germany. So at some point the slots now owned by 
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Laudamotion will belong to Ryanair. Otherwise they would never be able to access 
certain airports due to slot scarcity. So from this perspective, consolidation is ongoing. 
Concerning small airlines, I rather see three different business models.  
 
1) Would be something like we have, so strongly focused on a niche. In addition to that 
we are trying to get flying hours through charter flights, but in essence what generates 
revenue is the niche we are serving. So Altenrhein-Vienna. The advantage for us is that 
we have the airport that can’t be easily served.  
 
2) An example would be Helvetic. So they are relatively dependent on SWISS trough 
wet-lease but also fly routes on their own, also seasonally. They also do charter and ACMI 
(Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance, Insurance, A/N). That works usually quite well because 
through consolidation there’s a tendency that the aircraft are getting bigger and bigger, so 
the growth is generated through capacity. Which means that the lower seat segments 
between 70 and 110 seats or so is being neglected by the big ones. And that’s an 
opportunity for the small carriers, like us.  
 
3) Third example, when talking about regional airlines, could be Adria Airways. They are 
almost doing the same as Helvetic but obviously with a different ownership structure. So 
they are already much more involved with a larger entity. And that means they obviously 
have much fewer competences and are basically just the contractor.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think about small airlines in Europe? What are their 
advantages/opportunities and disadvantages/threats? 
 
Thomas Krutzler: It really depends on your business model, and what you are pursuing. 
It also depends on your ownership structure. I think that with those three pillars on which 
many small airlines in Europe base their business model on, it makes sense, also from a 
economic point of view.  There are regional carriers that only do ACMI. Which from my 
point of view is a very difficult business because you never know in advance how many 
orders you will actually get. So very difficult to calculate, and difficult to predict. An 
advantage could be the mentioned growth in aircraft size and that regional carriers can 
step in.  
 
  119 
 
Interviewer: How about the chances of survival for small airlines in 
Europe/Switzerland? Are they even needed?  
 
Thomas Krutzler: Yes, they are needed. Because I think out of Switzerland it makes 
perfect sense that routes that aren’t necessarily high frequent ones are being served by 
regional carriers. I also think that the chances of survival then are very high. On the other 
hand, one has to admit that the Swiss market is one with a very high purchasing power. 
If you operate as a regional carrier in a low-income country, it can be very hard because 
the costs per seat are obviously much higher with a smaller aircraft. And if you are in a 
market with low purchasing power then it’s difficult to even cover the costs.  
 
Interviewer: But then also a Skywork is struggling; and I mean Berne isn’t really the 
economic center of Europe. Since you are saying that the chances of survival are high, 
how do you see the threat of substitution? So the train, or maybe autonomous driving in 
a couple decades? 
 
Thomas Krutzler: Could obviously happen yes, and substitution too, yes. But I don’t 
think it’ll equal the demand for air travel. Flying isn’t some form of luxury anymore but 
rather a means of transportation for the masses. And I also think that developing new train 
lines is much harder than new air routes, due to infrastructure concerns on the ground. I 
don’t think it’s a big risk for a regional carrier. Skywork simply doesn’t seem to have a 
strategy. Now they’re trying to operate de-centrally, which is very difficult and which I 
would not recommend any regional airline.  
 
Interviewer: In Europe, market fragmentation still offers opportunities for small carriers. 
Do you think the concept of Peoples, and the niche market it serves, shelters it to some 
degree from the big competitive forces at work?  
 
Thomas Krutzler: It also has to do with the general frame conditions - such as the limited 
length of the runway. Only one airline from this DACH region could land here today, 
April 25, 2018 - and that’s Austrian Airlines with it’s Q400. We are operating in a very 
stable niche, the east-west traffic is here but where we meet competition is towards 
Zurich. So Winterthur is a hot topic, we’ve often tried to convince them of the benefits of 
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flying out of ACH. Simply put, if you are unlucky it will take you almost the same time 
to drive to Zurich Airport from Winterthur as driving to Altenrhein. But here you then 
have much shorter processes, no waiting in line etc. So that’s our advantage. On the other 
hand, and that is simply a fact, is that a  Star Alliance simply has a bargaining power that 
we as a small carrier can never match. Still we have a lot of regular customers and we 
have enjoyed quite some growth in the charter area in the last years. So apparently there 
is a market. And I also see potential for us to further grow in this region. We have also 
been thinking if it would make sense to collaborate with Austrian Airlines. We have had 
talks with Austrian - and the result was the following, and there the problems of 
consolidation become apparent. What passengers we attract from this region and 
distribute onto the network of Austrian, basically don’t fly with SWISS. So the entity that 
has something against such a collaboration is the Lufthansa Group - mainly SWISS, but 
ultimately the call came from Frankfurt. So it wasn’t Austrian that had something against 
a collaboration, but SWISS because they want to protect their home market. Apart from 
that we don’t know if it would make sense for us - since on code share connections, the 
amount of the ticket price we would get for the short trip Altenrhein-Vienna would 
definitely be much lower than what we can charge now. So I don’t see it being absolutely 
necessary at the moment. And since we only have regional traffic we have a much higher 
average passenger yield. So in terms of growth we can mainly grow organically through 
for example larger aircraft. And in this respect we are discussing what kind of equipment 
we could operate here in Altenrhein, specifically the Embraer E190 E2. Because the 
flights to Vienna are full. And in the charter more capacity promises more traffic, and 
with a larger aircraft and larger engines you can fly other, lucrative routes.  
 
Interviewer: An there are obvious limitations here concerning the infrastructure - I mean 
to extend the runway is impossible, since on one side there’s the lake and on the other 
there’s the environmentally protected area.  
 
Thomas Krutzler: True, but we also have opportunities concerning the frame conditions. 
For example the opening hours - this also has to do with noise abatement. Basically 
everything that is settled in the Swiss-Austrian bilateral agreements. That limits us very 
much. Easter Sunday - Airport closed. I mean, you see. So we are tackling those issues, 
but that takes a lot of time, and it’s politically difficult to solve.  
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Interviewer: Do regulators in Europe differ from other markets (US, Asia) and if so, 
how?  
 
Thomas Krutzler: I would say the EU regulations on aviation are very strict, so there’s 
basically no other industry that is regulated on such a high level. I recently had to go 
through all the EASA regulations, and you notice, I mean, these are books full of 
regulations and requirements. There are 600 people in Köln, doing nothing else than 
inventing new rules and regulations. And that hinders, to a certain degree, not just us as 
small airline but the overall market development. An in comparison to the US or Asia, I 
mean we are definitely not measured the same way. They are not necessarily less 
restrictive, but more oriented towards competitive markets. Much more open, too. For 
example the project CES - Single European Skies. The concept or idea is very good since 
it looks a lot like what the Americans do, but it cannot be implemented in Europe. Because 
every country still says no, that’s mine or this is up to me etc.  
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the impact of consolidation on: 
 
a. Efficiency in terms of margins 
b. Prices 
c. Diversity of choice 
  
Thomas Krutzler: Well that is really a question of the business model. So generally the 
price pressures are very high. And there’s this example of Zurich - Vienna, formerly also 
served by Air Berlin, apart from SWISS and Austrian. Star Alliance now has a monopoly 
on that route, and has flooded it with capacity, you can basically fly there every hour. 
Now we (Peoples, A/N) also fly to Switzerland, four times a day. What we observed was 
that prices rose, simply due to the monopoly of Star Alliance. But what we also saw was 
that the people compare prices much more often now. So the pressure on price will always 
be there, even if on certain routes there are times of less diversity of choice, such as 
Vienna - Zurich at the moment. But in the long term, the prices will always be under 
pressure. This partly then reflects on diversity of choice, as with all the different prices 
that are being made now, the passenger can select what he wants to pay etc. We as a small 
carrier obviously don’t follow this strategy, we have one price and it includes the entire 
service, but for the big carriers this makes sense, evidently.  
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Interviewer: In the airline value chain (below: Porter’s value chain), what do you 
consider as the most important aspect(s) for efficient value generation?  
 
Thomas Krutzler: I would say there are two important aspects. One is the frame 
conditions. So the political, traffic, and infrastructure conditions. And the other is 
technology. That’s absolutely crucial. Everything else basically follows. So just as an 
example, the new EMB E190 is much more efficient than its predecessor - completely 
new technology. So the technological advancement is decisive in remaining competitive. 
And if the frame conditions bind you, then the best technology will not help you.  
 
Interviewer: Where in this value chain due you think is your advantage as a small carrier? 
Especially to lower the costs and or gain operational efficiency. 
 
Thomas Krutzler: So if we don’t just consider the airline, but the group - the big 
advantage of us as Peoples group is that our staff is basically ‚multi-functional‘. We have 
people they’re first at the check-in, and then switch to the accounting department. Or we 
have people employed both as cabin and cockpit crew. So our efficiency lies in the HR 
or staffing function. Marketing and Sales is always a topic, and these days you can have 
very cheap and efficient marketing. Certain customer retention is important, but equally 
important is that you make use of the tools that are available today and don’t necessarily 
cost a scandalous amount of money. Service we rather plan on investing in, so the cost 
gains from that department are not too great. And operation of course also depends on the 
efficiency of the aircraft etc.  
 
Interviewer: You obviously can’t leverage synergies if you are alone - so unlike 
Lufthansa, who can benefit from group internal logistics etc., you have to organize it all 
yourself. 
 
Thomas Krutzler: Yes, and of course there are many areas which we cannot handle 
ourselves because we are simply too small. For example maintenance, which we buy from 
a supplier that already has this efficiency in-house - for example Lufthansa Group. Or in 
our case it is Laudamotion.  
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Interviewer: In light of industry consolidation, do you think it could be beneficial for 
small airlines to proactively sell themselves on their own terms (from a management point 
of view - before getting taken over or being pushed out by competition), and if so, why? 
What could be possible advantages / disadvantages?  
 
Thomas Krutzler: I think that if you have a business model that is economically 
sustainable, then you are not thinking about selling it. Of course the frame conditions or 
the business environment can change. If you are very dependent or reliable on other 
airlines anyway, or already have very close ties to another carrier, then it’s probably only 
a question of time until you get taken over. There the question arises of when would be 
the optimal point in time to execute such a transaction. It obviously also depends on the 
fleet, or the assets that you can offer. So if you have old planes then that is already not 
very attractive. If you have cheap and efficient staff than that is an advantage, because 
every consolidated group is searching for cheap platforms to put pressure on the 
expensive ones. So I would definitely not dismiss the possibility.  
 
Interviewer: Just as an example, if I am the management of a small airline and I come to 
the conclusion that in the long-term I will probably not survive, even though I have a 
good product and am serving a nice niche. So before holding an auction of some sort, 
what would you say could be KSFs for me to find a buyer, and to maximize the transaction 
revenue? 
 
Thomas Krutzler: Definitely tight organization, flat hierarchies, fast decision making 
and subsequently a favorable cost structure. If you are reliable and have a good service, 
you have something to show, which helps you to leverage your stand point. Adria 
Airways would be an example, I mean they’ve been almost bankrupt for four times or so. 
Now it belongs to an investor that does nothing else but pretty it up and then sell it again. 
So the operational history isn’t too bright. They’ve also not had a clear strategy, basically 
flying around Europe kind of a bit for everyone. In turn of course there are some very 
smart tactics - basically ruining the airline so you have to start over, but without all the 
burdens from the past.  
 
Interviewer: Very last question: Would you say that, sooner or later, you anticipate to 
receive a takeover offer for Peoples? So sooner or later you will face this option anyway.  
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Thomas Krutzler: Yes I do. In the long-term, definitely. The question is more: a buyer 
for the entire group or just for the airline. And if I may give a concluding 
recommendation, then of course to buy the entire group, because it doesn’t make sense 
otherwise (laughs). A large advantage if you are small and independent is also that you 
are not bound by collective wage agreements. And that is of course a large asset. If you 
don’t have that and someone buys you, then you are still tied to those agreements. And 
that is our advantage that we have and that we can leverage, or a Helvetic can leverage, 
or any other small regional carrier on this planet.   
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11.2 Recent and significant mergers and acquisitions in Europe 
 
Buyer / 
Merger Target 
Post 
Transaction Year Deal Value 
 Source 
       
EasyJet Go Fly EasyJet 2003 £374 m €598 m https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2762800/EasyJet-buys-rival-Go.html /  
https://www.n-tv.de/archiv/EasyJet-kauft-Go-article127913.html 
Ryanair Buzz Ryanair 2003 €23.9 m 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/jan/31/money.cheapflights 
Air 
France/KLM 
  separate Brands 2004 €800 m 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/oct/17/theairlineindustry 
Lufthansa SWISS separate Brands 2005 €310 m 
 
http://www.dw.com/en/eu-gives-lufthansa-swiss-merger-go-ahead/a-1640372 
Lufthansa SN Brussels separate Brands 2006 €65 m 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lufthansa-m-a/lufthansa-board-approves- 
brussels-airlines-takeover-idUSKCN11Y1IK 
Air Berlin LTU Air Berlin 2007 €250 m 
 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/handel-konsumgueter/millionen 
geschaeft-air-berlin-kauft-ltu/2788206.html 
Lufthansa bmi separate Brands 2009 £175 m €227 m https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/lufthansa-buys-final-20- 
of-bmi-1796083.html 
Lufthansa Austrian 
Airlines 
separate Brands 2009 €220 m 
 
http://www.dw.com/en/lufthansa-completes-takeover-of-austrian-airlines 
/a-4623031 
British 
Airways/Iberia 
  separate Brands 
(IAG) 
2011 £5bn €6.5bn https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/29/british-airways-iberia- 
agree-merger 
IAG bmi separate Brands 
(IAG) 
2012 £172.5 m €223 m https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/apr/20/iag-bmi-acquisition- 
british-airways 
IAG Vueling separate Brands 
(IAG) 
2013 €123.5 m 
 
http://www.iairgroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=240949&p=irol-newsArticle_ 
Print&ID=1809515&highlight 
IAG Aer Lingus separate Brands 
(IAG) 
2015 €1.5bn 
 
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-tourism/aer-lingus- 
value-soared-by-50-after-purchase-by-iag-1.3319474 
IAG Nikki separate Brands 
(IAG) 
2017 €20 million 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iag-niki/ba-owner-iag-to-buy-insolvent- 
austrian-holiday-airline-niki-idUSKBN1EN1NF 
Lufthansa Air Berlin Lufthansa 2017 €210 million 
 
https://www.ft.com/content/e453d592-e662-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da 
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11.3 Airlines in Switzerland 
 
 
Airline Homebase 
Fleet 
size 
Passengers 
p.a. (2017) 
Category 
 
Sources (all accessed on May 21, 2018) 
SWISS* Zurich 83 17m Mid-sized 
 https://www.planespotters.net/airline/Swiss 
 https://www.swiss.com/corporate/EN/media/newsroom/traffic-reports-
archive 
 
Edelweiss Zurich 15 1.7m small 
 https://www.flyedelweiss.com/de/aboutedelweiss/pages/fleet.aspx 
 https://www.flyedelweiss.com/de/aboutedelweiss/pages/company.aspx 
 
Helvetic 
Airways 
Zurich 12 2m small 
 https://www.helvetic.com/fleet-and-maintenance 
 https://www.blick.ch/news/wirtschaft/helvetic-ceo-tobias-pogorevc-
ueber-lukrative-spezialauftraege-und-seinen-chef-martin-ebner-sie-
koennen-uns-auch-fuer-ihre-hochzeit-chartern-id8132741.html 
Skywork Berne 6 156k small 
 https://www.flyskywork.com/de/unternehmen/profil/flotte 
 https://www.bernerzeitung.ch/region/bern/Nach-dem-Grounding-
investiert-Skywork-Millionen/story/11106040 
 
People’s 
Air Group 
St. Gallen 
Altenrhein 
2 100k Small 
 https://peoples.ch/peoples-airline/flotte 
 https://www.srf.ch/news/regional/ostschweiz/das-unternehmen-
schreibt-schwarze-zahlen 
 
*incl. both Swiss International and Swiss Global Air Lines Ltd. 
 
 
